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In 2011, Yusra lived in Aleppo with her husband and her children. Life had not been gentle 
to her, but she had no desire to leave her place of origin. When she was a girl, she could not attend 
school. She got married very young, but soon her husband died of cancer, and she found herself 
widowed with a boy aged ten, who had to quit school and find a job. She eventually married a 
kind, older man, who gave her a daughter and a son. When her younger children were four and 
two years old, the Syrian revolution began. The police started shooting the protesters, but Yusra 
believed that those events would not last long and that she could continue living life as usual. Then, 
the bombing started. Her daughter, traumatised, gave up talking. Scared for her kids, Yusra left 
Syria for Jordan, while her husband stayed back in Aleppo. They continued to believe that the war 
would not last long. Two years later, Yusra was still in Jordan. She had spent all the money she 
had taken with her and struggled to work. She saw no future in Jordan, nor in Syria, so she turned 
to her husband for a solution. Her husband, who had worked in Germany many years before, told 
her that it was a country that surely protected the rights of women and children. He would have 
helped her to get there. Yusra and her children reached Turkey, were smuggled to Greece, then 
took the Balkan route. They walked for nearly a month, and eventually crossed the German border. 
Four and half years later, she was still living in a refugee shelter. Nevertheless, she told the 
interviewer: “Believe me, if I had to do it all over again, I would” (Pearlman 2017). 
In 1997, Luis Angel was a twenty-three-year-old farmer who lived in the Jiguamiandó 
valley in Colombia with his wife and his children. He was proud of having received a diploma and 
regretted not having had enough money to pursue a university education. However, he was happy 
with his small business and his family life. All of a sudden, his life changed. Operation Genesis 
against insurgent guerrillas had begun. The army and their paramilitary allies began attacking the 
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local residents, accused of supporting the guerrillas, and forcing them to leave immediately.1 Luis 
Angel saw people fleeing barefoot or without a shirt. He also had to leave behind everything he 
owned. What he regretted the most, though, was not having had the time to take his diploma with 
him. His community fled to the Pavarandó area and spent a year and a half living crammed under 
plastic roofs, without any sanitation. Diseases spread, and some of the children died. In 1999, they 
eventually dared go back to Jiguamiandó, only to find their homes destroyed. Moreover, the 
economic blockade impeded returnees from resuming selling crops. Luis Angel and other peasants 
were determined to take back their lands, and they rebuilt some shelters, but in 2001 those shelters 
were burnt down again. Along with economic hardship and the cut of social services in the area, 
intimidations continued to pressure peasants to leave again (NRC/IMDC 2007a). 
These are two real stories of forced migration. Yusra’s story can be easily classified as the 
story of a refugee who has been forced to abandon her country of origin where her life was in 
danger. Luis Angel, by contrast, did not leave Colombia. Forced-migration scholars would 
describe him as an internally displaced person (IDP). To the European public, Yusra’s story would 
sound much more familiar, but the forced migrants who seek asylum in the global North are just a 
minority of those who are forced to leave their habitual place of residence. At the global level, the 
number of people forcibly displaced due to war, conflict, persecution, human rights violations, and 
events seriously disturbing public order has doubled over the last decade. According to the 
UNHCR (2021), the number of forcibly displaced people in 2010 slightly exceeded 41 million. By 
the end of 2020 it had grown to 82.4 million, the highest number on record according to available 
data. Over half of them (48 million) were IDPs, while recognised refugees were slightly more than 
a third (26.4 million), 86 percent of whom were not hosted in the global North. Thus, though the 
public debate and most political theorists’ works concentrate on those forced migrants who arrive 
 
1 On 27 December 2013, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights found the Colombian state guilty of the mass 
forced displacement of 1997, which resulted from the actions of both the army and the paramilitaries of the 




at the borders of Western states, these people are just the tip of the iceberg. This becomes even 
more evident if we consider that UNHCR figures do not include trafficked people (who are coerced 
or deceived into migrating) and those displaced because of development projects, slow-onset 
environmental degradation, and natural disasters. 
The more inclusive is the category of forced migration, the more it becomes blurred. From 
the legal point of view, these people have different statuses. From the sociological point of view, 
some cases intuitively seem to be blatant cases of forced migration, while we might have doubts 
about other cases where coercive external pressure is less obvious. As I will argue, definitions are 
often deeply influenced by their (normative) implications. However, there is little doubt about the 
fact that forced migration exists. The stories summarised at the beginning of the chapter are 
paradigmatic examples of people who were coerced into moving or felt that leaving was the only 
acceptable option open to them because their life would otherwise have been at risk. Of course, 
this does not mean that anyone who decides to migrate because alternative options are non-ideal 
is forced to migrate. If so, no one would migrate voluntarily, given that we do not live in a just 
world, whatever theory of domestic and global justice we adopt. This seems counterintuitive given 
that, as Ottonelli and Torresi (2013) noted, both in ordinary language and in philosophy it is 
assumed that voluntary actions are possible even in non-ideal conditions. A person can desire, 
plan, and actively seek to migrate because leaving home to temporarily or permanently settle 
elsewhere is part of their life plan, is valued as a means to achieve ends worth pursuing, and may 
also be valued in itself. 
Empirical scholars have often proposed to consider migration as a spectrum or a continuum 
(Richmond 1993). At one pole we might imagine situating cases of migration where external 
triggers and background injustice do not play any role at all. At the opposite pole we might imagine 
situating cases where the person is physically moved under duress and their autonomy is 
completely curtailed. Real cases of migration fall in between the two. Cases of forced migration 
involve a significative impairment of individual autonomy. Some of them appear closer than others 
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to the forcedness pole, given that they involve coercion, violence, threat of violence, or deception. 
We might think of cases of human trafficking, and individual or collective persecution. Along with 
these cases, I will also consider as clear cases of forced migration those cases where the option of 
staying would include threats to life and physical integrity. We might think of cases of conflict-
induced migration, but also of cases where the person would be at risk of being tortured, cases 
where the person is deprived of their livelihood and impoverished to the extent that they face 
malnutrition and starvation, or cases where the person is at risk of poisoning (e.g., because of water 
or soil pollution). These are the kinds of cases that I will focus on throughout the next chapters. 
My aim is not to set the precise limits of the forced-migration category. Rather, I will concentrate 
on clear cases of non-voluntary migration to determine what, if anything, makes this sort of 
migratory experience a distinctive phenomenon and whether this has implications for how we 
frame the normative debate on the ethics of migration. 
Migration scholars typically approach migration from the perspective of Western liberal 
democracies, conceived of as destination countries. Thus, migration is predominantly seen as 
immigration. This is evident in normative political theory: the basic question in the ethics of 
migration is “who should get in?” or “how open should borders be?” As a consequence, the issue 
of forced migration has been often framed within the ethics of admission policies: forced migrants 
are the special category of people who should not be excluded when they seek admission, because 
their life or their human rights would be put at risk.  
It is important to make clear that the ethics of admission policies is crucial to provide 
guidance to policy makers under non-ideal conditions: assessing what just admission policies 
would look like is a key component of the broader issue of justice in migration. Moreover, being 
granted or denied admission makes a crucial difference in migrants’ lives. However, as I will argue 
in Chapter 1, the focus on borders and admission to Western countries has some important 
conceptual and normative consequences concerning forced migration. Indeed, the ethics of forced 
migration is usually approached within the frame of the ethics of admission policies. As a result, 
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it is often shaped by previous presuppositions on immigration law and policies concerning 
admissions. Often, theorists assume as a background presupposition the right to exclude, either as 
a principle they endorse (see Miller 2016; Song 2019) or as a real-world fact, which they may 
ultimately find unjust (see Carens 2013) When theorists presuppose the state’s right to exclude 
ordinary migrants, either as an endorsement or as a real-world fact, they are urged to determine 
who are the necessitous migrants who should not be excluded or should be prioritised over other 
admission claimants. Thus, theorists who presuppose the right to exclude are inclined to approach 
the conceptual and normative issues of forced migration as subset of a general ethics of admission 
policies which is influenced by their right-to-exclude presupposition. Furthermore, even those 
theorists who assume that justice requires open borders or a human right to migrate may often 
associate the normative salience of forced migration to the ethics of admissions in a world where 
states have the right to exclude migrants. Claiming that categories such as those of refugee are 
instrumentally used to keep immigration restrictions applying to all migrants who fall outside this 
special category, some of they may go as far as rejecting the normative salience of forced 
migration, both in relation to admissions and besides admissions.2 According to open borders 
advocate Chandran Kukathas, for instance, it makes little sense, either conceptually or 
normatively, to consider refugees “special”. Indeed, he maintains that “the purpose of distinguish 
between refugees and immigrants is to limit the movement of people in a world in which free 
movement is not tolerated.” (Kukathas 2016, p. 257).  
In sum, the very conceptualisation of forced migration is very often burdened by its 
normative implications in relation to admission policies. What is more important, whatever side 
theorists take in debate over open borders, they seem to agree in attributing most of the normative 
salience of forced migration to the existence of border restrictions, as long as migrants, including 
 
2 It should be noted that defenders of open borders may well concede that in exceptional circumstances the state may 
regulate immigration, e.g.in case the number of immigrants or the immigration rate were so high that they caused a 
breakdown in public order or suddenly jeopardised the welfare state (see Carens 2013). Hence, the issue of who should 




forced migrants, are considered qua admission claimants. Indeed, displacement within borders (i.e. 
internal displacement) has been largely neglected in normative political theory. 
The focus on borders and admission also shapes the normative debate who should take 
responsibility for forced migrants and what is owed to them. Normative theorists are usually 
primarily interested in whether states should admit forced migrants when they arrive at their 
shores. Thus, a large part of the normative debate on the ethics of forced migration revolves around 
non-refoulement and burden sharing. Among the key issues, along with the issue of who is owed 
non-refoulement, there is the question of how many forced migrants a state is required to admit 
until it has reached its “fair share”, whether states can trade admission quotas, and whether forced 
migrants should have a say on which state takes them in if they are to be distributed among states. 
Moreover, theorists discuss whether what is owed is temporary admission until repatriation is 
possible or a permanent new membership. While some theorists have begun elaborating on what 
forced migrants are owed before or besides admission, the debate still largely concentrates on the 
ethics of admission (Parekh 2017).  
Lastly, to the extent that forced migrants are seen as a category of admission claimants, 
political theorists often concentrate on to the minority of forced migrants who seek admission in 
the global North, even though the majority of forced migrant are either internally displaced or 
displaced in neighbouring countries in the global South.  
As a result of the focus on borders and admission policies, it is difficult to see whether the 
fact of being forcibly displaced, per se, is normatively relevant and how this shapes what is owed 
to forcibly displaced people. Instead of assuming the perspective of receiving states and 
proceeding from a general ethics of admission policies, I propose to start from the beginning of 
their journey, from their experience of being forced to migrate. Irrespective of whether they face 
closed borders, I wonder whether there is anything morally significative in forced displacement 
itself. Intuitively, we typically consider the fact of being forcibly displaced as an unpleasant 
experience. The first goal of my enquiry is to clarify what is harmful in forced migration. To do 
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so, I pay special attention to cases of forced migration where closed borders are not an issue, so 
that the harms that forced migrants suffer do not depend on being denied admission to a foreign 
country. A phenomenology of forced displacement has crucial implications for normative issues. 
If, for instance, we consider displacement as statelessness—i.e., the fact of “being outside your 
country of citizenship and denied political belonging in your state of residence” (Parekh 2017, p. 
5)—this implies that what displaced people are owed is fundamentally a surrogate political 
membership. By contrast, if, as I propose, we investigate the harms of forced displacement that 
apply even to those who are displaced within their own country, this will lead us to divergent 
conclusions about what is owed to forcibly displaced people. As I will show, this will help us to 
see why, even where there are no closed borders, forced migrants should not be conflated with 
other people on the move. Furthermore, it will also illuminate in what respects the condition of an 
IDP differs from that of non-displaced compatriots even where both groups face severe injustice 
and deprivation. In sum, while my account does not aim to settle the issue of who is owed 
admission, it offers a promising path to rethink what is owed to forced migrants before, after, or 
besides admission. 
This work is divided in two main parts. Part I considers forced migration as a global 
phenomenon in its common features. This inevitably requires abstraction and simplification. 
However, real examples based on qualitative empirical research and quantitative data will be used 
throughout the chapters to illustrate arguments. This first part is composed of four chapters. 
Chapter 1 offers a critical overview of the interdisciplinary debate on what counts as forced 
migration and who is a refugee. It argues that the concepts of forced migration and refugee, as well 
as related alternative notions such as “survival migrants” or “necessitous migrants”, are often 
shaped by the normative aims that such concepts are intended to serve in relation to admission. 
More precisely, it shows whatever side they take in the debate over the ethics of admissions, 
scholars are influenced by the implications that such concepts currently have or would have in 
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relation to admissions, and they seem to agree that the distinction between forced and voluntary 
migration gets much of its relevance from the existence of (normally) closed borders. 
Chapter 2 challenges this view. It aims to explore what is distinctively harmful in the 
existential condition of forced migrants and continues to hold even when forced migrants enjoy 
freedom of movement. Thus, the chapter argues that the concept of forced migration continues to 
be epistemically and normatively relevant even when admission is not an issue, when there are no 
borders (as is the case for internal displacement) or borders have been opened. Referring to 
empirical qualitative works and narratives of forced migrants’ displacement experiences, I argue 
that forced migrants experience four kinds of distinctive harms related to forced displacement. The 
first kind of harm I will consider is a loss of control over one’s body and bodily movement, over 
one’s personal space and belongings, and over one’s immediate future. Secondly, I argue that 
forced migrants lose what I call “the Home environment”: a familiar environment where the person 
possesses sufficient social and cultural resources to perceive their personal identity as meaningful 
and to conceive future plans. This includes human relations, well-known spatial landmarks, and 
predictable cultural and social conventions. Thirdly, I argue that forced migrants do not only 
typically lose their livelihoods and most belongings, but they also suffer a loss of status. Finally, I 
consider the loss of psychological well-being caused by violent and traumatic experiences 
connected with forced displacement. 
Chapter 3 begins to draw normative implications from this phenomenology of the harms 
of forced migration. It suggests that, to understand what is owed to forced migrants, we should 
adopt a backwards-looking, harms-based approach to their needs. This allows us to acknowledge 
that what they need once displaced depends on the specific harms of displacement. Forced 
migrants have distinctive needs to restore the control over their lives that was disrupted by forced 
displacement, to rebuild a “Home environment”, to regain social status and livelihoods, and to 
restore the psychological well-being undermined by violent and traumatic experiences. This goes 
well beyond basic survival needs. Neither mere admission to a foreign country nor emergency 
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humanitarian assistance suffice to meet them. By contrast, the chapter argues, forced migrants 
have a strong moral claim to have these needs met because if those needs are unmet forced 
migrants lack the conditions for a dignified, minimally flourishing life. Thus, the moral claims of 
forced migrants share the same purpose as human rights, although they specifically apply to 
displaced people and are irreducible to human rights. 
Chapter 4 moves to the issue of who is responsible for addressing the specific needs of 
forced migrants and how. The first section of the chapter adopts a harms-based approach to 
responsibility. This leads us beyond a purely forward-looking, humanitarian approach that grounds 
responsibility on a “Samaritan” or beneficiary principle independent from the causes of forced 
migration. Taking the harms of displacement as the point of departure, the approach I propose 
considers whether such harms can be attributed to human actions. I argue that not only states of 
origin, but also external states and non-state actors often individually or jointly contribute to forced 
displacement. While not necessarily morally responsible, they can be held outcome responsible. 
Indeed, forced displacement and the subsequent harms are often foreseeable, though not always 
intended, consequences of either their actions or the structures and processes they contribute to. 
This, I argue, grounds either special (individual) or general (collective) responsibilities to respond 
to the needs of forced migrants as a form of reparation for displacement-related harms. Finally, I 
propose three principles that policies should respect to count as reparations: namely, the 
specificity, continuity, and expressivity principles. This, I will show, has important implications 
concerning the kind of assistance that should be provided to forced migrants both in the short term 
and in the long term, including to the few who are admitted to the global North or return to their 
place of origin. 
Building on the theoretical frame provided in part I, part II explores three case studies. All 
three case studies concern kinds of migration that are clearly non-voluntary, although very 
different. Chapters 5 and 6 consider two kinds of forced migration where borders do not pose an 
issue. Chapter 5 is devoted to forced displacement in Colombia. Colombia is the country counting 
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the largest number of IDPs in the world. Most Colombian forced migrants are IDPs and do not 
face restriction on their freedom of movement, yet their existential condition is clearly different 
from both that of voluntary migrants and that of non-displaced people. The chapter explores 
underlying causes of, triggers of, and responsibilities for forced displacement, shows how the 
specific harms suffered by Colombian forced migrants shape their needs, and underlines the limits 
of current policy approaches that fail to adequately recognise and repair those harms. 
Chapter 6, by contrast, looks at a form of forced migration taking place across borders in a 
regional free-movement area, namely intra–European Union (EU) trafficking for labour 
exploitation. Again, borders do not limit freedom of movement, yet trafficked people are in a 
different situation compared to those who migrate voluntarily, including those who might end up 
in labour exploitation after they have voluntarily undertaken a migratory project. The fact of 
having been coerced or, more often, deceived into migrating has an impact on what trafficked 
people need. Indeed, the chapter argues, trafficked people suffer the same kind of losses suffered 
by other forced migrants, starting with the loss of control, even though they might have ended up 
being trafficked because they wished to migrate. 
Finally, chapter 7 is devoted to the case of forced migration from Syria. The plight of 
Syrian forced migrants has attracted a good deal of attention among theorists, as well as among 
Western politicians, the media, and the public. Indeed, the majority of displaced Syrians moved 
outside their country. While most remained in a neighbouring country, the number of those who 
embarked on dangerous journeys to Europe was remarkable enough to confront European 
countries with unprecedently pressing ethical and pragmatic concerns. Theorists have usually 
approached responsibility for Syrian forced migrants inside a humanitarian frame and have 
concentrated on the issue of admissions and how to relieve the burden on neighbouring host 
countries. The chapter reframes responsibility in a harms-based, backwards-looking approach. 
Moreover, it illustrates how a harms-based approach to forced migrants’ needs allows us to 
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identify shortcomings even in the policy of a European state, namely Germany, that has often been 
praised for its generosity in providing admission and integration to Syrian forced migrants. 
Case studies offer the opportunity to better capture the complexities of forced migration 
and the interplay between common harms and specific contextual specificities. Furthermore, case 
studies allow us to test the limits of theory, highlighting the difficulties of tracing responsibilities 
and of identifying harms and needs as well as the appropriate policy responses. Rather than 
providing a precise checklist of the policies that should be adopted in each of these cases, my aim 
is to illustrate how the normative account proposed in part I helps to reorient political theorists in 
considering real examples of forced migration. Thus, theorists, rather than policy makers, remain 
the primary intended audience. Besides, a space of indeterminacy on how to bridge theory on the 
one side, and policy and practice on the other side, is bound to remain: normative theorists cannot 
adequately fill it. Case studies, however, allow us to bring theory closer to the challenges of 










How Borders Shape the Conceptual Debate on Forced Migration 
 
Normative theorists usually approach the ethical and political issues related to migration 
from the perspective of Western liberal democracies, conceived of as receiving countries. Thus, 
as Serena Parekh has already noted, the ethics of migration is largely reduced to the ethics of 
admission policies. Forced migrants, particularly refugees, come into the picture from this angle: 
since the ethics of admissions “focusses on the question of what moral obligations states have to 
foreigners who seek admission on their countries”, refugees are “thought as one category of people 
seeking admission” (Parekh 2017, p. 51). Most authors use the term “refugee” to designate all 
those foreigners who have such a strong moral claim to admission that it can trump restrictions on 
ordinary admissions. The moral obligations to admit this special category of foreigners seem less 
contested than the moral obligations to let in ordinary migrants; therefore, they are often only 
addressed in brief sections within arguments about immigration (Cherem 2015, p. 1). 
Nevertheless, the conceptual issue of how to define a refugee has gradually attracted increasing 
attention precisely because of the normative obligations attached to such a category. Given that 
special claimants benefit from exceptional treatment in relation to admission, it becomes necessary 
to understand to whom such exceptional treatment should apply, and on what grounds. In sum, in 
political theory the conceptualisation of refugees (or other categories of migrants deemed to raise 
stronger claims to admission) has usually emerged as a consequence of theorists’ normative 
interest in the ethics of admission, and it is influenced by background presuppositions on the ethics 
of ordinary admissions.3 
However, even scholars who approach the conceptualisation of refugees and other forced 
migrants from different disciplines are deeply influenced by the focus on borders and admission 
 
3 As clarified in the Introduction, such presuppositions do not necessarily correspond to the theorist’s own views on 
what justice in migration requires. Even a theorist committed to open borders may adopt states’ right to exclude as a 
background presupposition to develop a theory within that non-ideal frame, as in Carens 2013. 
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policies. Indeed, often non-normative scholars, at least implicitly, assume or contest the normative 
claim that receiving states have a right to unilaterally and discretionarily exclude ordinary 
migrants. Given the mutual influence of normative political theorists and other forced-migration 
scholars, this chapter aims to offer a critical overview of the interdisciplinary debate on what 
counts as forced migration and who is a refugee. The reader who expects an exhaustive survey of 
all definitions provided since World War II, when the issue of forced migration began to be 
politically and legally salient in Europe, will probably be unsatisfied. This chapter will not provide 
a complete historical reconstruction, but rather present some recent and influential views to 
illustrate a specific claim. The point that I want to make is that the forced-migration debate is 
strongly influenced by the focus on admission policies and that the concepts of forced migration 
and refugee, as well as related alternative notions such as “survival migrants” or “necessitous 
migrants”, are shaped by the normative aims that such concepts currently serve or would be 
intended to serve in relation to admission. 
Firstly, this chapter will present the restrictive view of the refugee concept defended by 
those who insist on the distinctive harm of persecution and argue that only those who have lost the 
protection of their state of origin as a result of persecution are in need of a new membership, which 
can only be secured if admitted to the territory of another state. This view, which is mainly put 
forward by legal scholars, insists on preserving the persecution rationale in the definition of 
refugees, as expressed in the Geneva Convention, to keep them clearly distinct from other people 
on the move, including those “necessitous strangers” who could be helped in situ or given 
temporary protection by a foreign country and eventually repatriated.4 
Although a few political theorists defend the restrictive interpretation of the refugee 
concept, most seem to criticise it. Indeed, refugee studies have progressively merged with forced-
migration studies. In the broader interdisciplinary debate on forced migration, the restrictive 
 
4 Michael Walzer, one of the first political philosophers to address the issue, adopted a tripartite distinction among 
economic migrants, refugees, and necessitous strangers (Walzer 1983). 
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refugee definition, made legally binding by the Geneva Convention, is highly disputed. Empirical 
research shows that it is often impossible to attribute migration to a single trigger: migrants move 
for several reasons, which may often overlap, so that it is hard to disentangle political and 
economic reasons as the dichotomy between political refugees and economic migrants implies. 
Many scholars also claim that persecution is an arbitrary basis on which to concede or refuse 
admission, and thus to privilege some individuals over others, because some migrants who do not 
qualify as refugees face equal or even greater threats to their life and well-being. Economic reasons 
may well compel a person to move in order to survive. In sum, it is not straightforward that all and 
only persecuted people are forced to move, while those who apparently move for predominantly 
economic reasons do so voluntarily. Thus, the chapter will be mainly devoted to the views of those 
scholars who reject the restrictive interpretation of the refugee concept grounded on persecution. 
Among the views in this vast and heterogeneous group, I identify two main tendencies. 
The first tendency consists in extending or stretching the refugee concept or adopting an 
alternative, broader concept to subsume other categories of forced migrants, so that more migrants 
could enjoy asylum or, at least, be protected from refoulement and deportation. Scholars who 
follow this first tendency do not reject the distinction between forced and voluntary migrants and 
the fact that forced migrants are special admission claimants. What they criticise is the distinction 
between political refugees who flee persecution and other kinds of migrants who flee desperate 
conditions in their home country, such as generalised violence, famine, and environmental 
problems connected to natural or human-made disasters and climate change. They claim that these 
people deserve admission too, because their basic needs are not adequately met in their country of 
origin, and therefore they should fall into an extended category of refugee or into a new, broader 
category of people that states have an obligation to admit. The basic claim is that all these forced 
migrants are people in distress, and thus they deserve admission, whatever the reason. 
The second tendency, by contrast, is more radical and consists in challenging, 
deconstructing, or even refusing labels or distinctions among migrants. The basic claim is that 
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every category, inclusive though it might be, still excludes those who do not fit the definition. Such 
an exclusion may be deemed unacceptable for both empirical and normative reasons. From an 
empirical point of view, scholars often point out that a sharp distinction between forced and 
voluntary migration is not applicable in practice. What empirical studies show is rather a 
continuum between voluntariness and forcedness, or a multidimensional migration-displacement 
nexus. Thus, artificial distinctions do not adequately reflect reality. Furthermore, several scholars 
seem to implicitly or explicitly express a normative claim against categorising people on the move. 
Indeed, labels have been used for political purposes—namely, to ensure that receiving states may 
legitimately exclude those immigrants who apparently moved voluntarily. While some may find 
such a right to exclude morally acceptable, this is not the case for those scholars who presuppose 
a cosmopolitan, egalitarian perspective on global justice, which would require open borders and 
an equal right to immigrate for both voluntary and forced migrants. 
This chapter underlines a shared assumption among scholars who discuss forced migration. 
Whether they defend a restrictive definition of refugee based on persecution or they reject it to 
either adopt a broader humanitarian one that includes more forced migrants or to criticise any 
distinctions, they all seem to agree that the distinction between forced and voluntary migration 
gets much of its relevance from the existence of (normally) closed borders. What they are largely 
interested in is international forced migration, where forcedness matters in relation to the moral 
and legal constraints on the receiving state’s right to exclude immigrants. In sum, the normative 
implication of concepts at stake (such as “refugee”, “forced migrant”, “necessitous migrant”, 
“survival migrant”, and the like) largely determines the extension and the very existence of the 
concepts themselves. This chapter is interested in highlighting how normative political theorists 
approach the forced-migration issue proceeding from background assumptions on admission 
policies. However, it also aims at situating the views of political theorists in the larger context of 
forced-migration studies, since this allows the reader to see how the focus on borders and 
21 
 
admissions also shapes the broader, interdisciplinary debate on who should count as a refugee or 
as a forced migrant in general. 
 
1. For a Narrow Definition of Refugee: Persecution and Asylum 
An influential and relatively recent defence of a narrow definition of refugee grounded on 
persecution has been advanced by Matthew Price. The introduction of Price’s book Rethinking 
Asylum effectively illustrates how the focus on international borders and on the ethics of admission 
policies frames the discussion on which distinctions, if any, should be made among people on the 
move. Price begins by sketching three stories of forced migrants who had to leave their country 
for different reasons and claimed asylum abroad. Then, he wonders whether these three individuals 
could legitimately be repatriated. If not, they should count as refugees (Price 2009, pp. 1–2). Price 
assumes that states have a right to exclude ordinary immigrants and to deport those who cross 
borders without being authorised, although his aim is not to argue in favour of this ethics of 
ordinary admission. In his three stories, he imagines that “the ordinary avenues of immigration are 
closed to them”. This means that these people have illegally crossed the border of the receiving 
state; nonetheless, they “hope to be granted asylum, an exception to the usual restrictions on 
immigration” (Price 2009, p. 2). The basic normative issue is: should these people be “permitted 
to remain in their country of refuge”, thus receiving “a reprieve from deportation” (Price 2009, p. 
2)? What criteria should determine this exceptional treatment, this “loophole in otherwise 
restrictive immigration policies” (Price 2009, pp. 3–4)? 
As a legal theorist and lawyer, Price looks at the answer provided by international law: 
the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the corresponding 1967 protocol 
state a legal right to seek asylum (and a legal duty not to refoul) anyone who, “owing to well-
founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable 
or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country”. According 
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to Price, the persecution criterion provides a morally legitimate ground to identify who is entitled 
to receive the exceptional treatment of asylum, which implies being allowed to remain in the 
receiving country and eventually acquire citizenship. Indeed, he argues, persecuted people face a 
distinctive kind of harm: they “do not merely experience insecurity; they are targeted for harm in 
a manner that repudiates their claim to political membership” (Price 2009, p. 13). In sum, if the 
(scarce) good at stake is asylum, persecuted people are those who should earn it: asylum “responds 
to the distinctive situation of persecuted people, who have been expelled from their political 
communities, by expressing condemnation of persecutory regimes and by providing a remedy—
surrogate membership abroad—that matches the special harm they have suffered” (Price 2009, p. 
13). 
In a more recent paper, Max Cherem recalls Price’s point to reiterate that “refugees are 
special because persecution is a special harm” (Cherem 2015, p. 9). He makes clear that, while the 
“non-persecutory peril” of other needy migrants can be “addressed at home or in other ways”, the 
“persecutory peril of repudiated membership . . . can often only be durably solved by new 
membership” (Cherem 2015, p. 10). In sum, those who really deserve admission are those who 
flee persecution, and thus this group should be set apart from all other people on the move. 
The fact that the normative implications of the concept precede the conceptualisation 
emerges even more clearly in Matthew Lister’s account of who is a refugee (Lister 2013). Lister 
states that “the question of who are refugees is not analytically distinct from the question of what 
we owe to refugees” (Lister 2013, p. 648). Attempts to address the conceptual question before the 
normative one, in Lister’s view, are methodologically flawed, because “we cannot get a clear 
account of either side of the equation in isolation” (Lister 2013, p. 648). What Lister seems to do, 
however, is build the answer to the conceptual question on the answer to the normative one. His 
aim is to determine “to whom what we owe to refugees (whatever it is) is owed” (Lister 2013, p. 
648). What, then, is owed to refugees? In the paragraph that immediately precedes his 
methodological remarks, Lister has already provided the answer. The “generally accepted duty” 
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(Lister 2013, p. 648) at stake is the duty of non-refoulement, the core of which is a duty to allow 
entrance (the other component being a duty to eventually grant full membership, which, however, 
falls on the international order of states, rather than on the state of first admission). The question 
of who is a refugee, then, is the question of who is the kind of immigrant “whom a state has a 
moral duty to admit into itself, despite whatever other immigration policies the state may have” 
(Lister 2013, p. 647). 
Lister explicitly acknowledges that the answer to this question is strictly dependent upon 
the ethics of ordinary immigration one presupposes. Indeed, those who start from the premise that 
there is a general moral right to free movement within states would answer that states have the 
moral duty to admit anyone. Therefore, Lister clarifies that he assumes that there is no basic right 
to free movement, though he does not argue for that. Analogously to what Price does, Lister too 
needs to rule out the option of evading the question of who is owed an exception to the norm of 
exclusion by challenging its premise (i.e., that states normally have the right to exclude 
immigrants) (Price 2009, p. 2). Lister’s and Price’s approaches suggest that only if we endorse this 
premise will we be interested in finding out what is special about refugees, because we would need 
to determine why states are morally obliged to admit them. 
The answer to this latter question, for Lister too, is that persecution is the special harm 
grounding the obligation to admit, because in the case of persecuted people “their state has not just 
failed to meet their needs but has actively turned against them” (Lister 2013, p. 662). Thus, while 
those who are forced to move because of poverty or because they have other basic needs unmet 
could also (and even more efficiently) be helped without granting them admission, persecuted 
people “cannot normally be helped via aid and development, at least not in a time-frame that will 
do them any good” (Lister 2013, p. 662). The reader may be puzzled to see the centrality of 
persecution fading away in his later effort to include a subset of climate change–induced forced 
migrants in his “wide reading” (Lister 2013, p. 648) of the narrow refugee definition; however, the 
author’s logic seems to remain consistent. Only a subset of those displaced by climate change 
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would qualify as refugees, in Lister’s account: those who can only be helped through (permanent) 
admission to a foreign country, such as the citizens of sinking island states. What could justify 
extending the refugee concept to include this non-persecuted group is the moral obligation to admit 
those whose survival and opportunity to lead a “decent life” could not be secured otherwise, for 
instance by relocating temporarily or permanently within their own country (Lister 2014). 
The alienage condition (i.e., being outside their country of origin) is the second key 
criterion to identify refugees in the narrow Geneva Convention definition. While persecution 
distinguishes those who are owed asylum from other needy migrants who seek admission in a 
foreign country but could be helped at home, alienage distinguishes refugees from IDPs, who, 
despite their refugee-like situation, are still inside their country of origin. IDPs have so far been 
largely ignored by political theorists, since they do not raise admission claims. Moreover, they 
have long been excluded from the scope of refugee studies and only began to gain the attention of 
scholars and policy makers in the 1980s and 1990s. Indeed, refugee studies developed as a mainly 
legal subject and largely in isolation from other emerging forced-migration studies. For legal 
scholars, such as James Hathaway, the fact that both refugees and IDPs have been forcibly 
displaced is a “rather superficial” one compared with the profound difference in their legal status 
and in the prerogatives attached to it (Hathaway 2007). While IDPs are still placed under the 
jurisdiction of their state and legally entitled to citizenship rights, refugees, “by crossing an 
international border, are now within the unqualified protective competence of the international 
community” (Hathaway 2007, p. 353). This means that the international community (of which the 
country of asylum is a representative) is both legally allowed and legally obliged to assume the 
responsibility to protect the human rights of the refugee in place of her country of origin. 
Hathaway’s substantial reasons why refugee studies should be kept separate from forced-
migration studies and why the exceptionality of refugee status should be preserved are, again, the 
persecution trigger for refugees’ move and the alienage condition. However, Hathaway also raises 
a prudential reason to keep the refugee definition narrow and to insist on the fact that Geneva 
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Convention refugees are distinctively different both from other international forced migrants and 
from IDPs. He is worried that subsuming Geneva Convention refugees under the broader forced-
migration concept would in practice undermine the legal prerogatives attached to the refugee 
status, thereby reducing the protection currently granted to refugees. Moreover, if the political 
consensus on refugee distinctiveness faded, he warns, this would allow receiving states to make 
containment policies increasingly morally and legally acceptable. Briefly, if persecuted people 
were considered basically as forced migrants, the entitlement to non-refoulement and permanent 
membership would seem less necessary: they could be helped in their home country or the nearest 
safe country and repatriated as soon as possible. 
The prudential reasons to avoid challenging the refugee definition enshrined in the Geneva 
Convention also resonate in the writings of some theorists who are not convinced by principled 
reasons (namely the persecution rationale). For instance, Luara Ferracioli maintains that an 
expansive legal reform would not be immediately feasible, given the lack of support this would 
have in public opinion and among governments in the global North. She asserts that challenging 
the Geneva Convention is risky and could result in undermining the rights of those forced migrants 
who are currently recognised as refugees. However, she claims that such a feasibility constraint is 
amendable, and that states have dynamic duties to progressively create the conditions to eventually 
expand the legal definition of refugee, moving beyond the persecution rationale (Ferracioli 2014). 
What, then, are the moral grounds for the broadening of the refugee definition? 
 
2. Broadening the Definition: From Refugees to Necessitous Migrants 
In 1985, Andrew Shacknove provided a broad definition that has become probably the 
most influential and discussed definition, among both defendants and critics of the narrow one 
(Shacknove 1985). Unlike nearly all other scholars, Shacknove maintains that the conceptual 
issues of who is a refugee and what refugeehood consists in are separate from and prior to a theory 
of policy and entitlements, which is to say the normative and practical issues concerning moral 
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obligations and their implementation (Shacknove 1985, p. 277). Since he does not begin his 
enquiry from the question of who is owed non-refoulement and asylum, he reaches different 
conclusions from those of defenders of the narrow refugee definition. His question is whether 
persecution and alienage are both necessary and sufficient conditions to be a refugee, and his thesis 
is that they are not. Persecution, he argues, “is but one manifestation of a broader phenomenon: 
the absence of state protection of the citizen’s basic needs” (Shacknove 1985, p. 277). Thus, “the 
same reasoning which justifies the persecutee’s claim to refugeehood justifies the claims of 
persons deprived of all other needs as well” (Shacknove 1985, p. 277). Similarly, alienage is an 
unnecessary condition: what it stands for is the “physical access of the international community to 
the unprotected person”, which need not be obtained by crossing an international border 
(Shacknove 1985, p. 277). 
In Shacknove’s account, “refugees are, in essence, persons whose basic needs are 
unprotected by their country of origin, who have no remaining recourse other than to seek 
international restitution of their needs, and who are so situated that international assistance is 
possible” (Shacknove 1985, p. 277). In sum, Shacknove blurs both the distinction between 
refugees and other necessitous international migrants and the distinction between refugees and 
IDPs. Indeed, he also delinks refugees and migration. He claims that, conceptually, “refugeehood 
is unrelated to migration. It is exclusively a political relation between the citizen and the state” 
(Shacknove 1985, p. 283). Therefore, his definition is so broad that it even blurs the boundaries 
between forced migrants and other needy people who did not migrate but are not adequately 
protected by their state. He states that there is no reason for denying refugee status to those whose 
state does not guarantee “physical security, vital subsistence, and liberty of political participation 
and physical movement” (Shacknove 1985, p. 281), provided that they are within the reach of the 
international community. This latter condition, and not alienage, “is essential for refugee status, 
distinguishing refugees from all other similarly deprived persons” (Shacknove 1985, p. 283). What 
is necessary for this condition to hold is “either the willingness of the home state to allow them 
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access to international assistance or its inability to prevent such aid from being administered” 
(Shacknove 1985, p. 283). 
Scholars who have afterwards provided a refugee definition could not avoid a confrontation 
with Shacknove’s position. His dismissal of the link between migration and refugeehood has been 
largely criticised. According to Matthew Gibney, scholars should “resist the temptation to define 
all threatened people as ‘refugees’ . . . lumping them into a single amorphous category”. In his 
account, “refugeehood is, in a vital respect conceptually related to migration” (Gibney 2004). 
Again, Gibney approaches the issue of the refugee definition from the perspective of Western 
states conceived of as receiving countries facing the question of “which claimants for entry deserve 
priority in admission policies” (Gibney 2004, p. 5). From this background, it is imperative to 
identify what distinguishes the refugee from other foreigners in need. What counts, for Gibney, is 
that “he or she is in need of the protection afforded by short or long-term asylum (i.e., residence 
in a new state) because there is no reasonable prospect of that person finding protection in any 
other way” (Gibney 2004, p. 8). IDPs “may in many cases be helped in situ”. Since they do not 
necessarily need asylum, they fall outside Gibney’s refugee definition, though he does not seem 
to exclude the possibility that they might become refugees eventually, if the only protection avenue 
open to them turned out to be asylum in a foreign country.5 The central claim of the refugee is 
therefore: “Grant me asylum for, if you do not, I will be persecuted or face life-threatening danger” 
(Gibney 2004, p. 8). 
Gibney’s methodological approach (assuming the entitlement to asylum is prior to the 
refugee definition) is analogous to the approaches taken by the defenders of the narrow definition 
presented above. Nevertheless, Gibney agrees with Shacknove in criticising the “arbitrariness of 
using ‘persecution’ as an essential criterion for refugeehood” (Gibney 2018; see also 
Gibney 2014). He goes on to say: 
 
5 He notes that “whether suffering peoples still inside their country of origin can be considered as requiring asylum 
should be determined by taking into account the options available in each case” (Gibney 2004, p. 8). 
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Why should one distinguish between someone whose life or liberty is endangered because they have been 
specifically targeted for bad treatment and someone who, while equally endangered, is escaping the indiscriminate 
violence of civil war? If, as seems plausible, the reason we want a category of people called “refugee” is to identify 
individuals with a need for the protection of a new state, the inappropriateness of this distinction seems obvious. One 
should no more distribute asylum on the basis of why someone is endangered than one should allocate access to 
hospital beds according to how an individual came to be injured.6 
Contra Hathaway, Price, and Lister, he contends that since “both the persecuted and those 
fleeing random or generalised violence may each face death if they stay where they are, prioritising 
one over the other seems unwarranted” (Gibney 2018). Indeed, the refugee definition provided in 
his 2004 book denotes as refugees “those people in need of a new state of residence, either 
temporarily or permanently, because if forced to return or remain where they are they would—as 
a result of either the brutality or the inadequacy of their state—be persecuted or seriously 
jeopardise their physical security or vital subsistence needs” (Gibney 2004, p. 7). 
While narrower than Shacknove’s definition and centred on the purpose of distinguishing 
refugees from other, less worthy admission applicants, Gibney’s definition reflects an expansive 
trend both in the academic debate and in the law and practice of refugee assistance. He observes 
that it is “virtually identical” to the legal definition adopted by the Organization of African Unity 
in 1968, which includes not only persecuted people but also victims of generalised violence caused 
by external aggression, occupation, and foreign domination or victims of events seriously 
disturbing public order, such as famine and natural disasters (Gibney 2004, p. 7). As Alexander 
Betts notes, also the 1984 Cartagena Declaration for Latin America incorporates people “fleeing 
generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violation of human rights or 
other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order” (Betts 2013, p. 14). Moreover, 
broad humanitarian approaches to the issue of who is owed asylum have been echoed by several 
political theorists. David Miller, for instance, defines as refugees “people whose human rights 
 
6 Gibney 2018; see also Gibney 2015. 
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cannot be protected except by moving across a border, whether the reason is state persecution, 
state incapacity, or prolonged natural disasters” (Miller 2016, p. 83). Joseph Carens also claims 
that “to insist that a refugee must be deliberately targeted [for persecution] is a mistake. From a 
moral perspective, what is most important is the severity of the threat to basic human rights and 
the degree of risk rather than the source or character of the threat” (Carens 2013, p. 201). Even 
Gillian Brock, notwithstanding her claim that “in the normative literature, far too much focus is 
on the issue of who counts as a refugee” rather than how they should be protected, also endorses 
this expansive understanding of the refugee definition and the insistence on the severity of the 
threat rather than on its source.7 
Some authors have recently attempted to combine a humanitarian and expansive 
understanding of the non-refoulement and asylum duties with the traditional insistence on the 
distinctiveness of persecution. David Owen has proposed a broad, yet internally differentiated, 
conceptualisation of who is a refugee. Owen’s aim is to identify the point and purpose of 
refugeehood before moving on to consider who is a refugee. Again, the angle adopted is that of 
receiving states, which should act “in loco civitatis”—i.e., “as a surrogate or substitute for the 
refugee’s state” (Owen 2020, p. 50)—and secure the human rights of those admission claimants 
whose state is currently unable or unwilling to secure them. In sum, refugees are all those who 
cannot be refouled, though the obligation to act in loco civitatis does not necessarily entail that 
refugees are owed asylum, if asylum is understood as leading to a permanent membership. A 
temporary protection, in some cases, seems sufficient. Thus, Owen distinguishes three categories 
of refugees on the basis of what they are morally entitled to claim. The category of people owed 
asylum is basically coextensive with the narrow definition expressed in the Geneva Convention. 
Owen agrees with defenders of the narrow definition when he argues that 
 
7 Brock 2020, p. 114. Note, however, that she adopts an internal differentiation within this larger refugee category. 
She focusses on those fleeing violent conflicts, such as the Syrian one, whom she maintains to be in “especially urgent 
need” for protection (Brock 2020, pp. 114–15). 
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being persecuted for one’s religious or political beliefs, or because one is a member of a social group, is a 
distinctive wrong and also a serious harm. . . . The wrong consists in the denial of one’s standing as a member of the 
political community of the state and, hence, in an international order of states of one’s standing as a member of global 
political society. The harm consists in the fact that in being rendered de facto stateless, one is made acutely vulnerable 
both to contingencies of circumstance and to the agency of public or private others.8 
However, he agrees with defenders of the broad definition that all those who are owed non-
refoulement should be counted as refugees, including those who are not targeted for persecution 
and for whom a temporary protection may be a morally appropriate response. Sanctuary refugees 
are those “who are fleeing the generalized violence and breakdown of public order—persons who 
are not targets but rather would fall into the condition of being, as it were, collateral damage” or 
those “that the state is incapable of protecting from persecution by private agents” (Owen 2020, p. 
57). Finally, among refugees Owen includes those who only need a short-term refuge—that is, 
emergency assistance: “The distinctiveness of the case of refuge is that it applies in the context of 
discrete and specific events such as a famine or natural disaster, where a person is so situated that 
she can save herself from the threat to her basic rights posed by the event in question by seeking 
immediate shelter across an international border and that this is her best reasonable option in the 
circumstances in which she finds herself” (Owen 2020, pp. 61–62). 
Sarah Song takes an alternative path. Instead of expanding the refugee definition to include 
all those who cannot be refouled and then differentiating based on what different groups of 
refugees are owed, she opts for keeping the refugee definition restricted to persecuted people while 
including them in a larger category of people owed obligatory admission. Having refuted the 
arguments in favour of opening borders to all immigrants, her question then becomes “to whom 
should the country’s doors be open” (Song 2019, p. 111). Are there any claims that give rise to 
obligatory admissions, rather than to discretionary admission? If so, who are those for whom 
admission is morally required? From this angle, which explicitly builds on a previous ethics of 
 
8 Owen 2020, pp. 54–55. 
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borders and admissions, she claims that “instead of stretching the legal definition of ‘refugee’ to 
include all forced migrants, we should instead extend international protection to other groups of 
forced migrants who, together with refugees, constitute a broader category of necessitous 
migrants” (Song 2019, p. 120, emphasis in the original). 
Alexander Betts’s concept of survival migrants has an analogous underlying logic, though 
its genesis was in fieldwork empirical research rather than theoretical research (Betts 2013). His 
conceptualisation was prompted by the direct observation of a case study: that of Zimbabwean 
forced migrants crossing the borders of neighbouring southern-African states. Those groups were 
fleeing “economic collapse, famine, drought, and generalized violence”, yet “most were not 
recognized as refugees”. According to the UNHCR, they were “in a ‘neither/nor’ situation, not 
refugees but not voluntary economic migrants either” (Betts 2013, p. vii ). Thus, they fell outside 
the legal protection provided by the current refugee system on persecution grounds: receiving 
states were not under the obligation not to return or deport them. However, this seemed to Betts 
ethically untenable. Should not these people have an entitlement not to be returned to their country 
of origin on human rights grounds? How, then, should asylum be allocated, and who is owed it? 
Like several other theorists, he argues that “the existing regime privileges asylum for 
people fleeing targeted persecution by governments over and above those fleeing other serious 
human rights deprivations, even where people may suffer the same threshold of underlying rights 
violations” (Betts 2013, p. 14). From a moral point of view the “gap in rights and entitlements 
available to refugees compared with survival migrants fleeing serious deprivations is arbitrary” 
(Betts 2013, p. 5). Indeed, he points to the fact that the “arbitrariness of distinguishing between 
persecution and other serious human rights deprivations as a cause of displacement” is “implicitly 
recognized” when it comes to IDPs, who are not differentiated on the basis of displacement drivers 
(Betts 2013, p. 5). Extending the refugee definition to groups of forced migrants displaced for 
reasons other than displacement (e.g., climate change refugees) is not a viable option for Betts. 
Firstly, he claims that there is an attribution issue: “In many cases it will be challenging to assign 
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movement to a single cause”. Most importantly, for him, it is not relevant: “If the aim is to identify 
who should be entitled to asylum, then isolating a particular cause of movement is unimportant. 
What should matter for allocating asylum is not identifying and privileging any particular 
proximate cause of movement but rather the underlying threshold of rights that, when unavailable 
in the country of origin, necessitate border crossing as a last resort” (Betts 2013, p. 16). In 
particular, Betts connects survival migration with state failure—i.e., the fact that the state of origin 
is unable or unwilling to protect its citizens’ basic rights, though it is not necessarily persecuting 
them. 
Analogously to those who, like Gibney, favour a broad, humanitarian refugee definition, 
Betts insists that “if one cannot survive or maintain the fundamental conditions of human dignity 
without leaving a country, then distinguishing between persecution and other causes is normatively 
meaningless” (Betts 2013, p. 20). Thus, there is a “strong case for grouping people fleeing 
persecution and people fleeing serious human rights deprivations under a single label”. However, 
unlike Gibney, he prefers to “adopt a new term for the broader category of people who should have 
a normative entitlement to asylum based on human rights grounds” (Betts 2013, p. 22). The 
survival-migration concept, he argues, has the advantage of focussing attention on the fact that, as 
opposed to the restricted subset of Geneva Convention refugees, those who migrate internationally 
to secure their basic needs are not legally entitled to non-refoulement and asylum, nor included in 
any non-binding legal document such as the guidelines on internal displacement. Building on 
Henry Shue’s concept of basic rights, famously applied to refugees in Shacknove’s account,9 Betts 
defines survival migrants as “persons who are outside their country of origin because of an 
existential threat for which they have no access to a domestic remedy or resolution” (Betts 2013, 
p. 23). This existential threat, conceived of as the lack of basic rights of liberty, security, 
subsistence, and therefore the “core elements of human dignity”, is meant to provide the threshold 
 
9 Betts 2013, p. 23. See also Shacknove, p. 281. 
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to determine who are those who are owed asylum. In sum, while clearly starting from the 
normative issue of who is owed asylum and despite endorsing the alienage condition, Betts ends 
up with a concept of survival migrant that reminds us of Shacknove’s concept of refugee. 
An important upshot of the expansive tendency shared by both defendants of a broad 
refugee definition and proponents of alternative concepts (e.g., survival migrant or necessitous 
migrant) is the move “from persecution to deprivation” (Betts 2013, p. 2) as the core element to 
define who are those admission claimants that states are not morally permitted to refoul or deport. 
However, the crucial common ground shared by both the authors who follow this tendency and 
those authors who insist on restricting non-refoulement and asylum to persecuted people is the 
focus on borders and admission policies. As the next section will show, even those who criticise 
any distinction among people on the move and reject their normative salience share this focus on 
borders and admission policies. Indeed, they often polemically denounce how the refugee status 
and other policy-based labels have been instrumental in containing human mobility. Some of them 
may even go as far as seeing asylum as purposefully directed to preserving the right to exclude all 
those who are not entitled to claim asylum. As a result, they tend to call for the deconstruction or 
even the dissolution of any distinction among people on the move precisely because they connect 
the normative salience of such distinctions to the use which has been made of them in relation to 
admission policies.  
 
3. Dissolving Distinctions: From Need to Agency 
Chandran Kukathas (2016) has explicitly challenged the normative relevance of the 
distinction between refugees (whom he also designates as “the displaced people”) and other 
migrants. Again, what is at stake is the purpose that concepts such as that of refugee are intended 
to serve in relation to the ethics of admission policies. He notes that behind the views that describe 
refugees as special admission claimants who deserve exceptional treatment lies “a very strong 
presumption in favor of a state having the right to, and being justified in, limiting entry into its 
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territory” (Kukathas 2016, p. 254). However, as we will see, he finds the thought that refugees are 
special troubling precisely because he refutes this presumption. 
When assessing the Geneva Convention definition of refugee, what strikes him is “who it 
excludes” (Kukathas 2016, p. 256). There is an epistemic and moral issue, he suggests, in giving 
priority to the claims of refugees, because “lives can be at risk in many ways and to varying 
degrees” and “there are also many would-be economic migrants who face greater threats to their 
well-being than do some refugees” (Kukathas 2016, pp. 258–59). He concedes that humanitarian 
broader definitions such as Gibney’s would be preferable, since they are more inclusive, but he 
finds the expansive trend unconvincing: if we “think the definition should be expanded to include 
a greater number of types of displaced people, the difference between refugees and economic 
migrants will be even harder to draw” (Kukathas 2016, p. 259). His main concern, however, is not 
the empirical difficulties in drawing a bright line, but rather the moral justification underlying the 
effort to draw such a line. “The problem”, he points out, “is not the quality of the definition but 
the pursuit of the distinction that gives the definition its point. The purpose of distinguishing 
between refugees and immigrants is to limit and control the movement of people in a world in 
which free movement is not tolerated. If only some are allowed to move, the question is: who?” 
(Kukathas 2016, p. 257). 
Unlike defenders of both narrow and broad definitions of refugee, as well as proponents of 
broader alternative concepts, Kukathas is not interested in identifying whom the state is not 
allowed to exclude because he starts from the premise that global justice requires global equality 
of opportunity, which in turn implies that borders should be open and that immigration restrictions 
are not morally justified. Indeed, he makes clear that current arrangements presupposing that the 
state’s right to control admissions trumps freedom of movement are arbitrary, and that such an 
arbitrariness is “difficult to ignore since the opportunities people enjoy to live reasonably 
prosperous lives in safety differ so dramatically from one part of the world to the next—
particularly when some people are effectively denied the freedom to improve their conditions by 
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moving to places where they might improve their lot. The birthright lottery might be a fact of life, 
but it is difficult to justify” (Kukathas 2016, pp. 264–65). In sum, making distinctions among 
people on the move only serves the purpose of restricting their mobility and of keeping in place 
an arbitrary global inequality by making admission exceptional (and conditional upon proving 
deservingness), the norm being exclusion. By contrast, if “the fate of the wretched of the world is 
something we cannot ignore”, “this means, more concretely, that we should open borders to 
immigrants of all kinds, thus removing the barriers to the free movement of asylum seekers and 
other kinds of immigrants alike” (Kukathas 2016, p. 266). 
Kukathas’s view illustrates once again how political theorists approach the normative 
salience of concepts such as those of refugee, displaced person, or forced migrant from the angle 
of an ethics of borders and admission policies. However, the works of other social scientists and 
migration scholars are also profoundly influenced by the role that such concepts play in providing 
a normative justification for border controls and restrictive immigration policies. While often 
authors’ underlying ethics of immigration is not made clearly explicit, their critiques of labels and 
distinctions express a moral commitment to a view of global justice in which borders should be 
far more open than they currently are. 
Several migration scholars have denounced the proliferation of “bureaucratic labels” 
(Zetter 2007) aimed at containing the movement of undesired foreigners and the “categorical 
fetishism” (Crawley and Skleparis 2017) that treats these labels as if they correspond to discrete 
groups of people that actually exist out there. They have urged academics to avoid uncritically 
adopting policy-oriented labels (Bakewell 2008), and to raise awareness of the constructedness of 
categories that “do not simply represent or reflect the world but simultaneously create and limit it” 
(Crawley and Skleparis 2017, p. 60-61).They try to denaturalise categories, such as that of refugee 
or forced migrant, and to de-label people on the move, showing that people also move across those 
categories and that the complexity of empirical reality challenges the efforts to simplify, classify, 
and manage human mobility. 
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These works clearly express the first of the two concerns advanced by Kukathas: making 
clear-cut distinctions among people on the move is empirically difficult, and thus it is morally 
troublesome to privilege one category over another in admission policies. Migration scholars often 
refer to the image of a continuum to describe the spectrum of cases that exist between the two 
extremes of coerced and voluntary movement (Richmond 1993), or they speak of a migration-
displacement nexus to insist on their being not completely separable. 
Koser and Martin defend the introduction of the migration-displacement-nexus concept to 
illustrate “the increasing complexities of migration and displacement; the growing [empirical] 
difficulties of distinguishing among the two; the misalignment between existing labels, categories 
and constructions and migration realities; and the consequence of falling into legal, normative and 
institutional gaps” (Koser and Martin 2011, p. 2). More precisely, the nexus arises because 
individual migrants often move out of mixed motivations, use similar migratory routes despite the 
variety of triggers behind their move (thereby creating mixed flows),10 adopt similar coping 
mechanisms, and change their legal status or fall in different analytical and bureaucratic categories 
over time or even fit in more than one category at the same time (Koser and Martin 2011, p. 4–6). 
Oliver Bakewell (2011) suggests that difficulties arise because terms like those of migration and 
displacement may be used to denote a process, a subjective condition, and a status, but these three 
senses are not usually disentangled. Focussing on migration as a process (i.e., as a succession of 
actions), however, challenges remain in distinguishing why individuals and groups move (the 
motivations) and whether such migration could be described as voluntary or as forced. 
Anthony Richmond crucially contributed to making the device of the continuum influential 
in forced-migration studies. In his account, “there is a continuum between the rational choice 
behaviour of proactive migrants seeking to maximize net advantage and the reactive behaviour of 
 
10 The related concept of “mixed migration” points precisely to the fact that, during their (often irregular) journey, 
refugees and other migrants face similar risks and have similar needs, despite the variety of motivations behind their 
move. See how the concept is understood by the Mixed Migration Centre (MMC 2020). The increasing currency of 
the term “mixed migration” among policymakers and practitioners was already remarked in Van Hear et al. (2009) 
over a decade ago. 
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those whose degrees of freedom are severely constrained. . . . The large majority of international 
migrants (including those generally regarded as ‘refugees’) fall somewhere between these 
extremes” (Richmond 1993, p. 10). Rather than being simply pushed by a single trigger, reactive 
migrants’ move is shaped by a combination of structural constraints, precipitating events, and 
enabling circumstances, where macro-level political, economic, and environmental factors may 
interact with micro-level individual characteristics. Richmond’s account rejects dichotomic 
approaches, but it is not meant to conflate all people on the move. Indeed, before proceeding to 
sketch a typology of reactive migrants, he writes that 
examples of typical proactive migrants include professionals, entrepreneurs, retired people and temporary 
workers under contract. Also proactive are spies, defectors and politically motivated movers in what Kunz calls the 
‘anticipatory’ stage. Reactive migrants include those who meet the UN Convention definition by having a genuine 
fear of persecution and being unwilling or unable to return, but may also comprise others reacting to crisis situations 
caused by war, famine, economic collapse and other disasters.11  
However, the larger debate on the relationship between individual agency on the one side 
and structural determinants on the other side has further challenged even the attempts to account 
for a complex and blurred distinction between forced (or reactive) and voluntary (or proactive) 
migration.12 Some authors have pointed out that all migration is a reaction to structures.13 For 
instance, according to Stephen Castles, 
understanding that forced migration is not the result of a string of unconnected emergencies but rather an 
integral part of North–South relationships makes it necessary to theorize forced migration and link it to economic 
migration. They are closely related (and indeed often indistinguishable) forms of expression of global inequalities and 
societal crises, which have gained in volume and importance since the superseding of the bipolar world order.14 
From this angle, the distinction between forced and voluntary migrants fades, as even 
voluntary, or so-called economic, migrants turn out to be significantly affected by structural 
 
11 Richmond 1993, p. 11. 
12 On agency and structure in migration theory, see Bakewell 2010. 
13 This point has been advanced in particular by “structuralist Marxist theorists who challenge the conception of 
voluntarism or agency in workers’ migration responses to global capital of flows” (Reed et al., p. 610). 
14 Castles 2003, p. 17. 
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constraints and by push factors in their decision to migrate. At the same time, several authors have 
insisted on the fact that all migrants, including refugees and other displaced people, express 
agency. David Turton, among others, makes this point when he claims that 
by trying to separate out categories of migrants along a continuum of choice—free at one end and entirely 
closed at the other—these schemes are in danger of ignoring the most important quality of all migrants and indeed of 
all human beings: their agency. Richmond’s choice of ‘proactive’ versus ‘reactive’ migration makes this very clear: 
he is classifying people as those with agency and those without agency, forced migrants being those with little or no 
agency. But . . . even in the most constrained of circumstances, human beings struggle to maintain some area of 
individual decision making. . . . Also, even at the most ‘reactive’ or ‘involuntary’ end of the continuum, people 
probably have a lot more choice than we might think—or than this model allows us to think. They may have choices 
not only about whether but also about when, where and how to move which cannot be encompassed by continua of 
this kind.15 
Indeed, he remarks, “to migrate, when applied to human beings, implies at least some 
degree of agency, of independent will. To migrate is something we do, not something that is done 
to us” (Turton 2003, p. 11, emphasis in the original). As migrants, and thus as agents, forced 
migrants should be regarded as “purposive actors—as ordinary people” capable of “agency against 
all odds” (Turton 2003, p. 12). To the victimising and dehumanising picture of forced migrants as 
supplicants in need of refuge, authors who emphasise agency oppose the image of forced migrants 
as first and foremost migrants, people who actively react to adverse circumstances by moving and 
by defying restrictions on mobility. 
The latter aspect—the insistence on the fact that refugees and other displaced people, 
analogously to other migrants, express their agency by defying borders and labels imposed on 
them—shows how the focus on borders, and the implicit normative presuppositions of the 
legitimacy of free movement and alien exclusion, also profoundly influence authors who do not 
adopt a normative approach to the issue of forced migration. Along with an explicit concern about 
the empirical soundness of categorising migrants, from the works of several migration scholars 
 
15 Turton 2003, pp. 9–10. 
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also transpires a less explicit resonance with the second concern expressed by Kukathas: all 
categories include members while excluding non-members, the purpose of categorising migrants 
is only to differentiate and discriminate between justified and unjustified movement, and this is 
unjust. This presupposes an ethics of immigration in which the state’s right to exclude and select 
immigrants is not assumed to be morally justified. 
A moderate and veiled critique of the right to exclude may be found in papers such as that 
of Bivand and Oeppen, who insist on the similarities between the condition of a man who would 
be likely to be recognised as a refugee and that of a man whom a receiving country would easily 
classify as a voluntary (and irregular) migrant on the basis of his nationality, where the differences 
basically derive from (arbitrary) labelling and legal-status attribution. While the authors do not 
dispute the legitimacy of excluding immigrants, they lament the fact that in the public debate it is 
not politically permissible to ask “the obvious question—what if border control was not the 
primary focus, but rather the lives of those in desperate humanitarian circumstances?” (Bivand and 
Oeppen 2017, p. 995). This does not necessarily imply that the authors envisage open borders, but 
at least it suggests that humanitarian obligations should be more extensive and weightier than they 
currently are, while the right to control borders should be given less prominence. A clearer 
normative position is assumed in papers like that of Crawley and Skleparis, who claim that a 
critical engagement with policy categories that misrepresent migratory processes is imperative, if 
what migration scholars ultimately want is “to challenge the use of categories to exclude and 
contain” (Crawley and Skleparis 2015, p. 60, emphasis added). This seems to suggest that all 
forms of movement should be legitimate and no one should be prevented from immigrating. 
An even stronger rejection of any distinction among people on the move based on a 
rejection of the sovereign power to exclude emerges from the approaches of those scholars inspired 
by postcolonial studies and by the biopolitical philosophical tradition. Again, migration (and 
forced migration in particular) is approached from the perspective of Western receiving countries. 
Thus, the focus is on the minority of migrants that attempt to cross their borders. The only forced 
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migrants that come into focus are asylum seekers who, given the lack of legal ways to be admitted, 
come as irregular migrants. As the concept of the migration-displacement nexus tries to convey, 
forced migrants and voluntary irregular migrants often travel along the same routes, rely on the 
same smugglers, and try to avoid being “captured” by the border officials who try to deter them 
from accessing the global North.16 As such, forced migrants are basically indistinguishable from 
other irregular migrants: both express their agency as actors that defy the limits imposed on 
mobility and that subvert the international order of sovereign states where nationality earned at 
birth should determine their place in the world and their life chances. According to Sandro 
Mezzadra, what migrants have in common is “the claim and the practical exercise of the ‘right to 
flee’ from objective factors”, including “poverty, hunger, famines, political and social 
dictatorships, environmental disasters”. Emphasising the right to flee, he argues, allows us to 
overcome, on the conceptual level, the distinction between migrants and displaced people that has 
already been undermined by recent “objective” developments (see Mezzadra 2006, p. 76, my 
translation). 
More radically, Papadopoulos and Tsianos, who defend the autonomy-of-migration view, 
argue that 
even if migration starts sometimes as a form of dislocation (forced by poverty, patriarchal exploitation, war, 
famine), its target is not relocation but the active transformation of social space. By being embedded in broader 
networks of intensive social change, migration challenges and reconstitutes the sovereign population control which 
functions solely through the identification and control of individual subjects’ movements.17 
From their perspective, irregular migrants, including asylum seekers, are far from being 
passive victims deprived of political agency because they are de facto stateless. Quite the contrary: 
their being deprived of citizenship rights makes them political agents—more precisely the avant-
garde of a new, postnational and postrepresentative subjectivity. They state, “Instead of being 
 
16 Border controls are described as capture machines in a 2009 issue of Mondi Migranti. 
17 Papadopoulos and Tsianos 2008, p. 225. 
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perceptible, discernible and identifiable, current migration puts on the agenda a new form of 
politics and a new formation of active political subjects whose aim is not to find a different way 
to become or to be a political subject, but to refuse to become a subject at all” (Papadopoulos and 
Tsianos 2008, p. 229). In this picture, forced migrants are not moving to find asylum; what 
migrants, qua migrants, claim is not membership, the “right to have rights”, but a right to move 
freely—a “right not to have rights” (Oudejans 2019), to not belong somewhere, to be 
“imperceptible” (Papadopoulos and Tsianos 2008, p. 229), to not be identified, classified, or 
represented. In sum, migration reveals itself as “one of the biggest laboratories for the subversion 
of liberal politics”, particularly of the “ideal correspondence and congruence of people and 
territory” as the core principle of national sovereignty (Papadopoulos and Tsianos 2008, p. 231). 
What’s more, they conclude, “within a theory of the autonomy of migration inspired by the 
philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari, migration is the paradigmatic driving force of the new 
postliberal sovereignty” (Papadopoulos and Tsianos 2008, p. 234). 
One may thus think that, if a just world  had open borders, or no borders at all, there would 
be no need to differentiate among voluntary and forced migrants. At least, there would be no need 
for a refugee status to be played as a “trump card” to “avoid the usual rules of migration control” 
(Hathaway 2007, p. 354).18 Normally, it would not be either necessary or morally legitimate to 
distinguish and classify people on the move in order to assess the strength of their moral claim to 
 
18 A historical approach to the institution of refugeehood, such as that offered by Owen (2020) clarifies that asylum 
(and the refugee status in its political picture) has an important function of protection against political extradition. 
This function would still be relevant even in a world of open borders unless we assume that all states perfectly 
complied with principles of justice, which is not usually assumed in open borders theories. Indeed, the etymology of 
asylum (from the Greek term asylon) expresses the idea of immunity. In pre-Westphalian Europe, such immunity was 
initially offered inside states, by the Catholic Church, against prosecution from secular authorities. The role of asylum 
provider was only progressively assumed by states, leading refugees to seek protection internationally (see 
Mastromartino 2012, pp. 13-19). Besides, until the end of the 19th century, the right to exclude was not a commonly 
accepted principle in international law (see Itzcovich 2013, p. 442), and international borders remained largely porous, 
given the state inability to control movement and even provide identity document. Thus the right to seek asylum did 
not historically develop as a breach in the wall of closed international borders (see Owen 2020, p. 18). My point, here, 
is just to underline that, since the refugee status is currently assumed to be first and foremost a “trump card” against 
the rules of immigration restrictions, defenders of open borders are inclined to dispute its salience in a world where 
such restrictions are normally impermissible (as clearly illustrated in Kukathas 2016). Again, this depends on the focus 
of the public and academic debate on migration being posed primarily on borders and admissions.  
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admission, given that states would not be legitimately permitted to exclude or select immigrants 
(more precisely, they might only be permitted to do so in exceptional circumstances). Ceasing to 
be special claimants, refugees and other forced migrants might seem not to be special at all. As 
Kukathas puts it forced migrants’ interests (qua migrants) are served by opening borders, just as 
the interests of voluntary migrants (Kukathas 2016, p. 255). As I will argue, though, if we consider 
forced migrants qua displaced people, rather than qua admission claimants, we clearly see that 
they have special normative claims besides admission claims, which still hold when they do not 
face borders restrictions. In other words, moving the focus off borders helps to highlight the 
normative relevance of forced migration beyond the ethics of admission policies. 
 
4. Forced Migration beyond the Debate on Borders: A Methodological Note 
This chapter has argued so far that the conceptual debate on what counts as forced 
migration and who is a refugee is strongly influenced by the focus on international borders and 
admission policies. Admission policies are particularly salient for normative political theorists. 
Indeed, the ethics of admission policies is crucial to provide guidance to policy makers under non-
ideal conditions, and the issue of how open the territorial and membership borders of states should 
ideally be is highly relevant for a theory of justice in migration. However, the focus on borders 
and on admission to Western countries has some important conceptual and normative 
consequences when it comes to conceptualising forced migration. The extension and normative 
relevance of forced migration and other related concepts are usually influenced by the function 
that such concepts have played, or would play, in relation to admission policies. Secondly, the 
normative debate on what is owed to forced migrants largely concentrates on the obligation to 
provide at least admission and a temporary safe haven, and admission to citizenship for those who 
cannot return. Furthermore, to the extent that forced migrants are approached as special admission 
claimants, the normative debate largely focuses on  the minority of forced migrants who seek 
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admission in the global North, rather than on those displaced to neighbouring countries in the 
global South and neglects the millions of forced migrants who are internally displaced. 
Therefore, it is hard to see whether the fact of being forcibly displaced, per se, has any 
moral relevance at all. Does it make any difference for a migrant if migration was actively chosen 
and pursued as part of their life plan, or if by contrast they had little control over whether, when, 
and how to move? Is it the case that the only purpose of such a concept is to “limit and control the 
movement of people in a world in which free movement is not tolerated”, as Kukathas (2016) puts 
it? Does the issue of voluntariness and forcedness lose all normative significance where freedom 
of movement is not an issue? 
Ottonelli and Torresi have made an important attempt to provide “a definition of 
voluntariness that is independent of, and prior to, the definition of the normative weight of 
migrants’ claims” (Ottonelli and Torresi, p. 794). A key upshot of their work is the idea that how 
voluntary or forced a person’s migration is should not depend on the normative work that these 
notions then play in the ethics of admission policies. They provide four necessary and sufficient 
conditions for migration to be voluntary. Firstly, for migration to be voluntary it “must not be 
caused by physical or psychological coercion”. Secondly, “a migration project is voluntarily 
undertaken only if the available alternatives at home are good enough for the migrant”. Thirdly, 
“exit options, that is, actual options to change one’s immigrant status,” should be available. 
Finally, migration should be undertaken on the basis of adequate information (Ottonelli and 
Torresi, pp. 796–804). Given this set of conditions, they show that, even in the current, non-ideal 
world, it is not true that all migration is unwanted and not voluntary: at least some people move 
because migration is part of their life plan. 
From Ottonelli and Torresi’s conceptualisation it is also possible to derive the conclusion 
that at least some migrants do not move voluntarily, because they are coerced, or deceived, or not 
appropriately informed, or had no other acceptable option in the country of origin or could not 
come back. However, we should not infer that all migration that does not meet a list of necessary 
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and sufficient voluntariness conditions is involuntary, in the sense that the migrant does not have 
any agency at all. David Bartram raises this point when claiming that some Geneva Convention 
refugees express a key form of agency in rejecting an (morally unacceptable) alternative that would 
have obliviated the need to flee (Bartram 2015). For instance, they could have given up their 
religion or political belief or accepted conscripted armed service comparable to forced labour such 
as the Eritrean armed service. But they actively rejected that option. Thus, Bartram argues, their 
choice to migrate was not involuntary, though it was a forced one, given that the alternative option 
would have entailed the violation of one or more human rights. Indeed, we should avoid the 
“agency trap” (Manocchi and Marchetti 2016), the assumption that to be forced, migration must 
not involve any agency at all and that if a forced migrant displays agency, then they are basically 
in the same boat as a voluntary migrant. 
My aim, in the following chapter, is to explore forced migration as a condition, to enquire 
what makes the fact of being forcibly displaced distinctive and whether the concept of forced 
migration is normatively relevant even when there are no closed borders. Analogously to Ottonelli 
and Torresi, I attempt to avoid being biased by the assumption of a prior ethics of what is owed to 
forced migrants. Thus, I do not focus on the condition of forced migrants when seeking admission 
at the borders of a foreign country, nor look at forced migrants through the lenses of legal/illegal 
immigration, which would conflate the consequences of being forcibly displaced with the 
consequences of mobility restrictions. Unlike Ottonelli and Torresi, though, I do not aim to provide 
a definition of what forced migration is, or the conditions for migration to be non-voluntary. I do 
not begin by assessing under what conditions a choice, an action, or a condition is (or should be) 
deemed “forced” in political theory and then apply such conceptual clarifications to the choice to 
migrate, the act of migrating or the condition of being a migrant19. By contrast, assuming that 
 
19 This methodological approach would have been analogous to the one adopted by Ottonelli and Torresi, who build 
the criteria to determine when migration is voluntary on the idea that the understanding of voluntariness in migration 
should be consistent with the understanding of voluntariness in other areas of political theory. 
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forced migration exists, the object of my enquiry is the lived experiences of forced migrants 
themselves and my goal is to assess what, if anything, makes forced migration distinctive and 
normatively relevant beyond the debate on admission policies.  
For the purpose of this enquire, it is not necessary to provide a policy-oriented clear-cut 
separation between forced and voluntary migration that would readily make each migrant fall into 
one of the two categories.  I assume a sociologically grounded conception of migration as a 
continuum, where at least some migrants appear to be, to a varying degree, closer to the forcedness 
pole rather than to the voluntariness pole. In other words, I assume the existence of a broad 
category of cases where migration appears to be non-voluntary. The limits of such a category are 
blurred, empirically difficult to draw, and contested. This broad non-voluntary side of the 
continuum comprises the cases where Ottonelli and Torresi’s voluntariness conditions do not 
obtain. I take the extension of such a category to be variable upon the meaning we might give to 
the “good enough” alternatives to migration, as well as to the “adequacy” of information that a 
migrant should possess to migrate voluntarily. However, I assume that, among such non-voluntary 
cases, there are cases that clearly count as cases of forced migration. When exploring the existential 
condition of forced migrants, I will focus on this more restricted set of largely uncontroversial 
cases of forced migration.  
A minimal definition of forced migration, I argue, can be identified based on coercion and 
deception criteria. Migrants are forced to migrate when they are coerced into leaving their place 
of origin, either by physical force or by threat of force, violence, or harm to physical integrity and 
survival. I do not assume this kind of coercion to be limited to human agents: a natural disaster 
may threaten physical integrity and force people to migrate. In the case of slow-onset 
environmental degradation, although migration can be initially voluntarily undertaken as an 
adaptive strategy, it counts as forced when survival and physical integrity are at risk, e.g., when 
the only available water is poisoned. Extending coercion to non-human external forces is 
consistent with the definition of forced migration assumed by the International Organisation for 
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Migration in its 2011 glossary: forced migration is described as a “migratory movement in which 
an element of coercion exists, including threats to life and livelihood, whether arising from natural 
or man-made causes” (IOM 2011, p. 39). This is the case of many people who are described as 
conflict-induced, environmentally induced or development-induced forced migrants, as well as 
many persecuted people. These forced migrants are still capable of exercising some agency over 
their flight. For instance, they may decide to remain in their country or undertake onward 
migration. Yet, their agency is exercised as a reaction to the coercive forces that have disrupted 
the usual background life conditions in such a way that staying would have been impossible or 
would have put their survival and physical integrity at risk. Thus, while defining migration as 
“involuntary” seems oxymoronic, the cases we are considering here are clearly not voluntary 
either. They may be defined, in Richmond’s terms, “reactive”20.  
In addition to coercion, deception is a second useful criterion to identify blatant cases of 
forced migration. Although the precise amount of information that a migrant should possess to 
migrate voluntarily is debatable, a person is clearly forced to migrate when they are deceived into 
migrating by someone else. Here, information is not merely insufficient or imprecise, but false and 
purposefully misleading. Moreover, deception is essential in motivating migration: the person 
would not have taken that migratory project had not received false information, though they might 
have wished to migrate. This is the case for those trafficked people who, as we will see, are 
persuaded into migrating and thus do not need to be coerced into moving. Indeed, the legal 
definition of trafficking explicitly mentions both coercion and deception.  
Bearing in mind this fairly narrow definition of forced migration, I intend to turn to the 
interdisciplinary debates in diverse fields of forced migration studies, such as conflict-induced, 
environmentally induced and development-induced forced migration, as well as trafficking in 
 
20 Draper (2021) has recently described the movement of internally displaced people as reactive, pointing to the “rapid 
disruption of background conditions of stability” that this movement involves. In his view, reactive migration is a 
subset of the “involuntary” one, which seems to correspond to the broad category of non-voluntary migration I 
sketched above based on Ottonelli and Torresi’s voluntariness criteria. 
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human beings. Since my aim is to investigate what is peculiar about the existential condition of 
forced migrants, I include both those forced migrants who cross international borders and those 
who remain inside their country of origin. In scholarly literature and in public debate the term 
“migration” usually refers to migration across borders. By contrast, “displacement” is more often 
used to denote the forced movement of people within a country. However, I will use forced 
migration and forced displacement interchangeably. Indeed, I consider internal displacement as a 
form of forced migration, which involves some agency on the migrant, though a very constrained 
one. Moreover, both international and internal forced migrants are displaced, since they are forced 
to abandon their habitual place of residence and are deprived of their routines, reference points, 
means of subsistence, social relations and so forth. I will use the expression “internally displaced 
people” (IDPs), to refer to those forced migrants who have not crossed an international border. 
This is consistent with the non-alienage-based definition provided by the UN Guiding Principles 
on Internal Displacement21. I do not assume non-alienage to be in itself relevant to the enquiry 
over what is normatively distinctive in being forced to migrate. Yet, it is epistemically useful to 
specify when we are discussing cases of people displaced within borders because it allows us to 
note that the harms experienced by IDPs do not depend on closed borders. The next chapter will 
adopt a phenomenological approach to the experience of being forced to migrate. I will make 
extensive reference to empirical work, privileging qualitative research and life stories that illustrate 
how individuals come to be forcibly displaced and how forced displacement impacts their lives. 
As a result, I will identify and illustrate a set of distinctive harms, which are related to being 
forcibly displaced, are common to both IDPs and internationally forced migrants and do not derive 
 
21 According to the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, internally displaced persons are “persons or groups 
of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular 
as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human 
rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border.” 
(Deng, 1999: 484). Drawing on Shacknove’s influential refugee definition, Beaton (2020) argued that those internal 
forced migrants who cannot recur to their home state for protection (i.e., persecuted ones), should be recategorized as 
refugees since they are owed refuge as well. However, I set this proposal aside because I am not distinguishing forced 
migrants based on their legal status and moral rights. My attempt is precisely to explore what forced migration is 
before turning to what is owed to forced migrants. 
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from closed borders. Only afterwards, in chapters 3 and 4, I will consider the normative issue of 
what is owed to forced migrants qua displaced people, rather than qua migrants tout court, irregular 
migrants, or victims of human rights violations.  
As Serena Parekh already argued, phenomenology can complement analytic normative 
theorising by providing a deeper understanding of what displacement concretely means for those 
who experience it (see Parekh 2017, p. 9). In other words, it contributes to avoiding misplaced 
idealisation of the phenomenon at stake. More importantly, I aim to show that a preliminary 
phenomenology that unearths the distinctive harms involved in forced migration also allows 
theorists to reorient the approach they adopt when dealing with normative issues. Once we have 
seen that the specific plight of forced migrants does not start in camps or on the route towards the 
global North, we are better able to grasp why forced migrants do not merely need humanitarian 
assistance or admission to a country that protects basic human rights. Thus, we will be led towards 
a more backwards-looking normative approach that accounts for those harms that make forced 
migrants’ moral claims different from both those of migrants who have not been displaced and 
from those of non-migrant people in need. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have argued that, in political theory, the conceptualisation of refugees and 
other categories of non-voluntary migrants is deeply influenced by the ethics of admission policies 
that the theorist defends or assumes. Even outside normative theory, scholars’ approach to forced 
migration is influenced by their implicit ethics of admission policies. I have identified a common 
assumption among scholars who debate forced migration. They may defend the distinctiveness of 
persecution as a ground for a narrow refugee definition or they may refuse it in favour of a broader 
one while still accepting that states have a right to exclude immigrants; they may even reject the 
right to exclude and thus refuse classifying migrants based on the urgency of their claim to 
admission. In all three cases, they approach forced migration from the angle of the ethics of 
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admission policies and they share the assumption that the forcedness of migration concept is 
normatively salient to the extent that those migrants seek admission in a foreign country having 
closed borders.  
In the last section of the chapter, I have sketched a methodological approach to assess the 
normative relevance of the forced migration beyond the debate over admission policies. I have 
proposed to explore the condition of those forced migrants who are clearly forced to migrate, since 
their movement is compelled by coercion or deception, to assess what makes their condition 
distinctive compared to that of voluntary migrants and to that of non-migrants. I have proposed to 
concentrate on those distinctive harmful experiences that do not depend on borders being closed, 
thereby avoiding being biased by a prior ethics of migration policies. This brings into light the 
experiences of internally displaced people, who have largely been overlooked in the ethics of 
migration. I have claimed that a phenomenology of forced migration is not only epistemically 
useful to deepen and refine our theoretical understanding of the phenomenon at stake. It also has 
important normative consequences since it allows theorists to reframe their approach to what is 
owed to forced migrants based on the specific harms involved in forced migration. The next 
chapters will adopt this methodological perspective. Chapter 2 will provide an exploration of the 
harms involved in forced displacement which make the concept of forced migration normatively 
relevant even when closed borders are not an issue. Chapters 3 and 4 will then discuss what is 




The Grounds of the Forced-Migration Concept 
 
The first chapter argued that the interdisciplinary debate on forced migration is shaped by 
the focus on borders and admission policies. Though scholars do not usually make this link 
explicit, their use of terms such as “refugee”, “internally displaced person”, and “forced migrant” 
depends on the broader ethics of immigration they endorse. Therefore, how forced migration is 
conceptualised is highly dependent on previous assumptions concerning sovereignty, the scope 
and strength of receiving states’ domestic and global obligations, and their right to control 
immigration. This is not surprising: since the world’s surface is entirely divided into sovereign 
states, each of them meant to be primarily responsible for its own nationals and for its own 
territory, obviously territorial borders matter in assessing responsibility for forced migrants. The 
focus on borders explains why the international community usually concentrates on refugees rather 
than on IDPs.22 There seems to be no trouble in identifying which state is responsible for IDPs: 
they are still inside the territory of the state they belong to. The problem with refugees, by contrast, 
lies precisely in the fact that they move outside the jurisdiction of their country of origin and cannot 
be returned because the country is unwilling or unable to meet their basic needs. To restore the 
legitimacy of the world order, another actor must act “in loco civitatis” and provide for refugees 
(Owen 2020). However, for the receiving state, admitting refugees into its territorial borders—and 
eventually into the political borders of the demos when they become eligible for citizenship—
entails a demographic change, which has economic, social, cultural, and political consequences. 
Unlike regular voluntary migrants and analogously to irregular voluntary migrants, forced 
migrants are not invited to come. But, unlike irregular voluntary migrants, refugees cannot be 
legally “returned to where they belong”. This is the background for the conceptual debate on who 
 
22 This is reflected in the ethics of migration. Political theorists’ works revolve around international migration, while 
domestic migrations have not stirred debates. Not only internal displacement but also voluntary domestic migrations 
have been largely overlooked. 
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is a refugee and the normative debate on which states are responsible for refugees. The more 
comprehensive is the definition of refugee, the higher is the number of refugees and thus the 
heavier is the burden to be shared among states. 
As we have seen, some scholars however reject the concept of refugee or forced migrant 
altogether, because they challenge the assumption that receiving states have normally the right to 
refuse entry to non-nationals trying to settle temporarily or permanently inside their territory. They 
claim that freedom to immigrate is a human right and that justice in migration requires borders to 
be normally open. If so, there is no need for receiving states to distinguish between refugees and 
voluntary migrants, because every foreigner is entitled to admission. Briefly, it seems that the 
salience of the distinction between forced and voluntary migrants is conditional upon the existence 
of restrictive admission policies. 
The aim of this chapter is to show that the epistemic salience of the concept of forced 
migration is not dependent on the lack of freedom to move. Even where there are no closed borders, 
I will argue, forced migrants experience distinctive harms and have distinctive needs they would 
not have, had they stayed put or had the moved voluntarily. The chapter explores the harms that 
forced migrants experience qua forced migrants, which are common to both international forced 
migrants and internal forced migrants. Such harms distinguish forced migrants from both 
voluntary migrants and non-displaced victims of human rights violations.  
As the following chapters will illustrate, shifting the focus from borders and admissions to 
why and how forced migrants are compelled to move and to the harms and needs resulting from 
displacement allows us to broaden and to enrich the scope of normative theorising. In fact, it allows 
us to underline the similarities between the condition of the international forced migrant and the 
condition of the IDP. Furthermore, it allows us to highlight the complex transnational and 
structural causal responsibilities for forced displacement, including internal displacement. Finally, 
it shows that freedom of movement is not sufficient to compensate for the harms that forced 
migrants endured and to respond to their needs after displacement. 
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The chapter is structured as follows: section 1 provides an extensive phenomenological 
exploration of forced displacement experiences to identify what makes them harmful. Section 2 
focusses on forced migration in both real-world free movement areas and in counterfactual 
scenarios to illustrate the claim that the salience of the forced migration concept does not depend 
on borders being closed, and that what fundamentally characterizes all forced migrants, compared 
to voluntary migrants, is not the moral force of their claim to admission in case they reach an 
international border.  I do not aim to deny the importance that freedom of movement and admission 
policies have, but rather to show that an exclusive emphasis on them obfuscates why forced 
displacement is harmful, while voluntary migration is not, and that the harms of forced migration 
are prior to the additional ones that may derive from closed borders. 
 
1. Why Forced Migrants Are Special: The Distinctive Harms of Displacement 
It is not an easy task to isolate from the empirical literature what makes the existential 
condition of forced migrants distinctive: firstly, because there is no clear-cut separation, but rather 
a continuum between forced and voluntary migration; secondly, because some harms are currently 
experienced by voluntary and forced migrants alike, while others are shared by both displaced and 
nondisplaced populations; thirdly, because some are not shared by all forced migrants. In other 
words, some distinguishing criteria might be too vague and broad, or not broad enough. As the 
first chapter illustrated, a single but inclusive forced-migration concept is difficult to delineate if 
grounded on political persecution, sheer need, or general human rights violations. 
Extended as it might be, political persecution does not seem to immediately fit cases of 
displacement induced by natural disasters, environmental degradation, or development projects, 
although all such triggers may indeed have a greater impact on individuals who belong to 
oppressed groups or may offer useful pretexts to justify the permanent relocation of such groups. 
While the purpose of the refugee definition is to identify those individuals who cannot be 
legitimately refouled when they physically arrive at a foreign border or apply for resettlement, 
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when we zoom out and bring all displaced people into the picture, wherever they are, political 
persecution alone seems a less sound criterion to account for the harms of all such people who 
have not moved voluntarily. 
Need and general human rights violations, however inclusive, are not sufficiently precise 
to capture what is peculiar about being a forced migrant. Consider first humanitarian grounds. 
Forced migrants who do not meet the persecution criterion may be no less endangered than Geneva 
Convention refugees. Other forced migrants can be so destitute that they migrate to survive 
(Betts 2013). It has been argued that, when people claim admission because their life would 
otherwise be in danger, it seems unjust to prioritise those who flee political persecution over them. 
Based on humanitarian grounds, it seems sounder to prioritise admission claimants on the basis of 
the needs’ urgency, as happens with the sick and injured awaiting treatment in a hospital; there, 
those with the most urgent needs are treated first, regardless of the cause of their injuries 
(Gibney 2015; see also Song 2019, p. 118). However, humanitarian approaches have been 
criticised for offering a misleading picture of the forced migrant. To fit the expectations, the forced 
migrant has to be as destitute, helpless, and passive as possible, like a starving innocent child. 
Ironically, the political dissident who has been the ideal type of the refugee since the French 
Revolution does not seem to have anything to do with the humanitarian refugee.23 In reaction to 
the victimising portrayal of the forced migrant as the perfect humanitarian-aid recipient, several 
scholars have emphasised the agency that forced migrants proved capable of exercising, even in 
highly constrained situations. For some, this leads to dissolving distinctions between forced and 
voluntary migration. Briefly, when insisting on need it seems difficult to determine how needy the 
forced migrant should be to be a genuine forced migrant, compared to a voluntary migrant. 
Moreover, if we consider IDPs, need alone does not seem a reliable criterion to distinguish between 
the displaced and non-displaced populations. Many people do not have their basic needs met and 
 
23 For a historical reconstruction of the humanitarian and political grounds of refugeehood and how they progressively 
merged, see Owen 2020. 
54 
 
would be entitled to humanitarian assistance, without being displaced. However, it seems 
implausible to assume that a person who has been compelled to leave their house, region, or 
country is in the same existential condition as a desperately poor non-displaced person. 
When it comes to human rights, our attention might be captured by the gross violations 
that migrants suffer during their dangerous journeys, when they move as “irregular” or 
“unauthorised” migrants. Consider the cases of torture and arbitrary detention perpetrated by both 
state officials and non-state actors. Consider also the cases of migrants refouled without having 
had the chance to apply for asylum, or those stuck on a crowded boat for several days because the 
closest state’s authorities do not allow them to disembark. These harms are very serious. However, 
they do not result from displacement itself, but rather from a border regime that restricts legal 
admissions and incentivises the demand for smuggling and the use of unsafe routes. Moreover, 
they may also affect people who decide voluntarily to migrate, as part of their life plan, as long as 
there is no chance to obtain legal admission. Finally, forced migrants do not necessarily travel in 
an irregular way; forced migration can exist even in free-movement areas. Briefly, the plight of 
irregular migrants does not seem to perfectly overlap with the plight of forced migrants. If 
something marks forced migrants, then, perhaps it has to do with the human rights violations which 
happened in the place they came from. Unlike humanitarian, need-based grounds, human rights 
grounds do not undermine forced migrants’ agency and seem better suited to apply also to political 
dissidents from authoritarian states: they are not necessarily poor and destitute, they might be 
persecuted as a result of having consciously performed certain acts, but they had been denied 
fundamental human rights. An academic, such as the sociologist Alfredo Molano, who fled 
Colombia for Spain after having received death threats from the paramilitaries (Molano 2013, p. 
17), rightly appears to be in a different condition compared to an academic who moves to a foreign 
university which offered them a better position than their current one. However, if we consider 
human rights violations in the country of origin as distinctive of the forced-migration experience, 
we are not able to highlight why an IDP is in a different condition compared to a non-displaced 
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person whose human rights are routinely violated. Indeed, many people suffer human rights 
violations without being displaced. Imagine an Afghan woman who was denied the right to 
education by the Taliban regime, denied the right to work, and forbidden to leave her home without 
a male guardian. Is not there any change in her existential condition if she also finds herself 
displaced in a refugee camp some hundred kilometres away from her village, after having fled an 
armed conflict? There seem to be some additional harms she has undergone, apart from the 
previous harms she already suffered before displacement. 
In the next subsections, I explore some harms and wrongs that affect forced migrants as a 
result of displacement, which they would not have experienced if they had migrated voluntarily. 
To illustrate some points, I refer to case studies in the forced-migration literature and to a few oral 
testimonies and narratives. Let me thus add a brief caveat on the use of narratives. Life stories are 
necessary subjective; they are often messy, incoherent, emotive; they may be consciously or 
unconsciously affected by the narrator’s aim of meeting the interviewer’s expectations, by the 
interviewer’s bias, and by the editor’s goals. Therefore, caution is needed in drawing conclusions 
from life stories. The few subjective stories I will refer to are not meant to be generalisable to all 
forced migrants, but to give voice to some lived experiences and to offer empirically grounded 
examples instead of purely hypothetical examples of idealised displaced persons. 
 
2.1. Losing Control 
Being forcibly displaced involves a loss of control over one’s own person. The displaced 
person does not lose their autonomy altogether: they may react or resist external intrusion, yet they 
typically experience some form of coercion24 that compels them to move or imposes physically or 
morally unbearable costs if they remain where they are. They have no acceptable alternative but 
 
24 In chapter 1, I have defined forced migration based on coercion and deception criteria. See chapter 1, section 4. 
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to move, although the move was not desired, planned, or prepared and they might not know where 
they are going. 
A displaced person can experience different forms of loss of control. The most acute is 
probably the loss of control over their body (which includes the body’s physical movement in the 
space). In fact, the loss of control over one’s body undermines the basic self-confidence which 
allows a human being to recognise themselves as a separate individual whose body parts have 
precise and interpersonally recognised contours and who retains exclusive control over how to use 
their body, how to move it in the space to perform actions. According to Axel Honneth’s theory, 
physical violence entails the most severe kind of social misrecognition a person may suffer, 
because the loss of control over one’s body “does lasting damage to one’s basic confidence . . . 
that one can autonomously coordinate one’s own body” (Honneth 1995, p. 132).  
This is particularly evident in cases of deportation and trafficking. Deported people are 
physically moved from one place to another. Often, they don’t know where they are heading to. 
Therefore, to the loss of control over their body, a loss of control over their immediate future is 
added. Deportation is an efficient way to massively relocate people while also causing severe 
physical and mental stress to the deportees. When the journey happens in very hard conditions, it 
can be a form of torture itself (think of the Jewish deportees during World War II or the minority 
groups deported across the USSR during Stalin’s regime or during ethnic conflicts). Trafficking is 
a more complex matter. It may involve different kinds of coercion, to varying degrees. In some 
circumstances, coercion takes the form of actual physical violence or threats of physical violence. 
This is how Angela described the way she was transported by car from Romania: “He hit me on 
my lips, which started bleeding. . . . Then he grabbed my hair and pushed me into the car. I 
screamed and told him I would jump from the car . . . but he had immediately locked the car doors 
and when I tried to open a door he said: ‘Look, if you don’t behave yourself, I’ll take my gun and 
kill you.’ I tried to figure out how to escape. We were still in my homeland and there were no 
policemen in the streets, nobody could hear me screaming or punching the doors. . . . It was 5 in 
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the morning. . . . I kept crying and screaming, and he would turn and hit me on the face . . . again 
and again . . . and I would cry” (Abbatecola 2018, pp. 71–72, my translation). In other cases, 
during the journey itself violence is not needed, because coercion takes the form of deceit: the 
trafficked person had been promised a regular job, for instance as a fruit picker or as a waitress at 
a bar, and they consented to move. However, on arrival, they find out that by consenting to migrate 
they incurred a debt they must repay through forced labour. For instance, they are told that they 
are expected to work in the sex industry, and, if they refuse, they undergo physical violence or 
psychological violence—e.g., the threat that their loved ones will be killed or hurt. 
It is true that forced labour involves separate harms on its own: it is not necessary to be a 
forced migrant to suffer them; non-migrants or voluntary migrants too may experience forced 
labour. However, in the case of trafficked people, the loss of control begins during the coerced or 
deceit-induced move, which is finalised to the protracted deprivation of control during the 
subsequent exploitation of the trafficked person’s body or work. Thus, for trafficked people, sexual 
and labour exploitation is particularly harmful, because it reinforces the loss of control over their 
body at the moment of their move. Losing control over one’s body can be a traumatic experience, 
and trauma may be even greater when displacement is followed by slavery, torture, rape, or other 
kinds of physical and sexual abuse, which all involve a loss of control over one’s body. For those 
displaced people who are not physically or psychologically coerced into migrating or deceived to 
get them to do so, the loss of control over their body is less obvious. However, if we consider 
bodily movement, a loss of control is visible whenever moving is the only possible or acceptable 
option, and when the option of heading back is impossible or unacceptable once the move has 
started. 
A second important kind of loss of control involved in forced migration concerns control 
over one’s most intimate belongings and one’s private space. Intrusion in one’s private space is 
particularly painful, because such a sphere of privacy around one’s body and place of habitual 
residence is perceived as constitutive of one’s personhood and dignity (Ottonelli 2020). The 
58 
 
largeness and the exclusivity of this space are culturally variable, but some sphere of privacy is 
nonetheless needed by human beings. We expect others not only to keep a proxemic distance from 
our body, but also to keep away from the place where we live, independently of whether we own 
it, or from its monetary value. Consider the case of the Italian mayor who cleared the shelter of an 
old homeless person who used to live in the street. This action provoked widespread moral 
indignation, although what was removed were only dirty blankets and the homeless person could 
not demonstrate any property right to the footpath he slept on. As the mayor pointed out, it is 
unpleasant for residents and tourists to see dirty, smelly stuff on the streets. However, we might 
feel that the homeless person had some moral justification in expecting their blankets to be still 
there where they left them and that they were somehow harmed when those blankets were removed 
without their consent. When someone is displaced, they lose control over that private space, and 
this is harmful.25 If displaced people end up in a precarious shelter, which can be demolished or 
evacuated anytime, this further perpetuates the sense of insecurity, unsafety, and uncertainty that 
displacement provoked in the first place. Moreover, if they have to move to a collective, crowded 
shelter, this is an additional harm, because it perpetuates a lack of necessary privacy and proxemic 
distance between them and the other residents. It is interesting to note how forced migrants in 
refugee camps try to re-create a private space inside or around their shelter and to erect barriers to 
delimit such space and protect it from strangers’ view. Consider Zaatari camp, in Jordan, which 
has gradually become a sort of city. Inside this camp, many forced migrants did not simply inhabit 
the caravans; they often dismantled and reassembled them to create an internal courtyard, as is 
common in Arab houses, and separate rooms for the various members of the family.26 
A third crucial way in which displacement undermines a person’s control concerns time. 
Although voluntariness is a matter of degree, and there is a continuum between voluntary 
 
25 On the importance of control over one’s home space and the sense of powerlessness provoked by displacement, see 
Nine 2017, particularly pp. 14–16. 
26 A. Dalal, unpublished PhD thesis. See also Dalal 2020. 
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migration and forced migration, a promising angle to evaluate the voluntariness of the move is to 
consider how it fits in the person’s life plan. Unlike voluntary migration, forced migration involves 
losing control over one’s future. In some cases, displacement is abrupt and unexpected 
(Gürer 2019, p. 7). It comes as a sudden, shocking disruption of the person’s usual routine, and it 
makes future life plans collapse at once. The most obvious examples are displacements triggered 
by extreme natural disasters, such as earthquakes, tsunamis, hurricanes, floods, and so on. 
However, the decision to flee a war zone or individual persecution may also be a sudden one, 
although the person may have endured an unsafe and uncertain existential condition for a while, 
until it has become unbearable. 
Even when not sudden, forced displacement is unplanned.27 There are cases where 
someone else might have planned it, but it was not part of the displaced person’s life plan. Consider 
cases of evictions for land acquisition and development projects. In the worst cases, the undesired 
settlers are made to leave the land under the threat of violence, without them knowing exactly what 
is going on; this seems to be the case for many displaced peasants in Colombia. In better cases, 
the affected population is informed about the land acquisition and may be relocated to a new site. 
However, even when informed, often the population has not previously been consulted. They may 
undergo the epistemic injustice of not being deemed worth consulting, because they are thought 
to be unable to understand or because the place they live in and the way they live are not considered 
valuable.28 Briefly, they must consent to move when they are told to; if they do not, they are seen 
as acting in an irrational and unreasonable way. 
 
27 One might argue that the displaced person, particularly if they have experienced deprivation and violence their 
whole life, may well have been planning to migrate. Yet, the point is that displacement disrupts their plans anyway. 
One or more events intervene and compel them to move. They are not in control of the time and of the modality of 
the move as they would have been if they had migrated according to their plan. Even in the case of a person who has 
always lived in a situation of deprivation and violence there is typically something that, at some point, makes 
alternative options unacceptable. This triggering factor undermines the person’s control over their life plan, even when 
that life plan included migrating. 
28 On development-induced displacement, see Oliver-Smith 2010; on the misrecognition affecting indigenous and 
nomadic groups which makes them vulnerable to dispossession and forced displacement, see Kingston 2019. 
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Consider now the case of migration induced by gradual degradation of a person’s 
livelihood. For instance, desertification and soil or water pollution are two factors that contribute 
to slow-onset environmental degradation and eventually lead to displacement, concerning 
primarily farmers, fishermen, and cattle breeders.29 Those who migrate for these reasons are 
usually considered economic migrants and thus voluntary migrants. However, while in some cases 
migration can be one of several possible adaptive strategies to provide an additional source of 
income and allow the rest of the family to stay, in other cases survival is at risk and entire groups 
have to leave their place of residence. For them too migration comes as a disruption of their life 
course: the alternative to migration would involve starvation or poisoning. 
As anti-sedentary mobility scholars rightly point out, human beings are not naturally rooted 
in one place.30 Migration can indeed be desired and chosen. Moving can be a constitutive 
component of someone’s future plan. When this is the case, there is a continuity in time throughout 
the life course, and migration, which might be either permanent or temporary, sometimes repeated 
or circular, can be a normal component of this path. However, there are cases in which migration 
clearly involves a disruption of the person’s life plan. Forced migrants are resilient agents and not 
passive victims; therefore, they may well react to such an event, make choices, act, and rework 
their life plans. Nonetheless, forced displacement marks a painful discontinuity in time and an 
experience of undermined autonomy, rather than an empowering choice. What is problematic 
about forced migration is not movement itself, but rather the loss of control over whether migration 
will be part of one’s future and over when and how movement happens31. 
 
29 See Afifi 2011 for a detailed discussion of environmental degradation and migration in Niger. 
30 Malkki denounced a sedentary analytical bias in anthropology and the social sciences in general; see for instance 
Malkki 1995. For a discussion of the later debate, see Jansen and Löfving 2009. 
31 To counter a sedentary bias, however, we should not assume immobility to be problematic either. Indeed, both 
movement and immobility are problematic to the extent that they are not voluntary. Schewel (2020) has recently 
decried a mobility bias in migration studies, pointing to “an overconcentration of theoretical and empirical attention 
on the determinants and consequences of mobility and, by extension, the concomitant neglect of immobility”. 
Immobility, she argues, can result from both aspirations to stay put and constraints to the capability to migrate. On the 
disempowerment deriving from “involuntary immobility”, see Lubkemann 2008. 
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This section has argued that, unlike voluntary migration, forced migration involves a loss 
of control. Losing control is a harm, and it would still be even in the counterfactual ideal world 
where forced migration would only be triggered by natural causes and no human responsibility 
would be at stake. In a non-ideal world, though, when forced to lose control over one’s body, 
immediate environment, and immediate future, displaced people are not only harmed but also 
wronged by the human agents who are causally involved in such an outcome. The issue of whether 
causal responsibility for forced migration results in reparative responsibility will be considered in 
depth in chapter 4. For the time being, it suffices to note that, although in principle forced migration 
is not necessarily a product of unjust actions or unjust human-made structures, this is usually the 
case in our world. Furthermore, it would still be the case in a non-ideal open-borders world, as 
long as such a world were not perfectly just. 
Ottonelli argued that control over one’s body and personal space provides the moral 
grounding for the human right to stay (i.e., the human right not to be displaced) (Ottonelli 2020). 
If so, losing such control constitutes not only a harm but also a violation of a specific human right, 
a violation which is distinct from the human rights violations that forced migrants might 
experience before or after displacement. Previous alternative groundings for the right to stay 
stressed the special emotional attachment people have for their home and country, or to the fact 
that the most important interpersonal relations and the most important life plans lie in the place of 
origin (see for instance Oberman 2011). Ottonelli argued that such approaches suffer from a 
sedentary bias and provide a poor ground for the right to stay. In fact, even those people who do 
not feel any particular attachment to the place they live in and those who belong to destitute or 
marginalised groups who have the fewest life opportunities in their place of origin nonetheless 
suffer the violation of the right to stay. In other words, the violation of such a right to stay cannot 
be conditional upon the existence of meaningful social relations, cherished life plans, or strong 
emotional attachment to the place one is forced to leave (Ottonelli 2020). 
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I agree with Ottonelli’s critique of attachment-based and located-life-plan-based arguments 
as an appropriate ground for the human right to stay, but I object that this leads her to undermine 
the importance of being in control of one’s life plan. I argue that losing control over one’s life 
plans is one of the key kinds of control loss involved in displacement. This is not to say that the 
life plan which was disrupted was the best possible life plan a person could have, just because it 
included that person staying put in the immediate future. Imagine a poor young man who lives in 
a remote rural area in a country in the global South. He has no running water, rationed electricity, 
and no internet connection at home. Suppose he had been denied the right to education and he has 
been working the land and breeding sheep from dawn to sunset since he was a young boy. It is a 
hard life, and he might get a better one elsewhere. Perhaps he hates this life and hopes that he will 
save or borrow enough money to migrate within some years. Or, perhaps, he is used to it, and his 
future life plan just includes continuing to lead this life, get married, raise his kids in that village, 
and age and die there, as his father did. Anyway, if next month his village is attacked by an armed 
group and he is forced to flee in the middle of the night, or if his land is expropriated and he is 
evicted, or the course of the meagre river which provides him with water is diverted and he loses 
his paddock and flock, his life plan is disrupted. Even if he wished to migrate, this is not the way 
he would have chosen to leave his house and his village, had those external factors not intervened. 
Briefly, what matters is not the content of the disrupted life plan, but rather the fact that this was 
his life plan. 
Furthermore, as Ottonelli makes clear towards the end of her paper, the loss of control and 
the violation of the right to stay grounded on control cannot account for all harms and wrongs 
involved in forced migration. The strength of conceiving of the right to stay as a control right, she 
argues, lies precisely in its independence from the moral value that place has to the displaced 
person. Nevertheless, the particular place from which a person is displaced does matter: 
displacement from that place can entail additional individual and collective harms, which are not 
reducible to the loss of control and thus to the violation of the right to stay. In the next subsection, 
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I will explore one of these harms, which, I suggest, could be described as the loss of the “Home 
environment”, broadly conceived of as a familiar environment (which is more extended than one’s 
private space but does not necessarily correspond to the territory of a state) where a person 
possesses sufficient social and cultural resources to perceive their personal identity as meaningful 
and to conceive future plans. 
 
2.2. Losing One’s House and “Home Environment” 
Forced migrants are compelled to abandon their place of habitual residence—a house or a 
more precarious shelter—and most of what the place contains (including gardens and crops). This 
is a material loss. Moreover, it is also psychologically traumatic. Losing one’s house is perceived 
as a long-lasting harm for many displaced people, and some continue to dream of regaining 
possession of that specific house, even when they have been displaced for several decades. As 
Smit notes, “Palestinians wearing keys to their homes of origin around their necks, and Greek 
Cypriots hanging photos of their homes of origin in the front entrances of their current dwellings, 
are powerful depictions of these sentiments” (Smit 2012, p. 101). This moral harm applies also to 
those who do not hold legal property rights to their place. In some countries, lands are collectively 
owned by the state, and residents never officially acquired legal title to it. Private property is not 
a necessary condition for a place to be one’s own home.32 
A house, as a physical structure, can itself be mobile. What counts is that even a mobile 
house (such as a tent) is situated in a larger and more stable geographical, social, and cultural 
background which includes usual mobility routes and provides a degree of continuity in the life 
course. This background provides a “Home environment”, the loss of which can be even more 
harmful than the loss of the house. Consider a case of displacement in a nomadic context: the 
Hawawir tribes in Sudan. The Hawawir are Muslims and Arabic speaking, like the majority of the 
 
32 As noted by Penz et al. (2011, p. 171), “Clearing people from land on which they rely for their livelihood causes 
hardships, whether or not the tract from which they are cleared is their property.” 
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population in the Northern regions of Sudan. However, the Hawawir are nomads who live in the 
Bayoda desert, describe themselves as a tribe composed of multiple (mostly endogamous) 
subtribes, and have their own social and juridical organisation. Traditionally, their livelihood 
primarily consists in the nomadic herding of camels, sheep, and goats. Nomadic pastoralism is 
also supplemented with seasonal (internal) labour migration and trade. Since the mid-1980s, severe 
droughts have caused the Hawawir to lose their cattle and compelled them to abandon the desert, 
disperse, and settle in the outskirts of various towns in the Nile valley. According to Larsen, the 
Hawawir perceived such movements as “unexpected” and recognised that “their move was not one 
of their own choice”: they would usually say that “they were ‘forced to move’ (jabarna nahal)” 
(Larsen 2003, p. 112). For the mobile Hawawir communities, displacement entailed both forced 
movement from the desert and a subsequent forced immobility in the new sedentary urban 
environment. As Larsen observes, “In cases where mobility is caused by ecological, political and 
economic ruptures, its consequences may be different from situations where mobility is one aspect 
inherent in the social organisation and cultural perception of the so-called everyday life” 
(Larsen 2003, pp. 119–20). Although used to mobility, the nomadic pastoralist Hawawir 
communities nonetheless perceived internal displacement as “a period of disruption” 
(Larsen 2003, p. 110). In fact, nomads too can be forcibly displaced from their usual paths, and 
they too can lose their usual way of life, interpersonal relations, and life plans. 
As the previous example illustrates, both (mainly) sedentary and (mainly) nomadic people 
can feel the loss of their “Home environment”. What I call here “Home environment” is not 
reducible to one’s house (or tent or shelter). When dealing with the issue of refugee return and 
property restitution, Stefansson distinguishes between “small home” (the property) and “big 
home”, referring to political and socioeconomic structures surrounding the small home 
(Stefansson 2006; see also Smit 2012, pp. 108–18). Smit observes that the tension between home 
as a physical structure and home as a social concept is widespread in the literature (Smit 2012, p. 
115). Here, I use “house” or “home” to indicate the physical structure where a person lives (and 
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the belongings it contains), and “Home environment”, broadly conceived, to denote a 
geographical, social, and cultural environment which has some practical function and a symbolic 
meaning in the residents’ daily life. Being deprived of the latter is cognitively and emotionally 
devastating for the displaced person, who find themselves obliged to rebuild it as soon as possible. 
As Turton puts it, what forced migrants lose and try to re-create is a “cool ground” from which 
planning the future is possible, while Jansen, drawing on Bauman’s notion of Unsicherheit, 
describes Home as a place of sufficient safety, security, and certainty (Turton 1996; Jansen 2009). 
One might wonder whether the Home environment is a physical space. I argue that it is 
primarily a sociocultural environment. Losing the Home environment, for the displaced individual, 
means being abruptly deprived of a web of social connections, symbolic meanings (e.g., language, 
conventional behaviours), and familiar landmarks on which one used to rely. Apparently, 
displaced people who move to contexts which are culturally similar to the one they came from are 
less likely to suffer from the loss of their Home environment, although they have lost their “private 
home”. However, an external observer may exaggerate cultural affinities among groups which 
actually show only some vague similarities, like a common faith in the same god. Think of the 
Muslim Bosnians who fled the Yugoslav war and whom Pakistan hosted in its refugee camps. 
Although Muslim, they came from a place which was not only geographically but also socially 
and culturally distant from Pakistan. Mertus et al. (in the typically emotive rhetoric of the refugee-
narrative genre) write that “Bosnian Muslims, a European people used to ski slopes in the winter 
and short shorts in the summer, are the most miserable in the traditional Muslim land of Pakistan” 
(Mertus et al. 1997, p. 101). Briefly, even when the new place where forced migrants settle has 
some cultural similarities to their place of origin, this does not prevent forced migrants from 
perceiving the loss of their sociocultural Home. 
Nevertheless, this larger Home may be strictly connected with territory, seen from a 
natural-geographic perspective, which can include lands, seashores, lakes, rivers, mountains, and 
other morphological features, as well as plants and animals. This natural landscape can have 
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important practical functions and collective symbolic meanings, especially for indigenous peoples. 
For many of them, territory is constitutive of their livelihood and social structure and may even 
have religious value. In the case of indigenous people, then, the loss of the Home environment 
disrupts the territorial symbolic basis of their collective identities and shared worldviews which 
cannot be transplanted outside that territory. Thus, what is lost is not just the functional meaning 
of the Home environment as an orientation-providing space but a deeper symbolic meaning. 
Furthermore, this loss entails a collective harm for the whole group that is distinct from the 
impairment of individual functioning and individual identity. Several indigenous communities 
have been displaced by state and non-state actors to acquire land for “development projects” such 
as dams, mines, or intensive plantations. National parks are perhaps a less cited example of 
development project, in which preserving nature results in humans’ eviction. Consider the case of 
the Veddas of Sri Lanka, who have been displaced since the establishment of the Maduru Oya 
Park in the 1980s. Forced to abandon the forest where they lived as hunter-gatherers (and which 
was transformed into a natural reserve surrounded by high electric fences), they were relocated to 
a nearby village. In the village, they had to turn into “civilised” sedentary farmers while still being 
kept segregated from the majoritarian Buddhist Singhalese people (Lund 2003). Analogously to 
the desert for the Hawawir nomads in Sudan, the forest was constitutive of the Veddas’ collective 
identity as indigenous people. Displacement, for them, meant not only the loss of their homes 
(understood as habitual shelter) and the loss of their individual place within a larger, collective 
sociocultural environment, but also the complete disruption of the meaning of such an 
environment: without connection with a precise kind of natural environment, the collective, 
sociocultural Home environment could not be re-created. 
Let us recap two points that emerged in this subsection. First, both the loss of one’s place 
of residence and the loss of one’s Home environment (understood as the surrounding natural and 
sociocultural environment) may affect not only sedentary but also mobile people. In fact, seasonal 
and temporary dwellings used by nomadic peoples are homes, which are part of the personal 
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private space of those who inhabit them. Moreover, not only neighbourhoods and cities can be 
considered part of the Home environment, but also usual mobility patterns as those used by 
nomadic groups. Briefly, the loss of the Home environment can also affect mobile individuals and 
does not require that individuals and groups be permanently anchored to one single place. 
Second, both the loss of the house and the loss of the Home environment do not only 
concern those who are displaced across borders; they affect IDPs too. In fact, states often do not 
correspond to the stereotype of a nation-state where residents belong to the same ethnic or national 
group, share the same language and often the same religion, and are generally immediately able to 
understand each other’s cultural references, habits, non-verbal communicative expressions, and so 
on. If such a uniform imagined community ever existed, this is clearly not the case for many states 
that originate IDPs. IDPs can be displaced to a region where local residents belong to a different 
ethnic group, speak another language, profess a different religion, or have unfamiliar habits, 
despite such a region being formally part of the same state as the region they came from.  
Recall the above-mentioned cases of Sudan and Sri Lanka. The Sudanese population might 
be simplistically divided into Muslim Arabs from the North and Christian/animist dark-skinned 
Africans from the South (indeed, decades of civil war resulted in the secession of South Sudan). 
However, the non-Arab population is composed of several ethnic groups, and even the Arab 
population is far from being ethnically and culturally uniform: think of the dissimilarities between 
the Hawawir nomads and the sedentary urban residents of the Nile valley. While having considered 
their nomadic lifestyle as normal before displacement, “those who have lived in the Nile Valley 
have become painfully aware of the fact that sedentarised agricultural and urban communities 
usually perceive the Hawawir and other nomads as uneducated people whose way of life is in need 
of change” (Larsen 2003, p. 119). Analogously, Sri Lanka comprises a majority of Buddhist 
Singhalese and a consistent minority of Muslim Tamils (who gained control of some territories 
during repeated civil conflicts), as well as several minor ethnic groups, including indigenous 
groups. Finally, even in an apparently more uniform country, such as Colombia, IDPs can be 
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forced to move and settle in a considerably different natural, social, and cultural environment. As 
Chapter 5 will illustrate in greater detail, displacement in Colombia is linked to land dispossession. 
Desterrados are usually forced to leave farms and rural villages and compelled to resettle in a 
distant city, away from paramilitary groups who reclaimed the land or threatened their life (often, 
their destination is the capital, Bogotá). Moreover, many displaced people belong to Black or 
indigenous minorities. Thus, for Colombian IDPs too, forced migration entails losing social 
relations and a familiar sociocultural background. A number of testimonies insist on alienation 
from the “strong social fabric” they used to live in, as well as the loss of their usual way of life 
(NRC/IDMC 2007, p. 180). For instance, according to Blanca (whose husband was indigenous), 
coming to Bogotá was somehow “moving to a new land”, and she describes adjusting to new 
customs as the most difficult thing to cope with (which seems quite surprising, since she also 
experienced considerable impoverishment and violence in the city) (NRC/IDMC 2007, pp. 81–
82). 
Now, someone may object that, although this account does not presuppose that individuals 
are rooted in one permanent place of residence (in a topographic sense), it still seems to assume 
that they naturally belong to one sociocultural Home, which in turn might be tied to a particular 
geographical territory. I argued that even nomadic people’s routes are part of their Home 
environment; if this environment were interpreted as the “right place” for them, it would reveal 
adherence to a sedentary, culturalist, and possibly nationalist frame. Therefore, it is necessary to 
give some additional clarifications. 
First, it is possible to conceive of human beings as situated in a Home environment, without 
presupposing that they are rooted there.33 The fact that a person’s life is embedded in a natural, 
social, and cultural environment does not imply that they are tied to that environment forever. It is 
 
33 I conceive of the fact of being situated within a natural, social, and cultural environment (however extended it might 
be) as a universal trait of human existence which is not dependent upon the existence or the quality of emotional states 
or cognitive functions. Human lives take place somewhere in time and space, and this “situatedness” matters, but this 
does not mean that they objectively belong there or that they subjectively feel that they belong there. For an influential 
philosophical theorisation of human existence as “dwelling” on earth, see Heidegger 1971. 
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possible to move outside this environment into a different one, and emigration per se is not a 
pathological deviant behaviour. However, moving out of a Home is different from losing it. In 
voluntary migration, the Home environment one leaves behind is not lost: it continues to exist, 
although it evolves over time, so that it is possible to keep connections with it and to come back. 
When migration is forced, by contrast, the person is either forcibly expelled from the Home 
environment or unable to return to it. 
Second, the moral importance that a Home has does not depend on the quantity or quality 
of the emotional attachment a person has or on the opportunities they are offered there. Such an 
environment need not to be a nice place to live in, let alone the best possible place for anyone. The 
important feature of this environment is the fact of being known, predictable, familiar: it is the 
environment in which the person is situated, where they are able to orient themselves in their daily 
life and to predict and plan their future. The more unknown and incomprehensible is the 
environment we are in, the greater are the cognitive and emotive costs needed to perform the same 
actions; we feel disoriented. Indeed, as Cara Nine (2019) argued, not only objects but also spaces 
(particularly houses) can serve as cognitive supports. As she puts it, houses are part of our 
“extended mind”. Thus, losing one’s house impairs cognitive functioning and epistemic abilities. 
In my account, though, the disorientation caused by forced displacement steams from the loss of 
the broader Home environment and does not merely consist in a decrease in cognitive functionality 
(leading agents to act less efficiently), but it affects more profoundly personal identity. Briefly, a 
person does not need to have any strong or positive emotional attachments nor a patriotic sentiment 
to feel the loss of such an environment. What counts is that they were compelled to separate from 
that environment, where their lives had some known and predictable features (even when it was a 
hard or miserable life).34 Moreover, the left-behind Home environment, for displaced people, often 
 
34 Even when the Home environment has a deep collective symbolic meaning, as in the case of indigenous peoples, 
individual members of the community do not need to feel strong attachments and positive emotions for their ancestral 
land, though many do. In their case too, the loss affects their collective self-understanding and worldview within 
which collective life had a meaning that cannot be sustained elsewhere. 
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becomes distant in time, and not simply in space: the natural landscape may have been disrupted 
or become uninhabitable; the social and cultural fabric may have changed, for instance as a result 
of war and ethnic cleansing. Thus, the Home environment is lost because it is no longer possible 
to return to that environment. 
Like voluntary migrants, forced migrants too may adjust to a new geographical, social, and 
cultural environment, which may be even more pleasant than the previous one. How many social 
relations they develop, how emotionally attached they get to the new one, and how strongly they 
miss the old one depend on many individual characteristics. However, the harm of being forcibly 
separated from the old one and obliged to adjust to a new one remains. 
 
2.3. Losing Wealth and Social Status 
The loss of one’s house and Home environment is not only painful as such; it results in 
further harms. When forced migrants are compelled to abandon their place of habitual residence, 
they have to leave behind their possessions. This economic loss results in immediate 
impoverishment. Sometimes, what they manage to take is a suitcase or a simple plastic bag. They 
may not have the time to pack anything more, or they may be unable to carry bulky luggage. They 
may think they are leaving their homes temporarily and will be back soon, while finally ending up 
in a situation of protracted displacement. Or they cannot let other people know they are leaving 
for good, because they are individually persecuted and their persecutors may be looking for them. 
When displacement and relocation are announced in advance, as may happen in the case of 
development projects, those who are evicted may manage to pack some of their belongings and 
get used to the idea of having to leave. Therefore, their displacement might be less traumatic and 
lead to a less dramatic impoverishment, compared to a sudden deportation or an abrupt flight. 
Development-induced displaced people may even be lucky enough to receive monetary 
compensation for the loss of their house and/or land. However, such compensation might be 
considerably inferior to the market value and insufficient to pay for an equivalent accommodation 
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or start an equivalent business. Furthermore, compensation might be limited to those who used to 
hold property rights to their place of residence, which may not be the case for many evicted 
people.35 Even announced development-induced displacement may thus result in considerable 
immediate impoverishment. 
Economic impoverishment is then exacerbated by the reduced capacity to generate new 
income. In fact, forced migrants do not only lose their house, but also their Home environment, 
the social and cultural norms they used to rely on, and the social roles they used to have, including 
their job. Thus, besides material losses, forced migration results in in a loss of status. Losing the 
Home environment entails losing social status because one’s skills, knowledge, social roles, and 
cultural heritage may be no longer useful, appreciated, or requested in the new environment they 
live in, and different ones may be needed. This clearly impacts the ability to restore livelihoods. 
For instance, how can fishing skills help when you are displaced far away from the sea, as was the 
case for many Sri Lankans displaced after the tsunami or fleeing ethnic conflict? As a Sri Lankan 
study suggests, some skills are more versatile than others and this can make some individuals more 
economically resilient than others. Studying a sample of seventy-six Sri Lankan IDP families that 
had all moved from the same village to the same town, the authors illustrate that masons’ and 
carpenters’ families were more resilient than those families that used to rely mainly on agriculture 
and fisheries. However, those families that experienced the greatest economic losses were those 
that used to own assets, such as those families that used to own a parcel of land or a small business. 
The head of Household 8 was not familiar with any manual work, having always being an 
entrepreneur. Moreover, he was “unable to mentally adjust to the reduced social status of working 
as a casual worker” (Lakshman and Amirthalingam 2009, p. 71). This highlights that displacement 
 
35 Numerous evicted people belong to marginalised, often de jure–stateless people (see Kingston 2019). Moreover, 
women are frequently denied monetary compensation, as they may not be recognized as landowners and house owners 
(Oliver-Smith 2010, p. 91). 
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may also entail a loss of social and economic status, which in turn hinders the ability to find 
alternative livelihoods. 
Forced migrants are often imagined by the Western public as a uniform mass of poor, 
uneducated, and unskilled people carrying presumed-backwards cultural values with them. Many 
displaced people were indeed economically poor or socially marginalised and oppressed before 
being displaced. However, this is not necessarily true for all displaced people. All forced migrants, 
including those who were poor and marginalised before displacement, possess some knowledge 
and skills, although the social value attributed to such knowledge and skills may be culturally 
dependent. Furthermore, some used to be wealthy, by the standards of the society they lived in (it 
is worth noting that in some contexts wealth is not measured in monetary terms, but rather in 
possession of land, cattle, or other sources of income). Finally, some look skilled and educated 
even to a Westerner’s eye, and they used to have what a Westerner would describe as high social 
and economic status in their place of origin before displacement. 
While most development-induced displacements, as well as displacements due to 
environmental degradation and some of the most destructive natural disasters, often primarily 
affect the more socially vulnerable and economically destitute strata of society, war and 
generalised violence also make wealthier and more educated people flee. This has been underlined 
in recent research on the socioeconomic profiles of those Syrian forced migrants who made it to 
Europe. According to a report released in 2016, 38 percent of the surveyed Syrian refugees had a 
university education and 32 percent used to own a business or work in a family business in Syria. 
While only 18 percent self-identified as coming from an elite background, most identified as 
having had average to above-average wealth levels prior to displacement. Moreover, 63 percent 
said that they would like to find work which fits their existing skills and only 11 percent were 
willing to accept any kind of work (Betts et al. 2017). Earlier examples may be found among 
refugees from former Yugoslavia. V. and her husband, for instance, used to be medical doctors in 
Bosnia, before the Yugoslav war. They fled to Croatia, where they had to take any available job 
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to provide for their family, because “no one wanted doctors (especially Muslims)”. “I was selling 
cosmetics”, V. writes, “washing hallways, milking cows, cleaning stables—things I had never 
done before in my life. . . . I was forced to obey people who were trying to humiliate me, as if I 
had chosen to be there, as if I wanted to be a beggar, as if I had asked the life of a refugee” (Mertus 
et al. 1997, p. 120). 
For educated and wealthy displaced people, losing such a socioeconomic position is often 
perceived as particularly humiliating. V. was happy with her life and her work in Bosnia, and she 
was not planning to emigrate. Again, control is crucial: voluntary migrants may know they will 
take a low-skilled job in the destination country, but taking that job can be part of their life plan 
and be to some extent empowering (this is not to deny that voluntary migrants might work under 
exploitative conditions). Particularly for young people, voluntary temporary migration may be a 
sort of rite of passage, and casual labour can be considered a socially acceptable component of the 
migratory experience. By contrast, forced migrants who did not plan to leave their place of origin 
perceive their loss of social status in the job market as a harm, a disruption of their life projects 
rather than a continuation of them. 
To sum up, the first evident consequence of losing one’s house is economic 
impoverishment. Moreover, when someone also loses one’s Home environment, they lose their 
previous livelihood, and their capacity to restore it is severely undermined. They might become 
completely dependent on other people’s charitable aid, or, at best, they have to struggle to find a 
new source of income, whatever it is. This entails not only a loss of economic status, but also a 
loss of social status. The socially recognised roles we take up are constitutive of our identity as 
individuals. Each of them makes us similar to other individuals while together they contribute to 
defining us as unique individuals. When a person has a job, this is one of the most important social 
roles they hold. Even when they do not have a job themselves, the job of their family members 
may constitute not only their means of subsistence, but also a key element of identification. 
Moreover, other formal or informal social roles, such as the authority of an elderly person in their 
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village or a peasants’ leader, may lose their meaning when there is no more village or when 
peasants have been forced to abandon the fields.36 To their hosts, displaced people can appear as 
anonymous strangers, with no place to come back to, no distinctive social roles. What is more, 
they appear as needy strangers who came uninvited. Therefore, besides the immediate 
impoverishment due to the loss of their house and belongings, the severely reduced capacity to 
sustain themselves as a result of the loss of their livelihood, and the loss of relevance of the social 
relations and skills they used to have, forced migrants also suffer an additional loss of status that 
may come with social exclusion in their host society. 
Forced migrants face extreme social, economic, and political exclusion when they are 
confined in closed camps and unable to exercise their citizenship rights or acquire new ones. There 
is a wide literature on the deprivation of legal personality and political agency that follows from 
the loss of citizenship that affects stateless and de facto–stateless people. Building on Arendt’s 
seminal work, several authors have elaborated on the reduction of the refugee to a purely biological 
life. According to Arendt, when deprived of citizenship a person is deprived of the “right to have 
rights” (Arendt 1973, p. 296). In other words, they are turned from a subject of rights to an object 
of humanitarian aid, in virtue of their being nothing more than an anonymous human being. The 
quintessential manifestation of this reduction to “bare life”, in Agamben’s (1998) famous terms, 
has been identified in the refugee camp, conceived of as a nonplace where undesired people are 
contained and prevented from acquiring a new political membership (see Parekh 2017, chapter 3). 
The refugee camp is thus the necessary product of the failure of a world order which ideally assigns 
every person to a state, a sort of limbo for the superfluous individuals that no state wants. As such, 
it is necessarily a bordered space. Since the camp is an apolitical space and not economically self-
sustaining, people are made dependent on the aid of those who come from outside to survive, and 
they are subject to their benefactors’ power without having any chance to shape the rules that 
 
36 On the loss of status affecting elders, see inter alia Oliver-Smith 2010, pp. 91–92. For testimonies of a displaced 
leader of peasants, see NRC/IDMC 2007. 
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govern them. Briefly, the camp is a dehumanising paddock for those who, as noncitizens, have 
been turned into nonpersons. 
The injury of confinement adds to the harms of displacement itself. However, I argue that 
the status harms caused by displacement precede the harms caused by containment and that they 
also affect those forced migrants who are not contained. Abstracting for a moment from the current 
border regime can help us to identify them. Even when formally allowed to move, forced migrants 
may lose control over their body, their personal space, their life plans; they may be compelled to 
leave behind their home and possessions, may be expelled from the natural, social, and cultural 
environment where they used to live, and may be deprived of their interpersonally recognised 
social roles. As a result, they may suffer the loss of their previous social and economic status, the 
humiliation of being dependent upon aid to fulfil their basic needs, and social exclusion and 
misrecognition in the place they arrive at. 
It seems widely assumed in the literature that the harms of refugee camps are caused by 
closed borders.37 Indeed, if borders were open worldwide, prolonged encampment could no longer 
be used as a “de facto solution” to prevent forced migrants from reaching wealthier Western 
countries, as Parekh (2017, p. 2) argues. Moreover, forced migrants who reach Western countries 
could not be illegalised, made deportable, and confined in camps while waiting for deportation. 
Therefore, some of the harms that forced migrants suffer in camps depend on the use of camps as 
instrumental to border policies. Nevertheless, an exclusive focus on borders conveys the 
misleading idea that camps themselves are produced by closed borders, coupled with the 
externalisation of border controls from the global North to the global South. If so, open borders 
would bring prolonged encampment to an end. However, this is not the case: closed borders are 
not a necessary condition for camps to exist. For many forced migrants who cannot afford to travel 
long distances, or who prefer to remain as close as possible to the place they had to leave, migrating 
 
37 In political theory, see for instance Parekh 2017. For an example of the debate in social sciences, see Rahola 2009. 
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to Western countries would not be an option. They would be IDPs or would migrate to 
neighbouring countries even if they had the freedom to migrate to a more distant destination. 
Informal camps would continue to exist, and authorised camps or collective centres could still be 
created as an emergency accommodation in case of mass displacement. Camps, or segregated, 
temporary, collective shelters, may be used as both humanitarian and public-order responses even 
in the absence of closed territorial borders: this becomes evident when internal displacement is 
brought into the picture. For instance, Georgian IDPs who fled the self-proclaimed autonomous 
republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia have been living isolated for decades in decrepit public 
buildings used as “collective centres”. IDPs have been looked at with suspicion by their local 
fellow nationals and have received extremely little institutional support to socially and 
economically integrate in the new environment.38 Despite being Georgian citizens, they have been 
treated as temporary guests and expected to return to where they came from. Indeed, a segregating, 
exclusionary rationale may produce prolonged encampment and precariousness even within free-
movement areas. As a result, forced migrants may continue to experience the humiliating condition 
of dependence, powerlessness, and marginalisation. Segregating and socially excluding forced 
migrants may still be a political strategy. Furthermore, spatial and social segregation may also 
arise without being a planned consequence of public policy: forced migrants may remain 
segregated in precarious accommodations for protracted periods if they cannot afford to pay rent 
or if locals refuse to rent them a house. Although not forbidden, the social integration of forced 
migrants might not be automatic in practice. 
Along with spatial segregation, economic exclusion might still be an issue even in free-
movement areas. We might presume that, in an open-borders world, the human right to freedom 
of movement within borders would be taken more seriously than today, and we might suppose that 
forced migrants who live in camps would be allowed to come and go, just like those who live in 
 
38 See Funke and Bolkvadze 2018. See also the testimonies in NRC/IDMC 2008. 
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urban areas. Forced migrants who settle in urban areas enjoy freedom to move and look for a job 
(at least in the informal market), but they may nonetheless face formal or informal social exclusion 
and unemployment. There is no guarantee that, if forced migrants had freedom to move, they 
would be allowed to work. Suppose, however, that in an open-borders world forced migrants could 
acquire citizenship after a reasonable time, and that in the meantime they formally enjoyed the 
same right as citizens to look for a job. Even so, they could face informal restrictions. Indeed, this 
does happen to several IDPs, who are displaced in the midst of their fellow citizens. Prejudice or 
xenophobia could still result in marginalization, informal social segregation and discrimination 
(including in the job market). 
What is more, even if admission were not an issue, forced migrants could still suffer the 
epistemic injustice of not being recognized as forced migrants, meaning people who were 
compelled to leave the place they used to live in to for a place where they never intended to be. As 
it happens in today’s world, they could be perceived as being ultimately voluntary migrants. 
Miranda Fricker (2007) proposed an influent theory of epistemic injustice. It identifies two kinds 
of wrong that can be done to someone in their capacity as a knower. Testimonial injustice occurs 
when a speaker’s credibility is systematically undermined because hearers hold prejudice towards 
the speaker qua social type (e.g., as a woman or a Black person). In other words, it consists in an 
“identity-prejudicial credibility deficit” (Fricker 2007: 4). By contrast, hermeneutical injustice 
happens at a prior stage, in the interpretive resources available to make sense of particular social 
experiences. There is a growing literature on the testimonial injustice that forced migrants often 
undergo during the asylum application, when they have to prove the credibility of their story and 
convince the court that they have been persecuted or would be in grave danger if they were returned 
to the country of origin39. However, forced migrants’ credibility is also systematically undermined 
 
39 Since epistemic injustice had been mainly discussed in feminist theory, feminist scholars have been among the first 
to apply this concept to credibility assessment in asylum procedures, focussing in particular on female asylum seekers 
claiming gender-based persecution. See Wikström 2014; Sertler 2018. 
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in public opinion since they are often depicted as voluntary migrants in disguise. Thus, forced 
migrants may well experience epistemic injustice besides and beyond the asylum claim 
assessment. For the Bosnian refugee S. in 1995, the toughest part of his everyday life in Germany 
was to endure this epistemic injustice: “We came too late. They already had enough of us refugees. 
But we are the ones who stayed so long because we never wanted to come. . . . I don’t know what 
I would say if I met the man who wrote in the paper that we are mostly economic migrants. What 
does he know about my life? Should I show him the photos? No, he doesn’t deserve to know me” 
(Mertus et al. 1997, p. 123).  
In a free movement area, forced migrants cannot be accused to be illegal voluntary migrants, 
but the harms they have suffered as forcibly displaced people may still be misrecognised and their 
identity may still be associated with downgrading stereotypes. They can be depicted as socially 
deviant, rootless individuals who might turn out to be enemies and terrorists. Consider again 
Colombian IDPs. Many of them face marginalisation and mistrust within their own country. At 
best, they are perceived as spoiling the neighbourhood. Osiris recalls a group of Bogotá students 
looking at her on the street saying, “You are turning this into a barrio of displaced people”, the 
term “displaced” (desterrados) having a pejorative meaning. She continued, “When I heard that, I 
wanted to tell those girls what it’s like where I come from and about all the crimes that were 
committed against us. But what could I do? Nothing but swallow my pride, and say nothing. That’s 
how silence humiliate us” (Molano 2013, p. 170). Carlos sadly remarked, “You appear on the 
street as a stranger, a criminal, as what is known in Colombia today as a ‘terrorist.’ No one knows 
why you came. No one understands that you came because you were forced to, because it was the 
only way of saving your life” (NRC/IDMC 2007, p. 183).  
In direct or indirect interactions with the host community, forced migrants often experience 
testimonial injustice. Here, the object of misrecognition is not their individual pre-displacement 
identity (the fact that they are not merely human beings, nor merely forced migrants) but their 
status as forced migrants. Their story, their claim to have been forced to move, is disbelieved, 
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denied or simply not acknowledged. The fact that forced migrants have been harmed by forced 
displacement is not recognised, and they may be even accused to be there to harm the local 
population. However, forced migrants’ lack of credibility denotes a hermeneutical injustice as 
well. Indeed, there is a lack of collective conceptual and interpretative resources in making sense 
of forced migration experiences. Not only forced migrants themselves and members of host 
communities but also policymakers, practitioners and scholars struggle to understand what is 
peculiar about being a forced migrant. Forced migrants are systematically reconceptualised in 
more familiar categories they may not fit. They are not necessarily persecuted people, but they are 
not voluntary migrants either. They are people who have suffered severe losses, but they often 
differ from the stereotype of the global poor. They have migrated as a reaction to coercion or 
deception, but they are not deprived of agency, and so forth. As Fricker highlights, the lack of 
hermeneutical resources affects collective understanding, but it places an unfair disadvantage on 
the group that is unable to properly make sense of their experience. Thus, forced migrants 
themselves are those who are wronged by the collective inability to properly understand the harms 
they have suffered qua forced migrants and to acknowledge their distinctive existential condition 
compared to both voluntary migrants and other non-displaced people in need.  
 
2.4. Violence, Trauma, and Loss of Psychological Well-Being 
The previous subsections made repeated, though passing, reference to violent and 
traumatic experiences. This subsection tries to clarify the role of violence and the kinds of 
psychological harms connected with forced displacement. I argue that, in addition to the three 
kinds of harm outlined above, forced migrants experience a fourth kind of harm. This harm consists 
in a loss of psychological well-being that derives from the psychological consequences of both the 
other specific harms involved in displacement and the violence that often triggers or follows forced 
displacement. Here, by violence I mean a human behaviour causing physical or psychological 
injuries in another human being, often (though not necessarily) involving physical force or the 
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threat of displaying physical force. In other words, violence impairs physical and psychological 
integrity. Physical violence includes killings, torture, beatings, rape, mutilations. Among 
psychological forms of violence, besides verbal aggression, I include the imposition to assist to 
the infliction of physical violence on others. Exemplar physical violence may indeed be 
intentionally used as a threat of inflicting analogous physical violence to the viewer or her loved 
ones, thereby simultaneously inflicting psychological violence on the viewer as well. Forced 
migrants may have several experiences of physical and psychological violence before and after 
the moment they leave their place of residence. Violence may be directed to them for what they 
have done or, more frequently, because they belong to particular social groups. Some forms of 
violence disproportionally affect certain social groups. For instance, sexual and gender-based 
violence disproportionally affect female and LGBT+ forced migrants.40 Moreover, violence may 
affect forced migrants simply for their physical location. In this latter case, violence is generalised 
and forced migrants are neither individually non collectively targeted. 
 The loss of psychological wellbeing which affects forced migrants, I argue, does not 
follow from a single source, but rather from the intertwining of losing control, losing one’s Home 
environment, losing social and economic status and experiencing one or more forms of violence. 
The psychological impact of all these experiences, taken together, results in a harm to the 
psychological wellbeing of the forced migrant that is distinctive, even though violence is not 
experienced exclusively by those who are forced to migrate. Indeed, people who live in countries 
that do not protect their basic human rights routinely experience physical, psychological, and 
sexual violence, independently from whether they are forcibly displaced. During conflicts, for 
instance, torture, rape, and intimidation are frequently used. Furthermore, violence may also stem 
from unjust border management and may affect migrants who were not originally forced to 
migrate. Thus, the fact that forced migration is psychologically harmful and forced migrants may 
 
40 On the use of rape in conflicts, see Clark 2016. On violence and persecution experiences of LGBT+ asylum seekers, 
see Hopkinson et al. 2017. 
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have specific traumas as a result does not rest on the view that only forced migrants experienced 
violence, while voluntary migrants or non-migrant people did not. However, I argue, violence does 
play a role, together with the other losses forced migrants experience, in undermining their 
psychological well-being in specific ways. 
Firstly, forced migrants often experience violence perpetrated by human beings before 
displacement. Sometimes, pre-displacement violence is generalised. The violent death of relatives 
and friends, the threat of one’s own death or the death of loved ones, intimidation, arbitrary 
detention, rape, torture: as I already noted, these kinds of harms are common in certain contexts, 
such as authoritarian regimes and conflict areas, and do not concern forced migrants only. 
Nevertheless, in the case of forced migrants, pre-displacement violence is causally linked to 
displacement and to further violence which may arise as a result of displacement. In some cases, 
violence may simply trigger displacement, which was not intended as the primary aim of violence 
itself. Indeed, the picture of displacement as an unintended outcome of violence prevails in the 
common humanitarian understanding of forced migration. However, note that sometimes violence 
is intentionally used in order to force people to abandon their homes, towns, regions, or countries: 
displacement itself can be the aim of violence.  
Consider cases of ethnic cleansing, such as the Bosnian one (see Stefansson 2006). 
Consider also cases of “land grabbing” where guerrilla or paramilitary corps use threats and engage 
in murder and mass slaughter (see Molano 2013; NRC/IDMC 2007). As the Colombian 
testimonies illustrate, violence may be directed at both specific individuals (e.g., landowners, local 
leaders) and entire communities, when all residents are standing in the way of more powerful 
subjects who intend to acquire the land. In the first case, migration may be described as persecution 
induced, while in the second case it may appear to be a mere outcome of generalised violence. The 
important common point, however, is that pre-displacement violence may be aimed at expelling 
the undesired residents, which is to say at causing cause their displacement. Note also that, in 
contexts of generalised violence, forced migrants experience distinctive psychological harms, such 
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as guilt about those who were left behind. Although a sense of guilt about the deceased may also 
be felt by non-displaced survivors, forced migrants may blame themselves or be stigmatised by 
others as the cowards who fled. Moreover, it has been suggested that when forced migrants 
abandon conflictual areas for safer ones, they “suffer the double burden of displacement and being 
the only group in the society who have experienced conflict” (Holzman and Nezam 2004, p. 90). 
Secondly, in addition to the pre-displacement violence, forced migrants are made more 
vulnerable to violence after they have been displaced. This is particularly evident in the case of 
female forced migrants, who become more vulnerable to sexual and gender-based violence 
perpetrated by strangers, domestic violence and intimate partner violence (Freedman 2014, 
Roupetz et al 2020). Forced migrants may also experience violence as they try to cross borders 
without being legally allowed to do so. Thirdly, violence or fear of violence may continue to 
concern forced migrants in the place they have moved to, particularly those who have fled to 
insecure places or are targeted for persecution. For the forced migrants who have been expelled as 
undesired from the environment they used to see as their Home, intolerance and xenophobic 
violence in the host society are also particularly harmful, since they may rouse the painful 
memories of displacement and perpetuate their sense of insecurity. Finally, violence or the threat 
of violence may also keep forced migrants from returning. Thus, violence may be not only the 
trigger behind displacement but also the proximate cause of the protracted condition of non-
voluntary exile from the place of origin. In sum, while not exclusively linked to forced migration, 
violence in forced migration is distinctively tied with the other losses that forced migration 
involves and contributes to making forced migration distinctively harmful to forced migrants’ 
mental well-being. 
It is necessary to be cautious when we describe as “traumas” the psychological impacts of 
violence and the other harms involved in forced migration. It seems implausible to consider all 
experiences of forced migration as equally traumatic. Moreover, someone may rightly object to 
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the idea that all forced migrants are necessarily traumatised people, in a clinical sense.41 I argue 
that, though not equally traumatic, all forms of forced displacement may undermine the 
psychological well-being of displaced people. The factual consequences of such potential 
psychological harm depend on several subjective variables: some individuals exposed to 
objectively less traumatic experiences turn out to be much more traumatised than others who have 
undergone more traumatic circumstances. Therefore, it is certainly important not to pathologise 
forced migrants, as if they all necessarily develop mental illnesses as a result of displacement. 
Nevertheless, clinical literature suggests that several do. Psychiatric research shows that many 
forced migrants develop symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder, as well as major depression 
and generalised anxiety disorder, with the probability that these disorders overlap in many 
people.42 Psychoanalysts have also suggested that forced migrants may show neurotic reactions 
due to the inability to accept and mourn the loss of someone or something they left behind, 
including the house, the Home, or the socially recognised roles they used to have (Volkan 2017). 
Therefore, there seem to be two normatively relevant conclusions. Firstly, it is necessary 
to recognise the fact that displacement is connected to traumatic experiences, although to different 
degrees. Thus, institutions in receiving communities should be aware that some individuals may 
be actually traumatised as a result of forced displacement and thus need specific treatment. 
Secondly, the moral harm involved in violent and traumatic experiences remains, whether or not 
this gives rise to medical conditions. 
 
 
41 Malkki is right in claiming that “we mustn’t assume that refugee status in and of itself constitutes a recognizable, 
generalizable psychological condition” (Malkki 1995, p. 510). 
42 Surveys’ results vary dramatically. However, a 2005 extensive meta-analysis suggested that one in ten adult 
refugees hosted in Western countries has posttraumatic stress disorder, about one in twenty has major depression, and 
about one in twenty-five has generalised anxiety disorder, with the probability that these disorders overlap in many 
people (Fazzel et al. 2005). 
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2. Forced Migration in an Open-Borders World 
As we have seen in the previous section, the normative relevance of the concept of forced 
migration does not lie merely in the moral weight of the admission claims that forced migrants, 
compared to voluntary migrants, have on foreign countries when they reach an international 
border. They already were forced migrants before reaching the borders, and they continue to be 
forced migrants after they cross them. The salience of the distinction between forced and voluntary 
migration, then, is not dependent on how open or closed borders are. To illustrate this, a promising 
way is to consider whether the forced-migration concept continues to be epistemically and 
normatively relevant when there are no closed territorial borders and admission is no longer an 
issue. This is already the case within the borders of states and across the borders of states which 
have agreed to create a free-movement area, such as the Schengen Area in Europe. Moreover, it is 
possible to conceive of a global free-movement area. In this section, I propose two counterfactual 
scenarios. The first is a non-ideal open-borders world, while the second is an ideal open-borders 
world. I argue that in a non-ideal open-borders world, forced migration would still exist and forced 
migrants would still have distinct moral claims, compared to both voluntary migrants and non-
migrants. Then, I argue that even in a just world forced migration is theoretically possible and that 
even if there were no wrong involved, forced migrants would nonetheless be harmed by 
displacement.  
Consider the case of a world where political, economic, and social arrangements are 
unchanged (compared to our world), except for borders, which have suddenly been opened. This 
means that migrants would not be required to have any authorisation to enter the territory of a 
foreign country. They would not be asked to justify their visit, to apply for a visa, or to demand 
asylum. Would the forced-migration concept still be descriptively and normatively useful in such 
a scenario? 
In order to imagine an open-borders world in which admission to a foreign country is no 
longer an issue, it is not necessary to postulate full compliance with principles of global and 
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domestic justice. Open-borders proponents do not usually claim that removing all barriers to 
freedom of movement is immediately feasible, but the open-borders world they imagine is not 
necessarily a perfectly just world. Joseph Carens, for instance, argues that borders could be open 
globally in a world in which global inequalities were reduced (because this would reduce the 
incentives to migrate), but it does not seem that such world would be a just world (although it 
would be less unjust than ours, from a global-egalitarian perspective). Indeed, domestic freedom 
of movement is recognised as a human right, although several forms of social injustice continue 
to exist in all states. Moreover, even international freedom of movement has already been formally 
recognised within some regions of the world.  
A familiar example is the Schengen area in Europe. Citizens of each member states are free 
to enter and settle in any other member state. Multilateral agreements on free movement exist also 
in less economically wealthy areas of the world, despite their enforcement is still imperfect. In 
Africa, for instance, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was created in 
1975. The treaty and the subsequent protocols aimed to ensure the rights to entry, residence and 
establishment through a three-phase integration process. The ECOWAS, which include some of 
the poorest countries in the world, is currently composed of fifteen countries: Benin, Cape Verde, 
Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, and Burkina Faso (Mauritania, which was among the founding 
members, left in 2002 but requested readmission in 2017, when Morocco also demanded 
admission). Since all ECOWAS states have implemented the first phase of the integration process 
concerning entry liberalisation, citizens of member states are legally permitted visa-free entry and 
stay for up to ninety days in any of the member states, provided that they hold valid travel 
documents (Adepoju et al. 2007, p. 2-4). The second phase of the process concerns the right to 
reside, as well as equal treatment with nationals in areas such as security of employment, 
participation in social and cultural activities and, in certain cases of job loss, re-employment and 
training (Adepoju et al. 2007, p. 2-3). Implementation of this second phase has to date been 
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incomplete. Only Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, The Gambia and Nigeria grant a specific 
residence permit to ECOWAS citizens (Australian Government DFAT 2020, p. 16). In sum, 
ECOWAS citizens are de jure allowed to move without a visa and, in a few member states, to be 
granted a long-term residence permit qua ECOWAS citizens. Besides, given the lack of 
enforcement in border controls and deportations, citizens of West Africa are also de facto free to 
enter, even in case they lack identity documents, and to settle also in those ECOWAS countries 
that have not yet recognised their legal right to reside (See Australian Government DFAT 2020, 
p. 17-18).  
These analogies are obviously imperfect, since they refer to regional free-movement areas 
with closed external borders, which would not exist in a global free-movement area. However, it 
is possible to conceive of a non-ideal open-borders world where domestic and global justice were 
not yet reached before formal barriers to immigration were removed. Clearly, this counterfactual 
world continues to be a non-ideal world even after borders have been opened. Some forms of 
injustice might well be reduced by opening borders, as some authors suggest. Removing 
restrictions on freedom of international movement would immediately increase the overall 
freedom and equality of opportunity of each individual, including non-migrants (Carens 2013, pp. 
233–36). Moreover, open borders are thought to gradually reduce global poverty and global 
inequality. It has also been recently suggested that freedom of movement would increase not only 
monetary remittances, but also “cultural remittances” of norms and values, fostering the spread of 
liberal democratic values and institutions (Tebble 2021). However, open borders might worsen 
some forms of injustice. Some authors point out that brain drain would increase while some 
suggest that in an open-borders world the exploitation of poorer countries’ lands and resources 
would be made easier (Song 2019, pp. 95–96). It is also possible that opening borders in a not-yet-
just world might create new injustices which did not exist before. I do not intend to assess all 
possible political, economic, or social consequences that suddenly opening borders would have. 
For the purpose of the present discussion, it is not necessary to offer a theory of just admission 
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policies; I remain agnostic about whether this counterfactual open-borders world would be utopian 
or dystopian, and I do not attempt to argue in favour of the feasibility of opening borders in an 
unjust world. I use this counterfactual scenario as a heuristic tool, to counteract the “admission 
bias” which usually affects anyone who tries to conceptualise forced migration from the 
perspective of Western countries, conceived of as destination countries. The question is: would 
the forced-migration concept still be needed in this open-borders world? Would it still make any 
sense, conceptually and normatively, to distinguish between forced and voluntary movement? 
It might seem obvious, but it is worth underlining that freedom to migrate does not suppress 
forced migration. This is evident if we think of internal displacement. Although domestic freedom 
of movement is already recognised as both a moral and a legal human right, the majority of forced 
migrants are displaced within their own country. In 2020, among the 82.4 million forcibly 
displaced people worldwide, 48 million were IDPs (UNHCR 2021). Some IDPs eventually cross 
the borders of their country and become international forced migrants. In 2020 Syria remained the 
country with the second-highest level of internal displacement (UNHCR 2021, p. 24) while also 
being the main country of origin for people displaced across borders (UNHCR 2021, p. 18). 
However, many IDPs never reach Western countries and remain largely neglected in public and 
academic debate on forced migration. As has been the case since 2015, in 2020 Colombia 
continued to report the highest number of IDPs, with over 8 million IDPs according to government 
statistics (UNHCR 2021, p. 24).  By contrast, only 104,900 Colombians were registered as 
refugees in 2019 (UNHCR 2020, p. 20, fig. 8) and the latest Global Trends report on forced 
displacement does not even include data on Colombian refugees. Freedom of movement is not 
what IDPs lack; what they lack is an acceptable alternative to such forced movement.  
Even when displaced people can legally migrate across borders, their international 
movement is not voluntary, although it does require some agency. Within already-existing free-
movement areas, clearly not all international migrants are voluntary migrants. Consider again the 
examples of the ECOWAS and the EU. 
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Within the ECOWAS member states, displacement has been triggered by several wars, 
such as the civil wars in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire. ECOWAS confirmed in 2007 
that the free movement protocols applied to refugees along with other ECOWAS community 
citizens. Thus, in legal terms, admission is not an issue neither for ECOWAS voluntary migrants 
nor for ECOWAS conflict-induced forced migrants (Australian Government DFAT 2020, p. 22). 
Yet, as we have seen, forced migrants find themselves in a distinctive existential condition and 
should thus be singled out from other migrants, even in a regional free movement area. Trafficked 
ECOWAS citizens are another subset of people on the move who still need to be singled out. 
Along with international trafficking routes to Europe, intra-ECOWAS trafficking in human beings 
has also been reported (concerning for instance young boys trafficked to Côte d’Ivoire to be 
exploited in the cocoa agricultural industry and girls taken to Gabon and Nigeria to be employed 
as domestic servants or street beggars). Moreover, mass expulsions of ECOWAS nationals were 
also carried out in some member countries, as a result of xenophobic clashes, especially during 
economic recessions (Fresia 2014). Despite the blurred boundaries between forced and voluntary 
migration, many cases international migration within the ECOWAS clearly do not qualify as 
voluntary. The concept of forced migration thus remains descriptively and normatively relevant in 
this context. 
Furthermore, at least some kinds of international forced migration exist within the EU. 
Trafficking is still considered a major issue. Chapter 6 will focus on trafficking within the EU, 
more precisely within the Schengen free movement area. As we will see, figures are difficult to 
estimate (since only some of the victims are registered as trafficked persons). What is interesting 
to note, though, is that EU citizens too are trafficked within the EU, despite they formally enjoy 
freedom of movement. Indeed, trafficking is reported to have increased after the EU enlarged to 
include Central and Eastern European countries, as a result of lifted or eased border controls 
(EPRS 2014). According to a Europol survey released in 2016, between 2013 and 2014 more 
than 70 percent of the victims in the EU were EU nationals. Most of them were (overwhelmingly 
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female) EU citizens trafficked for the purpose of exploiting them as sex workers from Bulgaria, 
Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia. The second-largest group was composed again of (mostly male) 
EU nationals trafficked for labour exploitation from Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Poland, Romania, and Slovakia. In both cases, trafficked EU citizens moved legally (though not 
voluntarily) using their genuine documents (Europol 2016). 
In her research on trafficking from Romania to Italy and Spain, Abbatecola describes how 
the removal of border controls impacted the Romanian racket. Mobility has been made easier and 
journeys more direct and comfortable. Sometimes trafficked women travel by plane, but the less 
risky option for traffickers is to use cars: with no more douane controls and no airport controls, 
the trafficked women have no chance to ask for help. Moreover, when travelling by car, the driver 
can keep the woman’s documents (Abbatecola 2018, pp. 53–54, 71–72). Once in the destination 
country, EU trafficked women seem to be even less visible than non-EU ones. And “according to 
informants, especially in Spain, the acquisition of new citizenship rights [i.e., EU citizenship] not 
only has not loosened the grips of exploitation but, paradoxically, it seems to have also undermined 
both the efficacy of police investigation and the impact of those services which had been created 
and conceived mainly for [trafficked women who came as] irregular migrants” (Abbatecola 2018, 
p. 54, my translation). 
Conflict-induced displacement is not an issue in the EU, but there are still EU citizens who 
were displaced before their nation joined the EU (e.g., those from Cyprus and Croatia). As EU 
nationals, they are allowed to migrate elsewhere in Europe, but they cannot freely return to the 
place of origin. In the case of Cyprus, a closed border separates Cyprus from the (internationally 
unrecognised) Turkish republic of Northern Cyprus, whose territory is not part of the EU. In the 
case of former Yugoslavia, while Croatia and Slovenia joined the EU, Bosnia and Serbia did not. 
In a counterfactual global free-movement area, all borders, including EU external borders with so-
called “third countries”, would be opened. However, even if EU displaced people could freely 
access the territory of their country of origin, they might still be unable to resettle there. They 
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might be unable to get their original property back or might be socially excluded if not targeted by 
ethnic violence. Indeed, the literature on property restitution and return in former Yugoslavia 
illustrates that even those who got their property back were very often unable to restore their 
livelihood and reintegrate in the changed social and cultural environment (Smit 2012; 
Jansen 2009; Stefansson 2006). 
Briefly, freedom of movement alone suffices neither to prevent nor to end displacement. 
In a non-ideal open-borders world, several kinds of forced migration would continue to exist, and 
the concept of forced migration would still be needed to make sense of the distinct harms and 
needs experienced by those people who are forcibly displaced. Freedom to migrate would alleviate 
some serious suffering that forced migrants experience, connected with smuggling, detention, and 
deportation. Forced migrants’ warehousing resulting from Western countries’ externalisation of 
containment policies would also be much reduced. However, forced migrants may still find 
themselves stuck in a condition of prolonged displacement even when they have freedom of 
movement, because they may lack the necessary economic and social capital to make life plans 
and restore their livelihoods. Opening borders would not address all the root causes that compel 
people to leave in the first place. Although free to move and settle elsewhere, they would not 
perform such actions voluntarily. Secondly, freedom to move would not be sufficient to 
compensate for the harm of being forcibly displaced and to meet the needs that arise from 
displacement. 
Consider now a just world. There might be reasonable disagreement on what a just world 
would look like. First, let us assume that a just world would be divided into sovereign states, each 
having territorial borders.43 In a just world, principles of justice would be respected both at the 
 
43 In a cosmopolis, or world-state, there would be no borders at all. Therefore, it would not make sense to talk about 
open borders. There would not be any distinction between nationals and non-nationals. However, the argument would 




domestic and at the global level.44 Second, let us assume that in a just world territorial borders 
would normally be open. Third, let us assume that in a just world the borders of the demos too 
would be open: in principle, any non-national resident could become a citizen, after a reasonable 
amount of time. Would the forced-migration concept be still needed in such a scenario? 
Presumably, in a just world people would not be “persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion”. Therefore, it seems 
unlikely that the refugee definition offered by the Geneva Convention would be of any use. 
However, even in a just world there might be natural disasters. As a result, some people might be 
displaced, meaning compelled to leave their place of habitual residence. Moreover, as Joseph 
Carens argues, there might still be failures of particular states (Carens 2013, p. 294). Some forced 
migrants might then be compelled to move to another country. Extreme natural disasters and 
climate change might also render the entire territory of a state or a large share of it uninhabitable, 
thus making displacement permanent. Even in a just open-borders world a forced migrant would 
find themselves in a different condition, compared to a voluntary migrant who desires to migrate, 
plans to do so, and knowingly takes on the possible economic, social, and cultural costs that settling 
in an unfamiliar environment can entail. Forced migration would still be a distinct phenomenon. 
It might be objected that the forced-migration concept would not be normatively relevant, because 
in a just world forced migrants would not be wronged: there would not be any human moral 
responsibility for causing their displacement. Nonetheless, forced migrants would still be harmed 
by forced displacement, and this would generate needs they would not have had if they had not 
been forcibly displaced. Therefore, as I will argue more extensively in chapter 4, states would still 
have a remedial responsibility to compensate for such harms. Briefly, the forced-migration concept 
would still be both epistemically and normatively relevant even in a just open-borders world. 
 
44 Here, it is not necessary to adopt a specific theory of justice; it suffices to say that agents would comply both with 
principles of domestic justice and with principles of global justice. 
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The two counterfactual scenarios presented above help to illustrate the claim that the 
distinction between forced and voluntary migration is not merely instrumental in restricting 
migrants’ movement in a world in which borders are normally closed. Current kinds of forced 
migration would continue to exist in a non-ideal open-borders world, and some kinds of forced 
migration could be possible even in a just open-borders world. The concept of forced migration 
would remain salient even in such thought experiments because of the normatively relevant 
distinctive harms connected to forced displacement. Thus, acknowledging the fact that forced 
migrants experience distinctive harms that are not caused by borders being closed allows us to 
better grasp what forced migrants need, apart from freedom of movement and admission to a 
country that protects human rights. Moreover, in a non-ideal world, even when there is freedom 
of movement, forced migrants may not only be harmed but also wronged, when their forced 
displacement results from unjust actions and structures. This is usually the case in our world. 
Therefore, the concept of forced migration has a normative relevance when it comes to the 
responsibility to repair those wrongs. In sum, the concept of forced migration is not only 
normatively relevant for the assessment of priority in admission policies when states have a right 
to control their borders and migrants are seeking admission. More fundamentally, it is relevant to 
justice in migration because it points to a subset of migrants who experience distinctive harms as 
a result of forced displacement and thus find themselves in a different condition compared to other 
people on the move and non-migrants. This, as we will see in the next two chapters, affects both 
what forced migrants are due and who has duties of justice towards them. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have argued that forced migration is harmful and distinctively different from 
voluntary migration. Referring to empirical literature on both internal and international forced 
displacement, I have illustrated that being forced to migrate entails four kinds of harms. Firstly, I 
have argued that forced migrants experience a loss of control; this may affect their own body and 
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bodily movement, as well as their private space. Furthermore, they lose control over their 
immediate future: while voluntary migration may be empowering even when undertaken under 
unjust or dangerous conditions, forced migration is disempowering to the extent that it is not part 
of the person’s life plan, but rather disrupts such a plan. Secondly, I have argued that forced 
migrants are harmed by the loss of their Home environment, which includes not only their place 
of habitual residence but, more importantly, the larger web of social connections, symbolic 
meanings, and familiar spatial landmarks on which they used to rely. Thirdly, I have argued that 
forced migrants suffer not only economic impoverishment, as a result of the loss of belongings 
and livelihoods, but also a loss of status: not only may they become dependent on material aid to 
secure their basic needs, but they also lose their social roles, while their skills and knowledge may 
become meaningless and useless in the new environment. Moreover, they may face 
marginalisation, as well as the epistemic injustice of not being believed to be forced migrants. 
Finally, I have argued that forced migrants face violent and traumatic events, which may 
undermine their mental health and give rise to psychological sufferings specifically connected with 
forced displacement (e.g., guilt or fear regarding those left behind; blame and stigmatisation for 
having fled). In sum, although it might be hard to draw a bright line between forced and voluntary 
migration, the concept of forced migration remains normatively relevant. Indeed, forced migrants 
(both those displaced within and across borders) experience distinctive harms, specifically related 
to forced displacement. 
My aim has been to provide a phenomenology of the forced-migration experience that does 
not depend on normative consequences that might be derived. However, such a phenomenology 
has important normative implications. First and foremost, it contributes to showing why forced 
migrants should not be conflated with other people on the move when assessing what is owed to 
them. Furthermore, it highlights that the plight of forced migrants, including IDPs, differs from 
that of non-displaced people in dire need and requires specific responses. In sum, a 
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methodologically prior assessment of the harms of displacement allows us to reframe the 





What Is Owed to Forced Migrants? A Harms-Based Approach 
 
The previous chapter argued that being forcibly displaced entails distinctive harms which 
make the condition of forced migrants distinct from the condition of both voluntary migrants and 
non-migrant needy people. In this chapter, I argue that the harms of displacement are normatively 
relevant to assess the needs of forced migrants qua displaced people, rather than qua people on the 
move or generically needy people. Thus, I defend the adoption of a backwards-looking, harms-
based approach to what is owed to forced migrants. A backwards-looking approach assesses what 
is owed in light of what happened in the past. Usually, backwards-looking approaches are adopted 
to assess whether an agent can be held accountable for a state of affairs, on the basis of their 
previous actions or omissions. In this chapter, I argue that, prior to any assessment of 
responsibility, taking the past into account is necessary to make sense of what forced migrants 
need qua people who have been displaced. In other words, we cannot properly understand forced 
migrants’ needs in isolation from the harms of forced migration.  
James Souter (2014, p. 327-328) noted that “much work on the ethics of asylum and 
migration tends to be primarily synchronic in character”, which is to say that it focusses on “current 
needs”, “on the fact of refugees’ current plight, rather than the processes that caused it”. In other 
words, most theorists adopt a forward-looking approach to what is owed to forced migrants, which 
considers present needs independently from their source. In this light, forced migrants strike us as 
people in immediate need of safety, shelter, nutrition, who should be granted humanitarian 
assistance in their country of origin, if possible, or admission to a safe country when they cannot 
avail themselves to their country of origin. Their needs for safety, shelter and nutrition do not differ 
from the needs of non-displaced poor people whose basic needs are unfulfilled. Indeed, from an 
exclusively forward-looking perspective, IDPs appear nearly indistinguishable from those of their 
non-displaced needy fellow citizens. When it comes to their interest in safe and legal migratory 
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routes and admissions, forced migrants are also very similar to other people on the move. However, 
this understanding of the needs of forced migrants is incomplete and insufficiently specific because 
it does not take into account the specific harms of displacement and thus prevents theorists from 
acknowledging the specific needs that derive from such harms.  
By contrast, a backwards-looking approach allows us to develop a more precise account of 
the specific needs of forced migrants based on how they have been harmed. Thus, it allows us to 
see why forced migrants are due more than the fulfilment of survival needs and the freedom to 
enter a safe country. In addition, in Chapter 4 I will argue that this backwards-looking, harms-
based approach can be fruitfully expanded to the issue of responsibility as well. I will argue that 
understanding how and why forced migrants have been displaced has important implications 
concerning the nature of obligations towards forced migrants and the identification of agents 
bearing obligations. However, the backwards-looking account of who is responsible for giving 
forced migrants what they are owed is separate from the backwards-looking approach to what 
forced migrants need. This is to say that someone may adopt the latter while rejecting the former 
in favour of a forward-looking humanitarian approach to responsibility.   
Independently from responsibility attribution, thus, the aim of this chapter is to offer a 
novel, harms-bases account of what forced migrants are owed qua displaced people. In the first 
section, I build on the discussion of harms provided in chapter 2 to elaborate on what forcibly 
displaced people need. Thus, I show that both freedom of movement and humanitarian assistance 
(aimed at securing basic needs such as food and shelter) are not sufficient to provide what forced 
migrants need as displaced persons. Then, in section 2, I consider why they are owed the fulfilment 
of such more demanding needs. I argue that those needs are morally compelling because they 





1. What Do Forced Migrants Need? 
The aim of this section is to show that (a) forced migrants have distinctive needs and (b) 
such needs derive from the harms of forced displacement. IDPs have specific needs if compared 
to the non-displaced population, although many non-displaced people may well benefit from 
humanitarian aid and development aid. Moreover, international forced migrants have additional 
needs compared to voluntary migrants. Often, forced migrants claim that what they need is simply 
“stability” or “a normal life”. However, this does not imply that they do not have any specific 
needs. On the contrary, their desire for stability and normality reflects the disruptive impact that 
displacement had on their lives. As the harms of displacement are strictly intertwined, so are the 
needs that derive from them: needs are related to harms and interrelated. Therefore, I show that it 
would not be appropriate to consider each of them in isolation from one another or to classify them 
according to their chronological or moral priority. I argue that forced migrants need to regain 
control over their body, their close environment, and their immediate future. Thus, they also need 
to re-create a “cool ground”, a new Home environment in which they can make plans for their life. 
This may require new abilities and cultural skills to understand and adjust to the new geographical, 
social, and cultural environment. Clearly, a source of livelihood is needed to make life plans and 
regain some control over one’s future. Moreover, a livelihood is also part of what they need to 
restore their social standing, which implies recognition as individuals and, sometimes, collective 
recognition as members of a displaced minority group. Furthermore, forced migrants need to 
overcome the possible psychological consequences of the traumatic experiences they had, which 
may undermine their ability to get on with their lives and may hinder the fulfilment of the other 
displacement-related needs45. 
 
45 One might wonder to what extent forced migrants need to regain control or social standing, and, more generally, to 
what extent they need to regain what they have lost as a result of forced migration. I do not maintain that they need to 
restore the same level of control over their lives or the same social status they had before being displaced. Rather, they 
need to regain a level of control, social status and mental health sufficient to access the conditions for a decent, 
minimally flourishing life. Thus, I assume a sufficiency threshold analogous to the threshold set by human rights. The 
analogy between human rights and the claims of forced migrants to have such needs met will be further developed in 
section 2 of this chapter. 
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The distinctive needs to regain control, re-create a Home environment, to regain social and 
economic status, as well as to receive special care for mental wellbeing do not only follow from 
the theoretical recognition of the harms of displacement, but they also emerge in empirical 
research. For instance, a study assessing the needs of forced migrants from the Horn of Africa who 
had been resettled to Australia concludes that 
while many of the problems experienced by refugees, such as language acquisition, recognition of overseas 
qualifications, rental problems, and intergenerational problems are common to other migrants, there is a 
significant difference for people who come to Australia as refugees. The horrors of persecution, loss of family 
and homeland, the violence of flight, and the stark conditions in refugee camps take a long time to heal. People 
are often vulnerable; the need for security is critical. The meaning of home as a place to rebuild shattered lives 
has incredible importance. The need to maintain family and culture in a new country has enormous significance. 
People feel the need to be able to contribute to their new country, to retake control of their own lives, to regain 
their dignity and their freedom46. 
 
1.1. Regaining control: the limits of humanitarian assistance and freedom to settle 
Consider first the need to recover control: neither the focus on humanitarian assistance nor 
the focus on admission policies allows us to acknowledge what is owed to forced migrants to meet 
such a need. As the second chapter illustrated, forced migration is a disruptive experience which 
undermines the individual’s control over their body and movement, their private space, and their 
ability to make future plans. When voluntarily chosen, migration can indeed result in agency 
empowerment, even when it involves exploitative work conditions and poor standard of living in 
the place of destination. By contrast, when displacement is compelled by overwhelming external 
force, individual agency is undermined. Forced migrants thus need to recover control over their 
lives, which has been eroded as a result of displacement and may continue to be diminished 
afterwards, during the journey and in the places where they temporarily or permanently settle. 
 
46 Pittaway et al. 2009, p. 144. 
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Recovering control over one’s body and bodily movement is the most fundamental need 
which derives from the harms of displacement. Indeed, losing control over one’s body impairs the 
basic self-confidence to a separate individual whose body parts have precise and interpersonally 
recognised contours. Of course, forced migrants are not the only ones that need to restore such 
basic confidence: non-displaced people may, for instance, be victims of torture or rape. Nor does 
forced displacement necessarily involve physical coercion. However, to the extent that their move 
was compelled and abrupt, forced migrants have a distinctive need to restore control over their 
body and movement, compared to voluntary migrants. Secondly, they need to restore control over 
their private space, which they lost as a result of forced displacement: this means that a sphere of 
inviolable, intimate space should be recognised, which should not be trespassed without 
permission, just as someone’s body should not be touched, moved, or modified without their 
permission. Finally, for displaced people it is crucial to regain control over their immediate future, 
which means being able to make basic predictions about what is going to happen and to make 
plans involving themselves. 
Emergency humanitarian assistance is currently the standard immediate response to the 
needs of most forced migrants, whose displacement is attributable to generalised violence or 
natural disasters.47 However, it does not suffice to meet their distinctive, displacement-related need 
to regain control. Unfortunately, humanitarian camps and collective centres usually allow limited 
autonomy to the assisted persons. Indeed, they often entail containment inside a delimited area or 
measures such as curfews, which involve a lack of freedom to move when and where one wishes, 
and thus impede one’s recovery of sufficient control over one’s bodily movement.48 Moreover, 
control over one’s private space may be severely limited: shelters may be shared with strangers 
and accessed anytime by roommates and possibly by managers. Privacy limitations and intrusion 
 
47 Note that not all of them actually receive humanitarian assistance. Moreover, development-induced displacement is 
normally not included. 
48 While curfews, strict control over external activities and acquaintances, and the obligation to sign in and out when 
leaving a receptive centre are far less coercive than containment inside a fenced camp, they still limit the autonomy 
of the hosts, who often declare that they feel like inmates (see for instance Murphy et al. 2019, p. 9). 
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on the part of managers may be particularly pervasive in the case of women who have been 
identified as victims of sex trafficking: fearing that victims of sex trafficking may end up in the 
prostitution market again, social workers may adopt strict control over their movement, 
acquaintances, and sex life. Despite the laudable aim of preventing their sexual exploitation, such 
intrusion is the opposite of what trafficked persons would actually need to regain control over their 
lives. Families who are lucky enough not to be separated after displacement may be sheltered 
together, but they may end up hosted in narrow spaces meant to offer an emergency 
accommodation, where each family member lacks minimal privacy for themselves. 
Furthermore, in humanitarian camps and collective centres control over one’s immediate 
future may be insufficient: assisted persons may not be able to tell how long they will be hosted 
there or where they will go next. Importantly, lack of sufficient control over one’s future plans 
does not affect only those forced migrants who are contained in camps to prevent them from 
migrating elsewhere, nor does it concern only those caught in a jurisdictional limbo while waiting 
for their refugee status to be determined; it also affects IDPs who are legally entitled to remain in 
the place they have moved to. In Georgia, for instance, the IDPs from secessionist republics of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia have been given a temporary shelter in dilapidated public buildings, 
in the indefinite, never-ending hope that they will return to their region of origin, without proper 
support to rebuild their future lives in the meantime (see Funke and Bolkvadze 2018). Finally, in 
humanitarian camps or other temporary receptive residences, not only do forced migrants lack 
control over important aspects of their future, but they also have little say on trivial choices 
affecting their present daily routine. An Irish survey illustrates that “the asylum system’s 
curtailment of asylum seekers’ efficacy to make simple daily choices, such as those about food, 
resulted in many of the participants feeling a reduced sense of independence. Instead, they likened 
themselves to dependent children with little to do during the day other than eat and sleep” (Murphy 
et al. 2019, p. 9). 
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However, forced migrants should not be deprived of any assistance and let free to settle 
autonomously as if they were voluntarily migrating, but rather supported in recovering control 
over their lives while also ensuring that their survival needs are met. Outside camps and receptive 
centres, urban forced migrants are let free to find autonomously an accommodation. This ensures 
greater control over their movement and daily choices, but, when left on their own, displaced 
persons may fail to secure clear water, minimum nutrition, and sanitation in their shelters. Such 
shelters can be extremely precarious over time: informal settlements are often unauthorised, so 
displaced people may be evicted.49 Indeed, as a result of their forced displacement, many forced 
migrants find themselves deprived of the material, social, and cultural resources that would have 
helped them find a decent accommodation if they had voluntarily chosen and planned to migrate. 
Moreover, the accommodation they manage to find may offer insufficient safety; consider the 
cases of IDPs who remain in a context of generalised violence, forced migrants who had been 
individually persecuted, and trafficked people who had fled an exploitative relationship and fear 
retribution. 
 
1.2. Recreating a Home environment and regaining social status 
It is true that humanitarian assistance could be reformed to ensure greater autonomy. The 
provision of humanitarian assistance in securing survival needs, coupled with the goal of restoring, 
instead of undermining, a sufficient level of control over one’s body and movement, one’s private 
space, and one’s life plan, would then be a more appropriate response to the needs of forced 
migrants than both the mere freedom to move and settle autonomously and the fulfilment of 
survival needs alone. Indeed, humanitarian actors are increasingly aware that “beyond survival, 
humanitarian aid should be committed to supporting people to live in dignity” (Cortés 
Ferrández 2019, p. 86). Nevertheless, a reformed yet merely forward-looking humanitarian 
 
49 See for instance Cortés Ferrández 2019 on urban IDPs in Colombia. 
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assistance would still be an incomplete response to the needs that forced migrants have qua 
displaced people. In fact, to determine what forced migrants need once displaced, it is necessary 
to consider simultaneously all the harms connected with their being forcibly and often abruptly 
driven out of their habitual place of residence and compelled to move somewhere else. The loss of 
their Home environment, with its familiar and predictable features, leaves them disoriented. They 
have left behind not only their house and usually most of their belongings, but also their source of 
livelihood, their social roles, and most of the people they used to know and rely on. When forced 
migration is compelled by human violence, the fear and guilt regarding the fate of family members, 
friends, and acquaintances remains, often accompanied by the fear of still being in danger 
themselves. Moreover, traumatic memories related to the disruptive events that triggered forced 
displacement or followed it may continue to haunt them. This may apply even to the luckiest forced 
migrants, and not only to those who had the most traumatic experiences. 
Consider the story of Dali and her family, with whom psychoanalyst Vamik Volkan 
conducted extended participant observations for several years (Volkan 2017). Dali and her family 
are Georgian IDPs who left the region of Abkhazia (an internationally unrecognised self-
proclaimed republic) after the civil war began. Before displacement, they led elite lives: Dali’s 
father was a well-known novelist and poet; her husband was a former soccer star. She and her 
three children all managed to safely reach the Georgian capital Tblisi on a helicopter and were 
eventually reunited with her parents and husband. She was not tortured or raped, she did not lose 
any family member, and she apparently only witnessed the destructive impact of ethnic conflict 
when flying away from Abkhazia. Moreover, she was given a shelter in a collective centre (a 
decrepit former hotel) in the Georgian capital Tblisi among compatriots (note, however, that local 
Georgians were reported to be mainly hostile to IDPs, who were marginalised despite usually 
being ethnic Georgians as well). Although privileged, compared to many forced migrants, Dali 
experienced flight as traumatic: she only had fifteen minutes to leave her home, where she had to 
abandon her dog and where she consciously left her ID, so that she could not be recognised as a 
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Georgian in case Abkhazian soldiers caught her. Moreover, she felt (long unexpressed) guilt about 
the death of the young pilot, since the helicopter was shot down soon after having brought her and 
the kids to safety. Finally, she could not resign herself to consider displacement as permanent, 
even after her husband obtained a rewarding job as policeman and was invited to play for a soccer 
cup, while his father got his post-displacement poems published and her eldest child got married 
in Tblisi. Indeed, the fact of being “left behind” by her family members who were now planning 
their future in Tblisi made her progressively fall into depression. She was stuck in a limbo: for 
many years she refused to ask for a new ID card which would have entitled her family to a little 
economic help from the Georgian government, as she nourished the absurd hope she would get 
back to her house and find her old ID card, despite having seen on TV the images of her house 
burnt down. 
Dali’s family story does not only illustrate the need for psychological care that even 
apparently less traumatised forced migrants may have. It also highlights the importance of 
restoring livelihoods and regaining social recognition in the new social environment, so that such 
environment can be perceived as a Home in which it is possible to conceive new life plans. 
Honneth’s approach can once again contribute to showing why forced migrants are particularly in 
need of social recognition. He argues that, along with love which grounds self-confidence, human 
beings need respect and esteem (Honneth 1995, chapter 5). Recognition in the form of respect is 
universal, because it is the kind of recognition owed to all human beings qua human beings (i.e., 
as capable of autonomous agency). By contrast, recognition in the form of social esteem admits of 
degrees and is due to individuals on the basis of their distinctive traits (Honneth 1995, pp. 111–
13). In other words, we might say that through respect the individual is recognised as equal, while 
social esteem entails recognition of difference. Forced migrants may experience the lack of both 
forms of recognition. They might be displaced because they were previously misrecognised as 
inferior, denied equal rights, and made displaceable: the most dramatic and familiar example in 
Western collective memory is probably the case of Jews during World War II, which illustrates 
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how inferiorisation can not only make the victim displaceable and subject to being socially 
annihilated but also subject to violence and death, as means of mental and physical annihilation. 
However, this is also the case for many contemporary displaced people. Finally, even when they 
do not experience that harm, forced migrants are usually harmed by the loss of status which derives 
from being expelled from their Home environment. When forced migrants are recognised as 
equals, as human beings, but as nothing more than human beings, they lose the recognition of their 
value as individuals, which is to say the social esteem earned in virtue of their socially recognised 
abilities and roles. In We Refugees, Arendt points to this kind of misrecognition, which harms self-
esteem: “We lost our occupation, which means the confidence that we are of some use in this 
world” (Arendt 2007, p. 264). Since their social standing has been harmed, forced migrants are 
particularly in need of respect and social esteem. Thus, they need to assume social roles and to re-
create social relations.  
As Straehle (2020) has argued about asylum seekers, displaced people, who have been 
deprived of social membership, do not only need shelter and protection against human rights. They 
have relational needs, which are fundamental human needs. Indeed, “social relations provide for 
the kind of social recognition that individuals need to be able to form and implement their idea 
and vision of the good life” (Straehle 2020, p. 537). The relational needs of forced migrants have 
been neglected so far. Straehle notes that asylum seekers are often kept apart from the rest of 
society, prevented from working and controlled. Such arrangements severely limit their 
opportunities for human interaction and lead to social deprivation. As socially deprived, those 
forced migrants are not even in the position to ask for social recognition (Straehle 2020, p. 534). I 
argue that a harms-based account of needs that elucidates the loss of control, the loss of Home and 
social status suffered by forced migrants helps theorists to acknowledge that forced migrants have 
a particularly urgent and strong need to re-create social relations and assume meaningful social 




1.3. Beyond economic self-sufficiency: jobs as means to overcome the harms of displacement 
As I anticipated, needs are strictly intertwined, because several harms may contribute to 
making the fulfilment of the same need particularly crucial for a forced migrant, and such a need 
cannot be properly met if other needs are ignored. For instance, the need to find their own source 
of livelihood, instead of being in a condition of protracted dependence on charitable aid, is 
particularly compelling since it contributes to recovering control over their life plan, to regaining 
social status, and also to developing a meaningful routine and perceiving the place where they 
have moved to as a Home environment. Reducing their sense of powerlessness and humiliation 
also contributes to recovering psychological well-being.  
Compared to protracted reliance on monetary allowance, the opportunity for forced 
migrants to access the job market is thus usually welcomed as a great improvement, as in Ireland, 
where this access was not allowed to asylum seekers until 2018.50 However, simply being free to 
enter the job market, or being assigned to any job, no matter which, does not properly take into 
account the harms involved in forced displacement. For instance, a study on Liberian refugees 
resettled in the United States shows that, in order to fulfil governmental guidelines and secure 
refugees a job within a short time, caseworkers used to urge refugees “to accept menial jobs, 
ignoring their plea for better positions for which they may have qualifications” (Ludwig 2016, p. 
13). Randomly assigned menial jobs may quickly provide forced migrants with a decent level of 
economic self-sufficiency, but they may further undermine their sense of worth and purpose and 
keep them from recovering the social status they lost because of displacement. In the case of Mr. 
Dorgbah Weemongar, who used to have a high-level job concerning health statistics in the Liberian 
government, being signed up by the resettlement agency to work as home health aide was felt as 
“extremely discouraging” and “downgrading [his] status” (Ludwig 2016, pp. 13–14). 
 
50 Murphy et al. 2019, p. 17. In the global South, forced migrants are usually excluded from the job market and unable 
to secure a livelihood. An exception is the widely celebrated “self-reliance model” in Uganda (Betts et al. 2019). 
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It is important to clarify that the social status that forced migrants have a legitimate 
expectation to have restored does not correspond to the socioeconomic position they hold in the 
social hierarchy. There is no legitimate expectation to regain wealth and social prestige as such. In 
addition, social hierarchies may have been unjust and may be irreproducible in the society where 
displaced persons have moved. Clearly, a displaced formerly wealthy slave owner would have no 
legitimate claim to have his slave-owning role restored. A less extreme, yet frequent example is 
the gendered power and social prestige connected with women subordination, which a man may 
find himself unable to restore in a less patriarchal society, for instance when displaced from a rural 
to an urban setting or to a foreign country. The point is not to restore the social position one used 
to have before being displaced, but rather to re-create meaningful social roles for the displaced 
person, where their individual skills and abilities are taken into due consideration. Such skills and 
abilities depend on pre-displacement social roles, which the forced migrant has been deprived of.  
Whatever their previous social status and level of income, the life-plan disruption that 
forced migration entails has harmed them. To reconcile their pre-displacement and post-
displacement lives, forced migrants thus need a job that is not completely alien to them or so 
inappropriate that it is felt as humiliating and disrespectful. What counts is that when assisting a 
forced migrant in finding a source of livelihood, their individual history be taken into account, 
including their previous roles, their skills, the life plan they used to have before displacement, why 
and how they were displaced, their current conditions, and the traumatic experiences they might 
have had in between. Thus, the need to recover a source of livelihood cannot be properly met in 
isolation from the need to recover social status and have one’s individual history, previous roles, 
and skills recognised.  
 
1.4. Integration and recognition policies as means to overcome the harms of displacement 
Forced migrants need to acquire sufficient knowledge of the cultural and social norms 
adopted in the place they have settled in. This is a particularly compelling need because it 
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contributes both to recovering economic and social status and to rebuilding a Home environment. 
In turn, a Home environment is needed to recover control over one’s immediate future. If forced 
migrants lack a Home, a “cool ground”, a relatively stable, understandable, and predictable set of 
geographical and cultural landmarks on which they can rely, they cannot properly make life plans. 
In order to acquire the necessary cultural knowledge to make sense of how things work in 
their destination place, and how they can reorganise a daily routine and make future plans, forced 
migrants need to develop some human relations with members of that society, including other 
fellow newcomers, who may also act as formal or informal cultural mediators and interpreters of 
cultural and social norms. Language is a fundamental social convention, but other interpersonal 
social conventions may be taken for granted and generate misunderstandings among citizens and 
newcomers.51 This may generate suspicion, hostility, and social exclusion, which are particularly 
humiliating for those who have been forcibly compelled to leave their previous place of residence 
and to resettle in an unfamiliar place. Thus, forced migrants need support in the process of social 
and cultural adjustment that moving to a different country or region may entail. However, how 
this support is provided is equally crucial: being lectured by public officials or social workers and 
expected to unilaterally adhere to norms which may be unusual and hardly comprehensible may 
also be perceived as humiliating (Fagen 2006, pp. 76–79). Therefore, host communities should 
also be encouraged to understand and actively include forced migrants, while public officials and 
social workers should also receive specific training. 
As a means to re-create a Home environment, to renegotiate who they are, what is 
meaningful to them, and what they wish for the future, forced migrants need to acquire new 
knowledge and need support in coping with change. However, they also struggle to find continuity 
between their lives before and after forced migration. Thus, they need support in finding out how 
their pre-displacement identity fits with the post-displacement identity they are progressively 
 
51 See Fagen 2006 on misunderstandings caused by reciprocal lack of cultural knowledge. 
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building. The subjective need to keep and continue cultivating one’s cultural heritage varies among 
displaced individuals. However, they all benefit from the opportunity to maintain or develop 
human relations with other displaced people with whom they share some cultural knowledge and 
social norms, if they so wish. How much public recognition and institutional support forced 
migrants’ minoritarian cultures are owed also depends on how forced migrants have been 
displaced and by whom. Nevertheless, independently from responsibility assessment, some groups 
are particularly in need of institutional support to maintain a distinctive way of life, including 
traditional sources of livelihood and distinctive kinds of settlements, religious worship, or 
language. This is the case when entire communities of indigenous or nomadic people are displaced. 
Recall, for instance, the case of the Veddas, the indigenous group in Sri Lanka: the Veddas would 
have needed social integration instead of segregation and marginalisation inside the Sinhalese 
villages; however, they would also have needed the option to continue to practice their religion 
and speak their language along with Sinhalese, instead of undergoing a forced cultural 
assimilation. For indigenous and nomadic peoples, keeping ties with other displaced members of 
the same community and with a specific kind of natural environment is extremely important. Thus, 
when households have been dispersed as a result of unfair resettlement projects, or when 
indigenous forced migrants are compelled to abandon their previous Home environment and 
disperse to survive (as in the Hawawir case mentioned in chapter 2), support for restoring 
interpersonal community ties and re-creating a Home environment is particularly needed. 
Being able to count on a web of social connections, particularly with other forced migrants, 
also provides important support to cope with the psychological distress caused by past or enduring 
traumatic experiences, as well as new anxieties which arose in the new place of residence. As I 
made clear in chapter 2, forced migrants are not equally traumatised and mentally unwell, and not 
all of them necessarily need professional psychological or psychiatric support to recover mental 
well-being. For some, informal, peer-to-peer support provided by friends and acquaintances may 
suffice. For those who need professional support in recovering mental well-being, however, being 
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part of a network of social relations is key: isolation may both exacerbate psychological suffering 
and reduce the opportunities to seek help. Nevertheless, the attitudes of family, friends, and 
members of a group may also adversely affect individual opinions about mental health and one’s 
chances to access mental health services. Indeed, when traumatic experiences and the need for 
psychological support are associated with stigma in their community, this makes forced migrants 
less likely to seek psychological support.52 Thus, when addressing forced migrants’ need to restore 
mental well-being, it is also necessary to raise awareness among them about mental health issues 
and encourage social acceptance of professional psychological support. 
 
1.5. Targeting forced migrants’ specific needs 
One may argue that, in the end, most needs that forced migrants have are similar to the 
needs of the non-displaced population hosting them: having a house, having a job, being mentally 
healthy. Such needs could simply be met with a mainstreaming approach to social services, which 
covers both the needs of forced migrants (or migrants in general) and the needs of the general 
population hosting them. Not only may mainstreaming be more efficient than providing a separate 
set of social services, but it may also avoid fuelling envy and hostility among the general 
population and avoid the stigmatisation of forced migrants as posing extra burdens and receiving 
extra benefits. Forced migrants are sometimes simultaneously marginalised and despised as 
inferior while also accused of being privileged in welfare provision and thus envied. This happens 
not only to international forced migrants, but also to IDPs, especially when they are beneficiaries 
of development-aid programmes in which the local population is not included. For instance, in the 
case of the Muslim IDPs from northern Sri Lanka who moved to the Puttalam region once expelled 
 
52 For instance, “in Syria and neighbouring countries, overt expression of strong emotions may be socially acceptable 
and emotional suffering is perceived as an inherent aspect of life. Instead, it is the explicit labelling of distress as a 
mental health problem that constitutes a source of shame, embarrassment and fear of scandal, because of the risk of 
being considered ‘mad’ or ‘crazy.’ The potential shame extends from patients to their families and affects the use of 
mental health services” (Hassan et al. 2016, p. 134). 
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from their territories by Tamil paramilitaries (LTTE), initial welcoming attitudes among hosts 
turned into hostility towards IDPs. Indeed, IDPs had been singled out as particularly vulnerable 
and had become the exclusive recipients of development aid, while the local population was neither 
included nor consulted about the impact of such projects (Thalayasingam 2009; see also 
Brun 2009). 
Thus, social scientists increasingly invoke mainstreaming development projects in the 
global South as well as social services in the global North, instead of providing separate services 
for IDPs and forced migrants. However, I argue that this should not lead to adopting blind policies 
which ignore the distinctive condition of forced migrants in the host community, and the specific 
needs that displaced groups and displaced individuals have, as a result of having been harmed in 
a distinctive way. As Christine Straehle (2019b, pp. 14-15) points out in relation to refugees’ health 
needs, while all human beings have a basic interest in enjoying physical and mental wellbeing and 
thus have a right to health, the content of such a right depends on specific individual needs. This 
requires that health services be targeted to meet such needs, rather than being based on a fictional, 
universal definition of what constitutes health. In the case of refugees and asylum seekers, Straehle 
argues, the content of the right to health is “based on the individual needs that arise in the context 
of persecution and flight”53. Thus, their health needs differ from those of the citizens of stable and 
peaceful liberal democracies. Targeting such needs, she notes, may demand different health care 
provisions than those normally accepted for citizens, particularly to address psychological trauma. 
Thus, Straehle concludes, asylum seekers and refugees are entitled to services that are not enjoyed 
by citizens (Straehle 2019b, p. 15). The same holds true for forced migrants (including IDPs), who 
have specific needs as a result of the harms of displacement. Targeting forced migrants’ needs, I 
argue, requires either dedicated services or mainstream services capable of acknowledging and 
 
53 Straehle adopts the Geneva Convention definition of refugee which, as we have seen, identifies refugees based on 
persecution and alienage. Given the applicative aims of the paper, she also distinguishes between asylum seekers and 
recognised refugees, whose asylum application has been accepted by the receiving country. 
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addressing specific needs. An approach which attempts to reduce special services for forced 
migrants in favour of mainstreaming universal services might only be fair to them if it is sensitive 
to their distinctive condition, which implies taking into account all past harms and present needs 
as a whole. 
A forced-migrant-sensitive approach to mainstream social service provisions—including 
physical and mental health, education and training, housing, and employment—should be further 
refined to acknowledge that, among forced migrants, some individuals may have more specific 
needs, depending on how they had been harmed. Intersectionality allows us to disclose such needs: 
for instance, gender, provenance, and sexual orientation might be taken into account. As we have 
seen in Chapter 2, female forced migrants are more likely than male forced migrants to have 
suffered sexual and gender-based violence, as a result of the events that forced them to migrate or 
of the events that occurred after displacement. Trafficked women are the most likely to be forced 
into sex work, but other displaced women may also end up engaging in survival sex work, 
particularly if ostracised by their community of origin for having been raped, if unable to marry or 
find their own source of livelihood, or if caught in abusive relationships (Bartolomei et al. 2014). 
Importantly, such traumatic experiences proved to have enduring consequences even once 
abused women have settled in a Western country. An extensive study carried out in Australia 
reported that interviewed women did not only continue to face stigma and ostracisation, but they 
were also particularly vulnerable to further sexual violence. For instance, women “known to have 
engaged in survival sex before arriving in Australia reported being targeted for abuse and 
harassment. They disclosed that men come to their homes demanding sex and rape them if they 
refuse” (Bartolomei et al. 2014, p. 51). Those women, often socially isolated and psychologically 
traumatised, were also more unlikely to access general welfare services and thus more unlikely to 
have other fundamental needs met, apart from their physical and mental health needs. In this 
Australian case study, women tend to avoid mental health services when stigmatised as “mad”. 
Furthermore, if “unable to learn English quickly as a result of the traumas they have experienced, 
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[they] are less likely to be able to be employed and therefore find it difficult to find safe and 
affordable housing. . . . This forces them to rent housing in unsafe neighbourhoods where they 
experience racism and discrimination and are isolated from community and services. It is difficult 
for services to reach them and for them to reach out to services” (Bartolomei et al. 2014, p. 52). 
Thus, their needs to regain social and economic status and to remake a safe and reliable Home 
environment in the destination country are not adequately met either. 
Displaced men, by contrast, may be socially stigmatised or feel guilty and ashamed because 
they did not live up to social expectations about their role (as males) in protecting female family 
members from violence; or they may become more likely to engage in violent behaviours against 
women in their families after they have been displaced, as a result of their inability to adequately 
cope with the harms they themselves have suffered.54 Furthermore, LGBT+ forced migrants may 
have undergone specific forms of violence and persecution which might have triggered 
displacement or otherwise impacted their needs once they are displaced.55 This subset of forced 
migrants should thus receive dedicated or otherwise targeted mainstream services. Research on 
male and LGBT+ sexual violence survivors in Syria, for instance, highlighted that they both 
“required specialised and differentiated care”, and that they “could feel uncomfortable accessing 
care through female-oriented service points” (Chynoweth 2018). All in all, only by taking into 
account past and enduring harms connected with forced displacement is it possible to assess what 
forced migrants need, to determine when forced-migrant-sensitive mainstreaming policies are 
appropriate to meet the distinctive needs of a displaced group or person, and when dedicated 
policies are needed. 
 
54 Bartolomei et al. 2014. In her research on Somali refugees in Norway, Fagen (2006, p. 87) also notes that “even 
though violence seems not to be unusual in Somali families, some of the instances of wife battering in Norway seem 
to have been triggered by a feeling of frustration and anger at not coping with one’s own situation in diaspora”, 
particularly their loss of previous social status and role as breadwinners. See also Roupetz et al. 2020 on intimate 
partner violence among Syrian forced migrants in Lebanon. 
55 Hopkinson et al. 2017. Note that LGBT+ people may be persecuted not only by repressive state actors, but also by 
nonstate actors, such as gangs, as in Central America, where widespread and systemic violence against people because 




2. The Moral Relevance of Forced Migrants’ Distinctive Needs 
The previous section illustrated the distinctive needs that arise from the harms of forced 
displacement. Freedom of movement alone does not suffice to meet such needs. Thus, suppressing 
the concept of forced migration in favour of a broader concept of migration or mobility would 
impede us from recognising and meeting the distinctive needs of those who have been harmed by 
forced migration. Moreover, the fulfilment of such needs is more demanding than the fulfilment 
of basic survival needs such as having enough food and water or having a shelter. Therefore, 
emergency humanitarian assistance would not suffice either. What then grounds the claim of a 
forced migrant to have such more demanding needs met? Why are they morally compelling? In 
this section, I will argue that forced migrants’ claims to have their distinctive needs met are 
analogous to human rights, because they are equally fundamental to provide the conditions for a 
dignified, minimally flourishing human life. Building on Lindsey Kingston’s recent theory of 
human rights, I will highlight that meeting forced migrants’ distinctive rights is necessary to fulfil 
the human interests in place and purpose that, according to Kingston, lie behind human rights lists. 
However, I will contend that although forced migrants’ rights belong to the same genus as human 
rights, they remain distinctive because they arise as a result of the distinctive harms entailed in 
forced displacement. This has an important upshot for the ethics of forced migration. It shows that 
the language of general human rights does not fully capture the peculiarity of forced migrants’ 
condition compared to those of both voluntary migrants and non-migrants whose human rights are 
unmet. When it comes to policy, it also clarifies why treating forced migrants as generically 
vulnerable and destitute people needing humanitarian assistance is an unsatisfactory approach. 
Furthermore, it also stresses that emphasising “durable solutions” (repatriation, local integration, 
and resettlement) obscures the fact that assigning forced migrants to a state responsible for their 




2.1. Why Forced Migrants’ Needs Are Fundamental 
In her recent book, Kingston argues that humans have fundamental rights to place and 
purpose. Her understanding of the rights to place and purpose expresses the importance of the 
needs I described, such as the needs to regain control over one’s body and private space and ability 
to make future plans, the need for a Home environment, and the need for social recognition of 
one’s individual identity. Indeed, she writes that “rights to place represent basic entitlements to 
home, both in the sense of geographic location as well as in the sense of belonging. . . . Relatedly, 
the right to purpose encapsulates a collection of rights provisions aimed at providing the 
opportunities necessary to pursue one’s goals and actualize the right to self-determination. At the 
most basic level, the right to purpose centers on the belief that people must have control over their 
own destinies” (Kingston 2019, pp. 10–11). 
Kingston argues that rights to place and purpose are threatened, to a varying extent, when 
people lack what she calls a “functioning citizenship”. Far from being exceptional, she claims, this 
issue concerns not only stateless or displaced persons, but also irregular migrants and members of 
discriminated-against groups, such as nomadic and indigenous peoples. Forced migrants’ needs 
may thus be viewed as arising from the specific ways in which their human rights to place and 
purpose have been infringed. According to Kingston, forced displacement “is perhaps the most 
extreme case of denied rights to place”, which “begins with a first instance of forced movement” 
and results in “a long process that continually threatens, transforms, and problematizes our 
understanding of the right to place” (Kingston 2019, p. 93). Indeed, she notes elsewhere that 
“rights to place are further violated by the destruction of community ties—and, in some cases, by 
denationalization and other rights abuses that strip individuals of their ability to return home” 
(Kingston 2019, p. 10). When it comes to rights to purpose, she points out that displaced people 
are compelled to prioritise their immediate needs to survival and “often find that their rights to 
purpose remain seriously compromised after they achieve relative levels of safety in camps and 
other places of refuge” (Kingston 2019, p. 94). 
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Kingston admits that legal human rights documents do not use the term “rights to place and 
purpose”, but she claims that they are expressed by legally recognised rights: 
For instance, the rights to place within the UDHR [Universal Declaration of Human Rights] consist of freedom 
from arbitrary detention or exile (Article 9), freedom of movement and residence within state borders 
(Article 13.1), the rights to leave any country and the right to return to their own (Article 13.2), the right to 
seek and enjoy asylum (Article 14), and the right to a nationality—including protections against arbitrary 
deprivation and the right to change one’s nationality (Article 15). The rights to purpose may include marriage 
and family rights (Article 16), the right to property (Article 17), freedom of “thought, conscience and religion” 
(Article 18), freedom of opinion and expression (Article 19), freedom of assembly and association (Article 20), 
rights to political participation and public service (Article 21), entitlements to the “economic, social and 
cultural rights indispensable for [one’s] dignity and the free development of [one’s] personality” (Article 22), 
employment rights (Article 23), rights to rest and leisure (Article 24), educational rights (Article 26), and rights 
to culture and community (Articles 27 and 29) (United Nations General Assembly 1948).56 
Following Kingston, we might suggest that general human rights to place and purpose are 
implied in human rights doctrine and detailed in human rights lists. Thus, forced migrants’ 
distinctive needs may be viewed as specifications of the general human rights to place and purpose, 
which arise in their specific condition of displacement. In other words, while all human beings 
have rights to place and purpose, forced migrants have distinctive needs as they are displaced 
human beings whose rights to place and purpose have been denied as a result of displacement and 
need to be restored taking their distinctive condition into account. 
Recovering control is needed to enjoy both the rights to place and the rights to purpose. 
Without control over one’s body, immediate environment, and personal belongings, rights to place 
are infringed. Thus, while collective temporary shelters and food distribution are necessary to the 
rights to life and bodily integrity, they are not sufficient to secure the right to place. Moreover, 
recovering control over one’s immediate future is necessary for rights to purpose to be fulfilled. 
Though forced migrants’ rights to purpose may have been already undermined before 
 
56 Kingston 2019, pp. 11–12. 
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displacement (e.g., if their educational rights and social, economic, and cultural rights were not 
respected), the disruptive impact of forced migration upsets the purpose they used to give to their 
life. Moreover, the loss of their livelihood and the loss of their social roles within a familiar Home 
environment, composed of well-known geographical landmarks, social and cultural conventions, 
and reliable human relations, make it much harder to enjoy rights to purpose. In the new 
environment they have fled to or have been forcibly resettled in, new formal and informal obstacles 
arise for displaced persons in having their rights to employment, education, culture, and 
community life respected. Moreover, psychological obstacles may also hinder their effort at 
replanning their life and reconsidering its purpose: traumatic memories, feelings of guilt for having 
fled, fear for the uncertain future, nostalgia for their life before displacement, anger for what they 
have been obliged to leave behind, and more. Thus, forced migrants develop new and distinctive 
needs as a result of displacement that should be met to enjoy the fundamental human interests in 
leading their lives in a place and with purpose. 
If we value general human rights, we should also recognise the analogous moral relevance 
of forced migrants’ needs. Both the fulfilment of general human rights and the fulfilment of forced 
migrants’ distinctive needs share the same object, which is to secure place and purpose. They also 
share the same goal; indeed, place and purpose provide the conditions of a dignified, minimally 
flourishing life.57 Consider the use Kingston makes of the word “dignity” in the following 
passages. She claims that rights to place and rights to purpose offer us “the bare necessities 
required for living a life of human dignity”, and that they “make a life of human dignity possible”. 
Inspired by Arendt’s influential works, Kingston stresses the fact that “a life of dignity requires 
not only the bare necessities to sustain human life and survival, such as food and water, but also 
 
57 The goal of a flourishing life might be thought to put the threshold too high: Gilabert observes that human rights 
are more appropriately thought to secure a decent life, while social justice is aimed at promoting a fully flourishing 
life (see Gilabert 2018, p. 196). In the current non-ideal world, and plausibly even in a not-yet-just open-borders world, 
not only forced migrants but also voluntary migrants and hosts lack the enabling conditions for an ideal, fully 
flourishing life. Indeed, my point is that forced displacement often undermines the very conditions for a decent, or 
minimally flourishing, life and that forced migrants need special support to recover them. 
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includes opportunities for action, expression, and belonging that make life worth living”.58 
Pointing to refugee camps as a paradigmatic example where conditions for a “life of dignity” are 
lacking, she notes that social workers and reporters frequently describe camps as “soul-
destroying”, as “places that keep people alive but stop them from living”. Indeed, people hardly 
perceive camps as their Home and lack “anything to fill their days”, which is to say purposes, and 
“opportunities to engage in purposeful activity, including the sorts of meaningful work and study 
that so many people consider central to their sense of identity and worth” (Kingston 2019, pp. 9–
10). In the case of displaced people, I argue, being able to restore control over one’s body, personal 
space, and immediate future, to recognise one’s habitual place of residence as a Home, to 
undertake social roles, and to receive interpersonal recognition are special needs that forced 
migrants have to have met to restore place and purpose. Thus, fulfilling forced migrants’ 
distinctive needs is necessary to provide the conditions for a dignified, minimally flourishing 
human life. 
It is important to clarify, firstly, that what is at stake is the object of human rights (fulfilling 
the fundamental interest in having place and purpose) and their point, or goal (securing place and 
purpose as they provide the conditions for a dignified, minimally flourishing life). Secondly, the 
object and point of human rights should not be conflated with the foundations of human rights. 
Following the works of Pablo Gilabert and Jan-Willelm van der Rijt, I propose to distinguish 
between two meanings of dignity which often overlap: the first is “status-dignity”, or “inherent 
dignity”, while the second is “condition dignity”, or “contingent dignity”.59 Status-dignity, or 
inherent dignity, pertains to the foundations of human rights, while condition dignity, or contingent 
dignity, is what human rights are aimed to guarantee. Here, my aim is to show that forced migrants’ 
distinctive needs are morally compelling as their fulfilment is necessary to have their human rights 
 
58 Kingston 2019, p. 11. A similar view is defended in Parekh 2017, whose work draws explicitly on Arendt’s 
conception of ontological loss and on her conception of action. 
59 Gilabert uses the terms “status-dignity” and “condition-dignity”, while van de Rijt uses “inherent dignity” and 
“contingent dignity” (see Gilabert 2018 and van der Rijt 2017). 
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to place and purpose met and thus to provide the condition for a “dignified” or “sufficiently 
flourishing” life. I am not interested in taking any side in the debate on what ultimately provides 
the foundations for human rights. 
It is true that the preamble of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 
relies on the notion of inherent dignity and that article 1 states that all human beings are “born free 
and equal in dignity and rights”. The UDHR affirms that since human beings possess inherent 
dignity (i.e., worth) qua human beings, they are equally entitled to some fundamental rights, which 
in turn are meant to protect their conditional dignity. The UDHR, though, does not specify in virtue 
of what human feature all and only human beings possess such inherent dignity. Kantians may 
point to the distinctively human capacity to act both rationally and morally, making autonomous 
choices according to a moral law or a conception of the good. However, it has been disputed 
whether it is possible to draw a line above which variations in the presence of such a capacity no 
longer matter, so that individuals in such a range have equal dignity, and what it implies in hard 
cases where humans do not yet, or no longer, possess such a feature to the relevant degree (e.g., 
young children and some mentally ill persons) or could never develop it (e.g., those who were born 
with severe mental disabilities). Some theorists have even argued against the entire enterprise of 
searching for a foundation of inherent dignity and urged getting rid of the concept itself (see inter 
alia Sangiovanni 2017). Debating the grounds of human rights is an important task for political 
theorists. Nonetheless, I will not attempt to delve into the foundations debate. My less ambitious 
aim in this section has been to show the affinity between human rights and the needs that forced 
migrants have qua forced migrants. Indeed, it is not necessary to endorse a conception of inherent 
dignity as a foundation for general human rights in order to appreciate their role, and the analogous 
role of forced migrants’ specific rights, in protecting condition dignity. For instance, what 
Kingston calls a “life of dignity” does not seem to be far from what Sangiovanni, avoiding any 
appeal to the concept of dignity, calls a life where the “structural conditions for a flourishing life” 
are met (Sangiovanni 2017). 
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To sum up, I have argued that forced migrants’ specific rights share the same object and 
the same point as general human rights, and that this analogy holds irrespective of what moral 
grounding of the theory of human rights we assume. The aim of the next subsection, however, is 
to argue that forced migrants’ rights are specific, and thus cannot simply be covered by general 
human rights lists, because they arise as a result of the distinctive harms entailed by forced 
displacement. 
 
2.2 Specific Claims: Why Forced Migrants Are Not Just Owed Human Rights Protection 
I have argued so far that forced migrants’ needs give rise to rights that are analogous to 
general human rights. Could not such rights be subsumed under general human rights? In the end, 
forced migrants are entitled to human rights, just like any other non-displaced human being. This 
position seems to be held by several political theorists. In her very recent book, Parekh wonders: 
“If we have obligation to refugees, what exactly are they? The answer is surprisingly simple and 
has a good deal of consensus: human rights” (Parekh 2020, p. 54). I agree with Parekh about the 
fact that we owe to forced migrants the conditions for human dignity, but I do not think that the 
provisions of basic human rights capture the distinctiveness of the forced-displacement condition. 
The point is that forced migrants do not just need what non-displaced people need to enjoy the 
fundamental conditions for a dignified, minimally flourishing life. Borrowing Aristotelian terms, 
we might define the claims of forced migrants to have their needs fulfilled as belonging to the 
genus of human rights (i.e., moral claims to have place and purpose, understood as basic conditions 
for a dignified, minimally flourishing human life). Yet, forced migrants’ rights are distinctive and 
specific. General human rights cannot cover them, nor should they, because non-displaced people 
(including voluntary migrants) do not have the same needs as forcibly displaced people.  
The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and in the Framework on Durable 
Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons seem to implicitly acknowledge that the specific needs 
of displaced people give rise to additional specific rights. The Framework states that “A durable 
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solution is achieved when internally displaced persons no longer have any specific assistance and 
protection needs that are linked to their displacement and can enjoy their human rights without 
discrimination on account of their displacement”. The Guiding Principles are aimed to “address 
the specific needs of internally displaced persons” by identifying relevant rights and guarantees. 
Several articles begin by stating a general human right such as the right to life, liberty and security, 
freedom of movement or family life, and then consider what IDPs specifically need to enjoy this 
right, compared to non-displaced people. Outside the displacement realm, there are several binding 
and non-binding human rights document listing the rights of specific categories of people, such as 
the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People (UNDRIP), the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child or the Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities. The normative 
status of the rights of forced migrants, I argue, is analogous to the normative status of these special 
rights.  
What gives rise to the specific difference of forced migrants’ distinctive rights are the 
harms of forced displacement, which is to say the specific ways in which they have been deprived 
of the conditions to meet the fundamental human interests in having place and purpose. As a result 
of the harms of displacement, forced migrants have specific and additional needs that non-
displaced people do not have, and they should enjoy specific rights until they cease to have these 
additional needs. Only then they can enjoy general human rights on an equal basis as non-displaced 
people. 
Of course, the conditions to meet the fundamental human interests in having place and 
purpose may be infringed independently from forced displacement. The same person may already 
have such conditions denied in several ways prior to forced displacement. Some of these pre-
displacement harms can be effectively described as human rights violations. However, forced 
displacement entails additional harms. Recall the fictional example of the Afghan woman sketched 
at the beginning of chapter 2. Suppose she grew up under the Taliban regime and she had some of 
her human rights denied (including the rights to education, employment, and free movement) well 
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before her displacement. She had been forced into marriage as a teenager and used to spend most 
of her daily routine inside her house, given that she was only allowed leave the house with a male 
guardian. No doubt, she was already deprived of the conditions for a minimally flourishing life 
before being displaced, although her life was fairly stable and predictable. Imagine, however, that 
her husband, who serves as teacher in the local school, refuses to abide by one of the rules imposed 
by the regime and the whole family is forced to flee persecution and death threats. Alternatively, 
imagine that during the war her husband is killed by shrapnel, and she ends up in a camp with 
other widowed women fleeing generalised violence. If she were merely recognised as a victim of 
general human rights violations, both before and after forced migration, this would not allow us to 
acknowledge the crucial change in her existential condition that came with displacement. 
In addition to harms covered by general human rights lists, other pre-displacement human 
rights violations could be identified that point to specific human rights lists which cover specific 
categories of people, such as indigenous people (UNDRIP 2007). Again, the point is that forced 
displacement entails additional harms for this subset of people as well. Imagine a man who belongs 
to a Colombian indigenous minority. He grew up in a decrepit house in a remote rural area with 
insufficient infrastructures and was unable to continue his education after primary school. He lives 
off subsistence crops that he grows on the collective community land. He belongs to a minority 
systematically discriminated against and marginalised on racial grounds in education, 
employment, political participation, and media representation. Imagine, however, that members of 
some paramilitary group force him to leave his house and his collective community land under the 
threat of killing him and raping his daughter. He might have been accused of supporting a rival 
guerrilla group, or his land might have been targeted for unlawful seizure by an expanding palm 
oil company.60 He moves to a shanty town in the suburbs of the closest city, which looks 
completely unfamiliar to him, to look for a job he has never done. In vain he tries to find out who 
 
60 Forced displacement in Colombia will be extensively discussed in chapter 5. On displacement as a political 
cleansing strategy, see Steele 2017. On displacement as a strategy for land grabbing, see Maher 2015. 
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exactly has forced him to move and why. He is constantly looked at with suspicion and open 
hostility by the local population, who accuse him of being a terrorist hiding from the authorities. 
He feels humiliated, angry, and afraid that his kids might be recruited by gangs and drug cartels 
controlling the urban area. Even if pointing to the rights of indigenous peoples may add some 
precision in assessing, for instance, what is owed to a Colombian indigenous desterrado, this is 
again not enough to make sense of the distinctive harms he experienced qua forced migrant, 
compared to non-displaced Colombian indigenous people. Analogously to the rights of indigenous 
people, the distinctive rights of forced migrants belong to the same primary genus as human rights. 
Yet they constitute a different species of rights which apply to a specific subset of human beings. 
What is owed to forced migrants, in addition to the fulfilment of their general human rights 
qua human beings (and in addition to the pre-displacement special rights they might have as 
members of a vulnerable group), is the recognition that, as forced migrants, they have specific 
needs which give rise to fundamental yet distinctive rights. Indeed, such specific rights arise when 
the basic human interests in place and purpose providing conditions for a dignified life are 
undermined as a result of the specific harms entailed by forced displacement (i.e., the loss of 
control, the loss of the Home environment, the loss of livelihood and social status, and the loss of 
psychological well-being). 
I leave open the question of the legal status and exact content that such rights should have. 
Theorists debating the possibility of reforming the Geneva Convention on the refugee status are 
well aware of the feasibility limits in making the Convention more demanding and stringent. 
Rights contained in non-binding documents such as the Declarations and Guidelines, such as those 
on Internal Displacement, may eventually be incorporated in domestic law, regional treaties and 
gradually become part of customary law. Whatever the legal form that a document on forced 
migrants right might take, I argue that it should be based on a harms-based understanding of the 






This chapter adopted a backwards-looking, harms-based approach to assess what is owed 
to forced migrants. The first section argued that forced migrants have distinctive needs that depend 
on the distinctive harms of displacement discussed in the previous chapter. Such needs extend well 
beyond survival needs that humanitarian emergency assistance is meant to fulfil, and they exceed 
the need to move to a safe haven, which has attracted much attention among scholars. Yet, forced 
migrants have a strong moral claim to have those specific needs fulfilled. Section 2 was devoted 
to considering what kind of moral claim forced migrants have in seeking to have such needs met. 
I have argued that the moral relevance of forced migrants’ distinctive needs lies in the fact that 
their fulfilment is necessary to provide the fundamental conditions of a dignified, minimally 
flourishing life. This is also the purpose of human rights. Forced migrants’ claims to have their 
distinctive needs met, then, are fundamental, analogously to human rights. However, they are also 
specific because they depend on the distinctive harms of forced displacement, which is to say on 
the distinctive ways in which forced migrants have been deprived of the conditions for a minimally 
flourishing life. Therefore, subsuming forced migrants’ rights under general human rights would 
prevent us from acknowledging what makes the predicament of forced migrants distinctive and 
from appropriately remedying the harms they have suffered. 
In the next chapter, I will move to the issue of who is responsible for meeting forced 
migrants’ distinctive needs. Again, a backwards-looking, harms-based approach will allow us to 
recognise reparative responsibilities that states and non-state actors have on the basis of their 
contribution to causing the harms involved in forced displacement and thus in generating forced 




Repairing the Harms of Forced Migration 
 
1. Responsibility for Forced Migrants 
The previous chapter argued that forced migrants have strong moral claims to the fulfilment 
of their distinctive needs, because those needs express the same fundamental human interests that 
are protected by human rights. Indeed, forced migrants have distinctive rights because the specific 
harms entailed by displacement have undermined, in a specific manner, the essential conditions to 
lead a dignified, or decent, or minimally flourishing life. This section addresses the issue of what 
institutions have the duty to meet the specific needs of forced migrants, and what kind of moral 
obligation they have towards them. 
Who is responsible for the needs of forced migrants? It might be useful to distinguish 
between two meanings this sentence can have: first, one may wonder who is responsible for 
generating such needs; second, one may wonder who is responsible for remedying them. The first 
interpretation refers to what Miller calls outcome responsibility, while the second refers to what 
he calls remedial responsibility (Miller 2007, chapter 4). According to Miller, an agent is outcome 
responsible when they caused, or contributed to, a certain outcome, given that such outcome was 
foreseeable, although not necessarily intended. By contrast, one is remedially responsible when 
one is in a position to remedy an outcome. While outcome responsibility may be discovered, 
remedial responsibility is attributed. In Miller’s account, being outcome responsible is one of the 
criteria on the basis of which remedial responsibility can be assigned, although other criteria (most 
notably capacity) should be taken into account (Miller 2007, pp. 99–104). 
When it comes to forced migrants, remedial responsibility is in practice generally assigned 
to states on the basis of their geographical position, independently of outcome responsibility. It is 
assumed that the responsibility to provide a safe haven falls on the closer “safe” country, and often 
the same proximate states are also expected to provide a “durable solution” in the form of local 
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integration. However, numerous forced migrants find themselves in a condition of prolonged 
encampment, as a “de facto durable solution” (Parekh 2017, p. 3), because the host state does not 
actually provide local integration: once admission to the territory has been granted, the host state 
does not take on the responsibility to fulfil forced migrants’ distinctive needs, which would require 
greater economic and social costs. This is because host states consider the moral obligation to 
address forced migrants’ needs as a matter of charity. The other states, which may have greater 
capacity to address forced migrants’ needs, also assume that their duty to provide for them, by 
supporting host states in local integration or resettling forced migrants to their territory, is a matter 
of charity.  
Not only political actors, but also scholars usually frame the moral obligations states have 
towards forced migrants as humanitarian. As Valentini notes, there is little controversy among 
political theorists about the existence of duties of charity, which is to say humanitarian duties, or 
duties of beneficence. When someone is in need, as in Singer’s often-cited case of the child 
drowning in the pond, any agent who has the capacity to help at a reasonable cost has a moral 
obligation to do so (Valentini 2013). Divergences arise concerning how this sort of moral 
obligation should be attributed, since there are multiple bystanders by the pond, i.e., multiple states 
that can provide help to displaced people at a reasonable cost.61 Yet, such a burden-sharing debate 
assumes that states have humanitarian obligations that do not depend on any pre-existing relations 
between the agent and the recipient of aid: humanitarian obligations are forward-looking. 
By contrast, I have argued that a backwards-looking understanding of forced migrants’ 
needs is necessary to assess what is owed to them: to make sense of what they need once displaced, 
we should take into account the way they have been harmed. In this chapter, I argue that a 
backwards-looking approach is also necessary to understand who is responsible for fulfilling 
 
61 While Singer’s pond thought experiment included just a bystander, when bystanders are more than one it becomes 
less clear how to determine each bystander’s fair share of humanitarian obligations and whether others should “take 
up the slack” in cases of non-compliance. Indeed, these issues have attracted a lively debate when it comes to 
humanitarian obligations towards refugees (see, inter alia, Stemplowska 2016). 
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forced migrants’ needs and to make sense of the kind of responsibility that responsible agents bear.  
A harms-based account of needs sheds light on the causes of forced migrants’ displacement and 
allows us to see whether any agents are involved in producing such harms and the subsequent 
needs. Assuming this perspective, mass displacements, in the current non-ideal world, turn out not 
to be purely natural disasters or the fruit of bad luck, but rather foreseeable (though not necessarily 
intended) outcomes of human actions and social processes. Thus, I argue, outcome-responsible 
agents have a reparative responsibility to redress the harms involved in forced displacement and 
to meet the needs that forced migrants have as a result of such harms. Acknowledging 
responsibility for harm is a key component of what forced migrants are owed, which a forward-
looking approach cannot provide. 
David Owen has already argued against the dominant humanitarian understanding of 
states’ obligations towards refugees. Owen claims that states have a reparative, rather than 
remedial, responsibility for the “failure of the international order of states to secure the conditions 
under which individuals and groups can enjoy basic rights in their own states” (Owen 2020, p. 67). 
Thus, for Owen, refugee protection raises duties of justice, more precisely obligations to “[redress] 
the wrong and harms to which refugees are subject” (Owen 2020, p. 67), and the discharging of 
this duty, he argues, is required to repair the legitimacy gap opened up by the failure of the 
international order. I agree with Owen in conceiving responsibility for forced migration as 
reparative, and in attributing obligations of justice to responsible agents, rather than less stringent 
humanitarian obligations. However, I assume a different account of what is owed to forced 
migrants, because I maintain that states have a duty to fulfil forced migrants’ distinctive needs qua 
displaced people, and not to generically fulfil their human rights. As a result, in my account 
reparative responsibility has a different justification. In Owens’ theory states have a reparative 
responsibility to secure forced migrant’s human rights because, as international order of states, 
they have failed to ensure that each person have their human rights fulfilled, and such an order has 
become illegitimate. What needs repairing is the legitimacy of the order of states. By contrast, in 
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my account states have a reparative responsibility to meet forced migrant’s specific needs because 
they contributed to producing the harms of displacement, which have undermined forced migrants’ 
basic conditions for a dignified life, and meeting their needs is necessary to secure such conditions. 
What needs repairing are the conditions for a dignified life undermined by the harms of 
displacement. 
While repairing the legitimacy of the order of states is a powerful reason for states to step 
in and take responsibility for forced migrants’ rights qua human beings, I argue that it is not 
sufficiently precise to explain why an agent would have a duty of justice to fulfil forced migrants’ 
specific rights as a reparation for the harms they suffered qua displaced persons. Restoring the 
legitimacy of the international order, per se, does not seem to require the fulfilment of refugees’ 
distinctive needs qua displaced people who have undergone specific harms. Since the international 
order is legitimate if, and only if, each person belongs to a state which guarantees their basic rights, 
what repairing legitimacy requires is that those whose state has failed are assigned to a state which 
can guarantee their basic rights qua human beings. Indeed, Owen maintains that the fundamental 
wrong in the case of Geneva Convention refugees is their being de facto stateless as a result of 
persecution; thus, asylum and eventually a new citizenship are what they are owed. Political 
pictures of refugeehood also underline the expressive role that states perform when they act in loco 
civitatis: they condemn the state of origin for violating or failing to protect the human rights of 
their citizens (see also Price 2006). However, condemnation seems to apply to this wrong, i.e., the 
lack of human rights protection provided by effective citizenship, rather than to the harms 
specifically connected to forced displacement. As Kingston (2019) widely illustrates, not only 
displaced people but also numerous people belonging to marginalised groups lack effective 
citizenship (though they may formally have one). Restoring the legitimacy of the international 
order seems to require securing effective citizenship to those who lack it, either displaced or not, 
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rather than repairing the distinctive harms that displacement entails.62 Moreover, since Owen 
offers a theory to assess what is owed to those who are displaced outside their country of 
nationality and who should provide for them, IDPs remain out of the picture, though they endure 
displacement-related harms too. 
In my view, fulfilling forced migrants’ needs should indeed be framed as an issue of justice. 
However, such duties of reparative justice arise as consequences of the violation of the negative 
duty to do no harm, because several agents are causally connected to forced displacement and thus 
to the distinctive harms and needs which arise as a result. Indeed, the harms of forced displacement 
do not simply arise from a failure, on the part of the states of origin, to secure forced migrants’ 
human rights to place and purpose; nor do they merely follow from the international community’s 
failure to assist them once displaced.63 On the contrary, not only home states, but also external 
states and non-state actors act in ways that directly contribute to the harms of forced displacement 
itself. This is to say that their actions contribute to the harms of forced displacement, either directly 
or indirectly, through their participation in structures and their contribution to processes that 
foreseeably trigger forced displacement. 
 
1.1. Special Reparative Responsibility for Harmful Actions 
Owen argues that states may have special responsibilities to refugees in virtue of their 
unjust acts or omissions foreseeably contributing to the production of these refugees. 
Responsibility for harm is a widely endorsed moral principle, and it has long been applied to states 
 
62 One may also observe that, if lack of effective citizenship is so pervasive, then the creation of refugees does not 
deviate from a baseline of legitimacy: the legitimacy of the international order does not seem to be in need of being 
restored, but of being achieved. 
63 Of course, the way forced displacement is managed may cause further harms and entail additional responsibilities. 
For instance, Parekh has argued that the international community is responsible for actively preventing forced 
migrants from finding “refuge”, meaning “minimum conditions of human dignity”, while they wait for a durable 
solution (Parekh 2020, p. 20). The international community, in other words, is responsible for providing those who 
have been displaced with unacceptable options only and thus for the harm they experience “as they seek refuge” 
(Parekh 2020, p. 19, emphasis in the original). Note that the responsibility for this secondary harm is independent 
from the responsibility for causing displacement in the first place. 
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as agents (Gibney 2004, p. 49). Moreover, few would deny that the unjust acts or omissions of 
states of origin originate forced displacement and those states should be held accountable for them. 
Bradley (2013) has argued that states of origin owe refugees repatriation as a form of redress. 
Indeed, the home country’s reparative responsibility for those who have been displaced (including 
IDPs) is particularly relevant in postconflict situations and may be a crucial component of 
transitional-justice processes (Duthie 2011). I do not mean to deny the special reparative 
responsibility that states of origin bear, in virtue of their acts or their failures to live up to their 
special duties to protect the human and citizenship rights of their nationals. However, I agree with 
Owen that in some cases there are specific external states that bear “some significant portion of 
[outcome] responsibility” for displacement and that this grounds special obligations towards those 
who have been forced to move. Indeed, such cases are more frequent than we might think. 
Certainly, as Gibney (2004, p. 51) noted, they are more frequent than acknowledged by those who 
adopt an “internalist approach”, according to which “the harms that generate refugees are caused 
solely by the states that they have fled”. 
External states, including Western ones, do act in ways that lead to or contribute to 
displacement. A paradigmatic case is military intervention: Gibney recalls the examples of US and 
Australian involvement in Vietnam in the 1960s and the NATO bombings in Kosovo in the 1990s. 
However, he notes, in most cases external intervention crucially contributes to displacements in 
which the state of origin is also implicated. External states may for instance sell and supply military 
equipment or provide economic and political support to the actors which appear directly connected 
to displacement itself (Gibney 2004, p. 52). Owen also provides two fictional examples to illustrate 
external states’ involvement. In the first case, “State A actively supports a dictatorial regime in 
State B, with the reasonably foreseeable consequence that particular individuals or groups are 
liable to be subject to persecution by the state (or by nonstate actors from which the state is not 
disposed to protect them)”. In the second case, “States A, B and C illegitimately act to produce, 
enable or exacerbate the breakdown of public order and the spread of generalised violence in State 
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D with the foreseeable consequence that affected citizens of State D have compelling reason to 
flee its territory or not return to it” (Owen 2020, p. 87). Thus, as Gibney and Owen illustrate, not 
only actions directly causing displacement, such as military intervention, but also actions indirectly 
but foreseeably related to it, such as diplomatic or economic support to states that generate 
refugees, can make external states outcome responsible for such displaced people. 
One might object that it seems counterintuitive to claim that states have special reparative 
responsibilities when forced migration derives from morally legitimate actions. If a state took up 
the responsibility to protect the human rights of citizens in a foreign country and this leads to 
displacing some of them as collateral, inevitable damage, it would seem unfair to impose to this 
state a duty to repair the harms of forced migration, particularly when the other states have refused 
to step in. Besides, this would disincentives any kind of displacement-enhancing intervention even 
when refraining from intervening amounted to culpable omission or collusion with a human-rights-
violating agent. Owen clarifies that special reparative responsibility arises in cases of illegitimate 
actions. He does not seem to hold states responsible when forced migration derives from actions 
“authorised under the norms of the international order of states and, hence, can be seen as acting 
in ways consonant with, or as the representative of, this international order” (Owen 2020, p. 122).  
Clearly, the legitimacy of the reasons for displacement makes a crucial difference. When 
causing displacement is morally illegitimate, the outcome responsible states are also morally 
responsible. Forced migrants, on their part, are not only harmed but also wronged. In principle, if 
an action causing forced migration was legitimate, I concede that it would not entail reparative 
responsibility. However, for a displacement-enhancing action such as a military intervention to be 
legitimate, it does not suffice that it is legal or authorised by the UN. It should be both morally 
justified, and procedurally just and proportionate (i.e., such actions genuinely strive at protecting 
the target population, do not exploit humanitarian justification to pursue the interests of the 
intervening state and genuinely attempt to minimise collateral damage, including forced 
displacement). In practice, few real-world examples would meet both requirements. Thus, even 
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adding the legitimacy caveat, states directly contributing to displacement typically retain special 
reparative responsibility for the displaced people, because displacement is not legitimate. 
Having agreed with Owen that external states have a special reparative responsibility for 
those they forced to migrate outside the country of origin, I argue that special reparative 
responsibility should be extended in three directions. Firstly, concerning the scope of 
responsibility, I argue that external states have special reparative responsibilities towards the 
internally displaced people whose displacement they have contributed to.64 For instance, if the 
United States or the UK has special reparative responsibilities for the Iraqis who have been forced 
to migrate across borders after the coalition attacked Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003, such 
responsibilities also apply to those who have been displaced inside Iraq for the same reason. 
Likewise, the United States also has special responsibilities for those Colombian IDPs whose 
displacement can be linked to the US government’s “war on drugs” and “war on terror”. Indeed, 
for decades the United States has provided strong support to military and paramilitary forces to 
both defeat left-wing guerrillas and curb drug trafficking (even though right-wing paramilitaries 
themselves are also involved in drug trafficking). Moreover, the United States carried out 
extensive chemical fumigation operations (a central element of Plan Colombia, launched in 2000) 
to destroy coca fields and undermine the left-wing guerrillas relying on them. Both increased 
militarisation and pollution caused by fumes are known to have fuelled forced displacement.65 
Secondly, with respect to the content of reparative obligations, granting admission to the 
territory of outcome-responsible external states to those forced migrants who reach their borders 
does not exhaust what such states owe them. As I argued in the previous chapter, forced migrants 
are owed the fulfilment of their distinctive needs. Outcome-responsible states owe this to those 
who have moved into their territory, not as a matter of charity but as a matter of justice. Moreover, 
 
64 Souter has argued that asylum, as well as other “durable solutions” such as resettlement and local integration, can 
be forms of reparations for external states’ involvement in the “unjust harms” of displacement (Souter 2013; 2014). 
Furthermore, his definition of a refugee is not conditional upon alienage and extends to IDPs too (Souter 2013). 




they should also support the state of origin, neighbouring host states, or humanitarian agencies 
who can ensure the fulfilment of the needs of those who are internally displaced or have migrated 
in neighbouring countries. As I suggested in chapter 2, even if borders were open not all IDPs or 
forced migrants who had moved in neighbouring host countries would desire or be able to move 
to distant countries in the global North. Thus, when outcome responsible for them, Western 
countries would still have to ensure that their needs are met where they are (and could still be 
required to provide resettlement options). Note that this obligation to provide in situ assistance, 
from my perspective, derives from the reparative duties owed to displaced people themselves. 
Thus, it is not a compensation to the host state for the costs of fulfilling their needs, nor a 
containment policy. As a result, forced migrants are not seen as objects to be managed but as 
subjects having claims. Moreover, they are also recognised as agents who may not choose to 
migrate in the external state which is outcome responsible for their displacement.66 
In the previous chapter, I argued that freedom to move is not all forced migrants need, 
because they have undergone distinctive harms which give rise to distinctive needs. In this section 
I have argued that external states, including Western liberal democracies, may be held outcome 
responsible for such harms and have special reparative responsibilities to fulfil the distinctive 
needs of forced migrants qua displaced people. This shows that current efforts to externalise border 
controls and keep forced migrants distant do not undermine states’ responsibility for those they 
helped to displace, because responsibility for harm does not depend on where the harmed person 
is located. While humanitarian duties to help may be weakened or evaded if other bystanders 
happen to be closer to the child drowning in the pond, reparative duties do not. Moreover, if states 
have special reparative responsibility to meet the needs that derive from the harms they have 
contributed to, admission alone is not an appropriate response. Briefly, even in an open-borders 
scenario where admission would not be an issue, states would continue to have special 
 




responsibilities both towards those displaced people who have migrated inside their territory and 
to those who have not. 
A third important extension of special reparative responsibility concerns the range of actors 
to whom such a responsibility applies. States are not the only international actors which could 
share outcome responsibility and special reparative responsibility for displacement. Supranational 
organisations or companies may be involved. For instance, the International Monetary Fund may 
provide loans to states that generate forced migrants, or the World Bank may fund development 
projects (e.g., dams) which involve mass evictions and sometimes environmental degradation 
leading to further forced migration.67 Some development projects which require displacement and 
resettlement might be morally justifiable if, at least, displacement is not arbitrary and the harms 
explored in chapter 2 are prevented or minimised.68 However, this is clearly not the case when the 
displaced population is not consulted, when displacement is carried out coercively using violence, 
threat, or deceit, when oustees are left uncompensated or households are arbitrarily dispersed, 
when they are left economically, socially, and culturally impoverished, or when the negative 
externalities of development projects on the environment and on nearby human settlements are not 
prevented or not even assessed.69 
Companies too may be involved in the unjust dispossession and removal of former settlers 
from the land they acquire or be implicated in environmental degradation leading to forced 
 
67 It is worth noting that the World Bank issued some guidelines on displacement and resettlement, which also inspired 
other banks’ policies. However, it has been shown that several projects funded by the World Bank failed to live up to 
its own ethical standards. Furthermore, recent World Bank regulations tend to be less demanding, compared to those 
issued over the previous four decades (see Mathur 2013, pp. 51–62). 
68 Displacement is legally prohibited when “arbitrary” (see the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 
principle 6, and the Kampala convention, article 4), but considerable discretion remains. A more comprehensive 
ethical framework, focussed on justifiable development-induced displacement, has been proposed in Penz et al. 2011. 
A specifically human rights–based approach to resettlement is prosed in van der Ploeg and Vanclay (2017). 
Importantly, the UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on Development-Based Evictions and Displacement already 
requires compensation for harms including “loss of life or limb; physical or mental harm; lost opportunities, including 
employment, education and social benefits; material damages and loss of earnings, including loss of earning potential; 
moral damage; and costs required for legal or expert assistance, medicine and medical services, and psychological 
and social services.” 
69 Consider, for example, the Jamuna Bridge case in Bangladesh: the project planner had not considered its effects on 
the over seventy-five thousand inhabitants of the Chars sandy island, who were massively and abruptly displaced, as 
the island eroded in a few days as a result of the bridge construction (Penz et al. 2011, pp. 198–201). 
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migration. For instance, companies may support paramilitary groups to unlawfully seize lands.70 
Moreover, they may legally buy extensive lands, including entire villages, at very low prices. 
Displaced people may thus be evicted without being consulted or even informed, and receive a 
risible compensation or none at all, since they often lack property rights on the lands where they 
lived.71 Companies do not have a territorial jurisdiction or institutions to fulfil forced migrants’ 
needs. However, they have both a negative moral duty to do no harm, and a positive moral duty to 
provide compensation and other forms of reparation (such as apologies) when they do harm. It is 
worth noting that positive and negative duties have been acknowledged in the United Nations 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, which is a non-binding, yet influential, soft-
law document.72 Although such duties have not been applied to the harms of displacement, some 
scholars suggest that they should (see Adeola 2017, especially pp. 262–65). Indeed, I have argued, 
the harms that forced migrants experience as a result of displacement undermine some essential 
human interests that, in Kingston’s terms, give rise to human rights to place and purpose. Thus, 
though not legally obliged yet, private companies are at least morally required to avoid causing 
the harms connected with forced displacement and to redress those who have been harmed. As in 
the case of states, companies’ reparative duties are not duties of charity, but duties of justice. 
 
 
70 For instance, in Colombia, some banana companies and other businesses are known to have supported paramilitary 
groups as a means to acquire tens of thousands of hectares of land, which were mostly inhabited and cultivated by 
indigenous, Afro-Colombian, and mestizo communities. In particular, the multinational company Chiquita Brands 
pled guilty in US court to having financed the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia between 1997 and 2004 (see 
Brodzinsky and Schoening 2012, p. 366). In Sudan too, between 1999 and 2002, the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating 
Company (a state-owned corporation in partnership with multinational companies such as Canadian-based Talisman) 
“with the aid of the military engaged in the violent displacement of civilians for oil extraction” (Adeola 2017, p. 249). 
71 See Mathur 2013 on the Indian case, particularly pp. 154–55 and pp. 168–83 on indigenous people’s evictions from 
lands acquired by multinational companies. See also Liberti 2013 on land acquisition in Ethiopia. 
72 Adeola notes that businesses are required “not to take any measures that will violate human rights and to ensure 
redress where these impacts occur during its activities. Some scholars have argued that there is a positive element to 
this obligation in addition to the obligation to refrain, as businesses are ‘required not just to avoid the passive avoidance 
of harm’ but also to take steps to ensure that such harm is addressed in accordance with human rights law” 
(Adeola 2017, p. 262, note 100). 
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1.2. General Reparative Responsibility for Harmful Outcomes of Structures and Processes 
I have argued that, in several cases, not only states of origin but also specific external states 
have special reparative responsibility for specific groups of forced migrants, in virtue of their 
actions or omissions which make such states outcome responsible for their displacement, and thus 
for the distinctive harms they have endured and the distinctive needs that have arisen as a result. I 
have also argued that non-state actors such as corporations may also have special reparative 
responsibilities. However, in some cases it is hard to isolate specific states (or non-state actors) as 
outcome responsible. Moreover, sometimes even when it is possible to attribute the proximate 
causes of displacement to the actions (or omissions) of some specific agents, such as local 
governments, such agents may have been in fact constrained, to a relevant extent, by processes or 
structures over which they have little control. Sometimes, as is often the case for the states of the 
global South which originate most forced migrants, they may occupy a subordinate structural 
position, or contribute the least to the processes which affect them. 
An example of a global process may be climate change. The harms deriving from climate 
change, including forced displacement, do not seem straightforwardly and exclusively attributable 
to the actions of specific agents. Instead, they derive from a global process resulting from “a 
complex combination of actions and policies by individual, corporate, and government agents” 
(Young 2011, p. 100). Furthermore, such agents do not equally contribute to the process. Indeed, 
it has often been argued that those states which contribute the least to climate change pay the 
highest costs (McAdam 2012, p. 38). Citizens of such states may well be more vulnerable to 
displacement because of their governments’ incapacity or unwillingness to mitigate or adapt to the 
environmental slow-onset changes and to cope with sudden disasters. Indeed, the fact that some 
social groups inside that country are more vulnerable than others may depend on domestic social 
injustices. However, their vulnerability and their state’s incapacity to reduce it may also, at least 




According to I. M. Young, structures include “the confluence of institutional rules and 
interactive routines” as well as the “mobilization of resources” (Young 2006, p. 112). As Young 
notes, structures remain relatively stable over time and “serve as background conditions for 
individual actions by presenting actors with options; they provide ‘channels’ that both enable 
action and constrain it” (Young 2006, p. 112). The global economy may be viewed as an example 
of such a global structure. Castles provocatively claims that “the North does more to cause forced 
migration than to stop it, through enforcing an international economic and political order that 
causes underdevelopment and conflict” (Castles 2003, p. 18). Although the general claim that the 
global order causes forced migration is vague and thus hardly verifiable or falsifiable, it seems 
reasonable to credit more specific claims, for instance that some structural processes, such as the 
rules regulating the appropriation and trade of natural resources, exacerbate local socioeconomic 
conflicts and sustain authoritarian regimes (see Wenar 2016), which, I add, often appear as 
proximate causes of displacement. 
Who, then, should be held outcome responsible for those cases of forced migration 
triggered by global structures and processes, such as climate change and global trade? How can 
reparative responsibility be assigned when it seems impossible to attribute the outcome (solely) to 
specific actions of particular states or non-state actors? According to Young’s social-connection 
model, all those agents (either individual or institutional) who participate in global structures “bear 
responsibility for structural injustice because they contribute by their actions to the processes that 
produce unjust outcomes” (Young 2006, p. 119). Thus, a backwards-looking assessment of 
causation still plays a role in Young’s model. However, she insists on the inappropriateness of 
holding single agents individually liable (i.e., morally responsible and thus blameable) when it is 
not possible to directly attribute a harmful outcome to a specific action intentionally meant to 
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produce such an outcome.73 Thus, she rejects reparative-justice accounts (as involving the 
retribution of identifiable particular agents and the absolution of any others) in favour of a forward-
looking remedial responsibility to reform structures falling upon all contributors (Young 2006, pp. 
121–22). Shall we then renounce adopting a backwards-looking, reparative approach when forced 
migration results from a complex chain of interrelated policies, norms, and practices? 
Some theorists have recently defended explicitly reparative or at least backwards-looking 
approaches to responsibility for displacement cases of this sort, particularly for displacement 
caused by climate change. However, to do so they avoid adopting a structural frame, and propose 
instead to trace the relative contribution of states as a proxy to determine their differentiated share 
of reparative responsibility. James Souter, for instance, maintains that climate change and political 
economy do not count as “pure cases of structural injustice, for they are partly sustained by 
individual and often deliberate acts of wrongdoing by states and others, such as their efforts to 
uphold political and economic structures despite their foreseeably harmful consequences” (Souter 
Forthcoming). Such actors, then, still bear a special reparative responsibility, as they “indirectly 
create the conditions” for displacement (Souter Forthcoming). Buxton and Draper frame 
responsibility for displacement triggered by climate change in a similar way. Discussing the case 
of the displaced people forced to leave permanently sinking islands, Buxton defends the 
application of the Polluters Pay Principle, arguing that reparative responsibility for climate-
induced displacement should be assigned to states based on their relative contribution to climate 
change through greenhouse gas emissions.74 Analogously, focussing on international “climate 
 
73 Drawing on Arendt’s distinction between political responsibility and moral or juridical guilt, Young opposes 
backwards-looking moral and legal liability (associated with blaming and punishing perpetrators while absolving 
anyone else) to her forward-looking social-connection model of responsibility (Young 2011, chapter 4). Moreover, 
she insists on direct causality, voluntariness, and sufficient knowledge as necessary conditions for liability 
(Young 2011, pp. 98–99). There is no place in her account for outcome responsibility as defined by Miller and adopted 
here as a basis for special reparative responsibility. Note, however, that although outcome responsibility singles out 
specific agents and acts, it does not require intentionality, nor does it necessarily imply moral blameworthiness. 
74 Buxton critically assesses also the Beneficiary Pay Principle (BPP) and the Ability to Pay Principle (APP), which 
are usually invoked in climate change ethics. See Buxton (2019), pp. 204–10. See also Eckersley (2015) for a defence 
of the APP as the most appropriate principle for assigning responsibility to assist forced migrants from sinking islands, 
coupled with the application of the PPP as a proxy to identify which state should receive them. 
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migrants” whose states do not face extinction, Draper argues that high-emitting states should be 
held outcome responsible, as they negligently failed to mitigate emissions notwithstanding the 
foreseeable harmful outcomes (Draper 2019, p. 67). Indeed, he notes, the possibility of 
displacement being triggered by climate change was already envisaged in the first 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change dating back to 1990 (Draper 2019, p. 68). Although 
Draper talks of remedial rather than reparative responsibility, all three proposals adopt a 
backwards-looking approach to the assessment of responsibility for forced migration, understood 
as a foreseeable outcome of climate change. Moreover, they all insist on the fact that responsibility 
to repair (or remedy) the harms suffered by climate migrants falls upon the high-emitting states. 
In sum, they attempt to overcome the challenges of complex interconnections by looking for 
special responsibility even for cases of forced migration triggered by global structures and 
processes, even though special responsibility only seems to partially cover such cases. 
By contrast, I argue that it is possible to reconcile a structural understanding of processes 
such as climate change with a reparative approach to responsibility for forced migration. Young’s 
model concerns individuals’ shared responsibility for structural injustices; however, it has already 
been applied to states. Serena Parekh, for instance, argues that it can be applied to the current 
global refugee regime (Parekh 2017, p. 120). While Parekh focuses on the containment and 
encampment of refugees rather than on their displacement (Parekh 2017, pp. 120–22), Owen 
seems to suggest that states have general responsibility also for the generation of refugees and that 
their share of responsibility depends on their contribution to its structural causes. He writes that 
“the share of the general responsibility owed by a state will, at least in part, be a function of its 
relative contribution to, and relative benefit from, the conditions of background injustice that make 
the generation of refugees an all too frequent feature of our global political life. In practice, this 
means that, in general, the wealthy, ‘rule-making’ states of the global North bear greater 
responsibilities than the poorer, rule-takers states of the global South” (Owen 2020, p. 90). 
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A structural approach to responsibility for forced migration triggered by climate change or 
political economy, I argue, has important explanatory and normative advantages. It sidesteps the 
epistemic challenges of tracing and measuring special responsibility of identifiable perpetrators 
for every case of displacement, by acknowledging instead a general reparative responsibility 
falling upon participants even when the causal contribution of each participant is hard to 
disentangle. Nevertheless, it is compatible with an assessment of special reparative responsibility 
when particular agents can be held directly outcome responsible for specific cases of forced 
displacement that happen against the background of global structures and processes. General 
responsibility for structures does not rule out special responsibility for discrete actions, but it rather 
allows us to see that discrete actions do not always tell the whole story. Secondly, a structural 
account also allows us to see that such a general responsibility is nonetheless differentiated: all 
contributors share some responsibility, but not equally. Thirdly, it shows why those actors who 
bear the larger shares of reparative responsibility based on contribution to the structure are usually 
in practice the same actors that benefitted the most from it and that have the greatest ability (or 
capacity) to both reform the structure and compensate those who have been harmed. When it 
comes to climate change and global economy, reparative responsibility for their harmful effects 
seems to fall primarily on the countries of the global North if we consider their relative (historical) 
contribution, benefit, and capacity to remedy. This is not a coincidence. Indeed, contribution, 
benefit, and capacity are all connected with the structural position of an agent. Thus, drawing on 
Young,75 I propose to adopt relative power (instead of relative contribution, benefit, or ability) as 
a criterion to determine states’ fair share of reparative responsibility for cases of forced migration 
triggered by global structures and processes such as the global economy and climate change. 
 
75 Power is the first of the parameters Young proposes to assign responsibility for structural injustice, followed by 
privilege, interest, and collective ability. All of them depend on the social position that each agent occupies in the 
structure (see Young 2006, pp. 127–30, Young 2011, pp. 145–48). 
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Someone might object that such an approach relies on a fully externalist explanation of the 
causes of forced displacement, where domestic injustices are always merely epiphenomenal and 
the global North is outcome responsible for each and every case. I do not deny that some injustices 
may be essentially local (Gibney 2004, p. 235), and I recognise the special responsibility of states 
of origin. My point, here, is to underline that external states are connected to forced migrants not 
only through particular acts and omissions, but also through global processes and structures in 
which they take part. Thus, they have obligations of justice to avoid or mitigate the foreseeable 
harms which such processes and structures may produce (including forced displacement) and to 
repair them. In virtue of such global connections, when forced displacement is to a relevant extent 
a consequence of global structures and processes, forced migrants are not owed the fulfilment of 
their specific needs as a matter of humanitarianism but as a matter of justice. 
 
1.3. Remedial Responsibility for Purely Natural Disasters 
I have concentrated so far on cases where there are agents who contributed to causing 
displacement, thereby violating the duty not to harm. Indeed, the harms of displacement are serious 
because they undermine rights to place and purpose that provide the conditions for a dignified life. 
However, there might be cases of purely natural disasters, i.e., cases in which no agent is involved 
in causing, or contributing to generate, forced displacement. In our world, such cases are extremely 
rare, but not impossible. Empirical research shows that the impacts of natural disasters depend to 
a significant extent on human actions or omissions and that environmentally induced forced 
displacement usually affects groups which were already made vulnerable by poverty or social 
marginalisation. Moreover, some natural disasters may be connected with global warming, 
pollution, and anthropogenic climate change. Although it is not easy to tell which phenomena are 
actually attributable to climate change, it has been argued that some phenomena are at least made 
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more probable.76 Thus, many cases of environmentally induced forced migration do not seem to 
be straightforwardly attributable to purely natural causes, even though scientists may not be able 
to attribute them to anthropogenic climate change either. A few cases, however, might be. We 
might think of geophysical hazards, such as an earthquake or a volcano eruption which has not 
been triggered by human actions (like underground atomic tests) but provoked by moving tectonic 
plates. At least ideally, we may also suppose that no one is unjustly made vulnerable. If so, no 
agent could be held outcome responsible for the displacement that these disasters provoke and 
there is no injustice involved. In such cases the state of origin and foreign states only have a 
remedial responsibility to fulfil forced migrants’ needs, depending on their capacity to remedy 
harms. 
Some may argue that states still have a duty of justice to compensate forced migrants for 
the losses they have incurred as a result of nature-induced displacement and to meet their current 
needs, since forced migrants are not themselves responsible for their displacement condition. 
Others may object that justice does not require neutralising the effects of bad brute luck and claim 
that states may only have a humanitarian duty (or duty of charity) to help those who have been 
harmed by natural causes (Valentini 2013). Even so, two points need to be made: first, since purely 
nature-induced displacement is extremely rare, the cases in which states may be thought to have a 
merely humanitarian duty to meet the needs of forced migrants are the exception, rather than the 
norm. Second, even in such exceptional cases the claims of forced migrants to have their distinctive 
needs met could not be easily overridden by competing considerations. As I have argued in chapter 
3, forced migrants have rights analogous to human rights, since fulfilling them is necessary to 
restore the very conditions for a dignified, minimally flourishing life that human rights are meant 
 
76 Anthropogenic climate change can be more easily connected with slow-onset environmental degradation 
(Zetter 2010, p. 140). However, extreme events have also been and are projected to be on the rise, and there is 
“increasing scientific evidence that the changing likelihood of extreme events is linked to human-induced climate 
change” (Banholzer et al. 2014, p. 35). 
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to protect. Thus, even if no agent had reparative responsibilities for the harms of displacement, 
states would still have a positive obligation to impede that such rights remain unfulfilled.   
 
2. How to Address Forced Migrants’ Distinctive Needs 
The backwards-looking harms-based approach I have outlined allows us to identify three 
principles that should guide policies aimed at addressing forced migrants’ needs. Call them the 
specificity principle, the continuity principle and the expressivity principle. The specificity 
principle highlights that policies should not be simply aimed at fulfilling forced migrants’ basic 
needs in the short term, qua vulnerable and destitute, and subsequently at securing their basic 
human rights, qua human beings, in the long term. By contrast, policies should be directed at 
meeting needs as they arise from the specific harms of forced displacement. This implies 
recognising forced migrants as people who have been forcibly displaced, instead of subsuming 
them into a generic category of “vulnerable” people in need of humanitarian concern until they 
eventually access a “durable solution”, a fictional turning point when they suddenly become 
indistinguishable from the non-displaced population, with whom they share the same claims to 
human rights protection. 
Relatedly, the continuity principle prescribes overcoming the artificial and misleading 
temporal separation between a “displacement” phase and a “postdisplacement durable solution”. 
Among theorists, policy makers, and humanitarian agencies, there is a well-established consensus 
about three “durable solutions”: repatriation, local integration, and resettlement.77 Until forced 
migrants reach one of those solutions, they are left in a limbo phase of displacement, largely 
equated with prolonged encampment, during which they receive emergency humanitarian 
assistance. Ideally, such phase is intended be brief, and displacement should be quickly solved. 
But it is now well known that the displacement phase is usually protracted (according to Betts and 
 
77 All three durable solutions are territorially based. However, a utopian transnational alternative has been proposed 
by Cohen and Van Hear (see Cohen and Van Hear 2017). 
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Collier 2017, p. 8, the average length is over two decades). Indeed, repatriation is usually 
unfeasible and undesirable in the short term. Moreover, only a risible percentage of forced 
migrants are resettled: most remain inside their countries as IDPs or move to neighbouring 
countries, while a minority make their own way to the global North to claim asylum. Those who 
remain encamped in the global South are usually denied local integration. Though over half of 
forced migrants now live outside camps, mostly in urban areas, they are very often prevented from 
integrating into the local community. 
I argue that the partition between the displacement phase and the durable-solution phase 
obscures the fact that forced migrants have distinctive needs which should be met both before and 
after they gain access to a durable solution. Indeed, the term “solution” may convey the misleading 
idea that being repatriated, resettled, or allowed to live and work in the host countries is per se 
sufficient to end the displacement condition. By contrast, I have shown that forced migrants have 
undergone specific harms connected to displacement, which require prolonged support in order to 
be overcome: this includes support to regain control over their lives, to re-create a Home 
environment, to regain both economic independence and social status, and to regain psychological 
well-being. Thus, forced migrants are owed specific support from the beginning of their 
displacement until they cease to have such needs. Such support is to be guaranteed both in host 
countries and in the home country, were they to return.78 Furthermore, I have argued that the state 
and non-state actors which are outcome responsible for provoking those harms have duties of 
justice towards them, duties to redress such harm and make sure that the needs that arise as a result 
 
78 It is worth noting that the UN Framework for Durable Solutions acknowledges that “mere physical movement, 
namely returning to one’s home or place of habitual residence, moving to another part of the country or choosing to 
integrate locally, often does not amount to a durable solution.” A durable solution is a “long-term process of gradually 
diminishing displacement-specific needs, while ensuring that IDPs enjoy their rights without discrimination related to 
their displacement” (see §§10 and 15). This may take years, even decades. In fact, “for long periods after return, those 
who have been displaced may find themselves in markedly different circumstances and with different needs than those 
who never left their home communities. . . . Similarly, those who are settled elsewhere may require humanitarian and 
financial aid until they are able to obtain shelter and employment in their new location” (Brookings-Bern 2007). 
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are fulfilled. This means that outcome-responsible actors continue to have such duties even when 
forced migrants are repatriated or locally integrated elsewhere. 
In order to publicly acknowledge and repair the harms of forced migration, a third principle 
is needed. The expressivity principle requires that policies directed at meeting forced migrants’ 
needs be explicitly aimed at recognising and repairing the past or enduring harms affecting them 
qua displaced people. Along with symbolic forms of apology, a range of other policies may be 
used as forms of redress. Such policies may be funded and implemented by actors bearing special 
reparative responsibilities, or they may be funded by such actors while provided by other actors. 
Furthermore, policies may have a reparative value even when actors that issue them only bear a 
general, collective responsibility for having taken part in processes or structures leading to 
displacement. This affects both the public justification for policies and the way policies are 
implemented. For instance, policies directed at sustaining forced migrants’ economic 
independence should not be implemented with the aim of quickly relieving the burden on the host 
state’s welfare system, or with the aim of contributing to the economic development of that state, 
although such policies can indeed contribute to these goals,79 but rather should start from the 
recognition that the forced migrant was harmed (economically, but also socially and 
psychologically) when forced to abandon their source of livelihood and thus should be redressed. 
Taken together, the three principles of specificity, continuity and expressivity offer 
normative guidance in devising policies that take seriously the needs of forced migrants as 
individuals harmed by forced displacement. In this section, I do not attempt to provide a 
comprehensive set of political prescriptions for all cases of forced displacement, which would both 
involve oversimplification and exceed the purpose of this theoretical discussion. However, in the 
next subsections I illustrate how such principles help us to rethink some policies directed at 
 
79 A development-based approach to the needs of forced migrants has been recently offered by Brock 2020, drawing 
on the influential proposal of Betts and Collier 2017. I will elaborate this point below in section 2.2. 
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meeting forced migrants’ needs, compared to dominant approaches to forced migrants’ protection 
as a humanitarian issue and emerging approaches which reframe the issue as a development one. 
 
2.1.Housing and the Home Environment: Beyond Restitution and Return 
As Parekh (2020, p. 17) notes, theorists and policy makers usually adopt an ethics of rescue. 
This influences not only the kind of responsibility at stake but also what is thought to be owed and 
how it should be provided. The term “rescue” chosen by Parekh is evocative, since it recalls the 
image of migrants drowning in the Mediterranean. Forced migrants are considered as people 
fleeing life threats, who thus are in need of safety. This implies they should be provided emergency 
humanitarian assistance in situ whenever possible or admission to a country capable of providing 
such temporary aid. Humanitarian responses to forced displacement are largely devoted to 
providing shelters to displaced people, along with other basic essential goods such as food and 
water. They are meant to be quickly available and provisional. Thus, as I argued in the first section 
of this chapter, housing provided as humanitarian assistance does not usually allow one to recover 
control over their private space and belongings or control over their future, which are necessary 
for a decent, minimally flourishing human life. Humanitarian responses are also focussed on the 
present: they are not meant to redress past harms or to rebuild displaced people’s future lives. 
Thus, while laudably providing shelters, this kind of policy freezes forced migrants in a never-
ending present, where their shelter is not meant to be their house. Moreover, such an emergency-
assistance phase is presumed to precede one of the three durable solutions: neither resettled, nor 
returned to their place of residence, nor locally integrated, forced migrants are not assisted in 
remaking a Home environment around their provisional shelters. Quite the opposite: formal norms 
or informal restrictions, including the recourse to encampment or spatial segregation, are used to 
discourage forced migrants from developing sufficient social and cultural resources to orient 
themselves in the environment, perceive their personal identity as meaningful within it, and 
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conceive future plans, because this would foster their local integration and make them more 
unlikely to return to their place of origin, if they eventually could. 
Indeed, a new house and a new Home environment seem more than what is owed, on 
humanitarian grounds. However, this is what is owed to forced migrants as a redress for having 
been deprived of their previous house and Home environment. Thus, it is unjust to prevent them 
from remaking Home for an indefinite amount of time while waiting for a durable solution to 
come. Even if their settlement is expected to be provisional, forced migrants are owed proper 
housing and support in re-creating a “cool ground” to get on with their lives. The specificity and 
continuity principles help us to identify what states should ensure to those who have been 
displaced: not merely survival, which generically requires providing a shelter, but the conditions 
for a dignified life that forced displacement specifically harmed. This includes shelters allowing 
minimum control over one’s private space, and support to quickly reorient in the surrounding 
spatial, social, and cultural environment. The expressivity principle also requires that these 
measures should not be publicly justified based on pragmatic or humanitarian reasons, but based 
on the acknowledgement of the harms of displacement, such as the loss of control and the loss of 
house and the Home environment. 
The most appropriate way to meet forced migrants’ need for a house and Home 
environment seems to consist in restoring the original ones. This seems to imply that a harms-
based approach requires return. However, I will argue, return and restitution are not necessarily 
the morally preferable options to meet forced migrants’ needs, nor even to rebuild a Home 
environment. Since the 1990s, return has been the preferred durable solution from the perspective 
of the international community (as well as from the perspective of host regions, in the case of 
IDPs). Moreover, it has been long thought to be the preferred solution from the perspective of 
displaced people themselves.80 Although not immediately feasible, return is usually conceived of 
 




as practically possible, since scholars typically equate forced displacement with paradigmatic 
cases of conflict-induced displacement, in which forced migrants move (both within and across 
borders) to escape from generalised yet temporary violence. Ideally, when the conflict is over, 
forced migrants can return to their Home environment and to their own house. In contrast to 
provisional humanitarian assistance, the durable solution of return can be used as a form of redress. 
Property restitution is meant to be a form of restoration of the status quo ante.81 Return itself, it 
has been argued, is a form of reparation for the harm of having been deprived of effective 
citizenship, since the home country was unwilling or unable to protect the human rights of the 
forcibly displaced people (Bradley 2013). 
However, it has been admitted that return to one’s own house and Home environment is 
not always possible in all kinds of displacement, nor is it always desirable. In the case of displaced 
people who were individually targeted for persecution, return is often unsafe if the risk of 
persecution remains.82 In cases of environmentally induced or development-induced displacement, 
which are not usually discussed in relation to return and restitution, the status quo ante may not be 
restorable. Even focussing on the typical case of conflict-induced displacement, forced migrants’ 
preference for return is not straightforward and decreases with the passing of time (see Smit 2012, 
chapter 3). Indeed, the term “return” is itself misleading, since it assumes that the Home 
environment has not changed.83 The truth is that that Home environment and life as it was prior to 
displacement do not exist any longer in a postconflict situation. Thus, despite still dreaming of 
returning to the lost Home environment, many are rationally aware that return would actually mean 
reintegration in a new environment which has “elements of familiarity and alienation” (Smit 2012, 
p. 113), where they may not be able to rely on the previous source of livelihood, social relations, 
and social status. 
 
81 See Smit 2012 for a critical assessment of restitution in kind. 
82 This is acknowledged in Brock 2020. Note that persecution may not only be perpetrated by an agent (e.g., a dictator 
who may be overthrown), but may stem from enduring social injustices. 
83 L. Hammond, “Examining the Discourse of Repatriation: Towards a More Proactive Theory of Return Migration”, 
quoted in Smit 2012, p. 112. 
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Smit insists on the contrast between emotional pressure to return and rational reasoning. 
Some may feel “burdened with a sense of obligation to return, partly rooted in the feelings of 
embarrassment, shame and personal failure for having fled in the first place” (Smit 2012, p. 112); 
others may simply retain a nostalgia for their pre-displacement lives. However, “nostalgia should 
not be confused with an actual intent to return”, and “return dreams” have mistakenly been taken 
to be something upon which forced migrants are “prepared to act” (Smit 2012, p. 110). In fact, an 
extensive literature on restitution and return in Bosnia shows that while many claimed the 
restitution of their original properties, most did not return or soon left again upon return, 
particularly if they had returned to an area in which they now belonged to the ethnic minority. 
Return failures should not strike us as surprising, since return itself does not end 
displacement: return is not a “solution” to forced migrants’ needs; it simply implies that such needs 
should then be met in that geographical location. When this does not happen, forced migrants are 
compelled to migrate again, or they remain internally displaced. This clearly does not repair the 
harms of being forcibly displaced. There is a limited but growing literature on the ethics of return, 
usually conceived of as repatriation.84 Repatriation, it is often argued, should be voluntary: indeed, 
justice in repatriation could not include coercing or deceiving those who had been forced to migrate 
to get them to move back (Bradley 2013, pp. 53–54). Importantly, it should also be safe.85 Forced 
migrants may want to repatriate even under non-ideal unsafe conditions, but at least, it has been 
argued, they should be informed about the risks and should not be encouraged to do so if available 
evidence allows them to infer that they would probably regret it.86 Thus, host states should be 
careful in facilitating repatriation and should not assume that it solves the loss of the Home 
environment, let alone the other harms involved in forced migration. We should bear in mind that 
repatriating may not imply being able to return to the place of origin (as a geographical location) 
 
84 The fact that the emerging debate revolves around repatriation shows that theorists’ gaze is still focussed on 
international migration and, in particular, on the ethics of immigration to the global North. 
85 If, as the UNHCR seems to assume, legal and material safety are required along with physical safety, this condition 
is hardly ever obtained. See Bradley 2013, pp. 57–58). 
86 See Gerver 2018 on these conditions and other conditions for ethical repatriation under non-ideal conditions. 
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and that that geographical location often does not correspond to the pre-displacement place of 
origin. Furthermore, neither repatriation nor the return to the exact place of origin puts an end to 
the reparative responsibility that external states and companies may have towards forced migrants. 
Return does not mark a spatial or temporal limit. Indeed, I have argued, that responsibility also 
applies to IDPs who have always remained in the jurisdiction of their state of origin. In addition, 
as the continuity principle underlines, reparative responsibility does not cease after return because 
it is a responsibility to meet the needs that forced migrants have qua displaced people and that may 
well continue to exist after they have returned.  
I do not argue that the place of origin is never the best place to meet forced migrants’ needs, 
all things considered. However, I argue that forced migrants should not be obliged or even 
economically incentivised to return if their distinctive needs will not be addressed after their return. 
Concerning international forced migrants, host countries should not deport or incentivise forced 
migrants to repatriate as soon as there are safe areas in the country they could be sent to. Indeed, 
forced migrants have needs deriving from the harms of displacement, and not just a need for 
physical safety. In addition, as Gerver (2021) has recently highlighted, the expectation of an 
obligatory return whenever possible prevents displaced people from regaining control over their 
life plan while in the host states. Uncertainty over the near future undermines the ability to form 
social relations or find employment. If, as I have argued, forced migrants have distinctive needs to 
regain control over their lives and re-create a Home environment, the obligation to return severely 
impairs the fulfilment of their needs. Of course, forced migrants should not be deprived of the 
opportunity to return either. Straehle (2019a) explicitly defended an autonomy-based right to 
return for refugees. She argued that countries of asylum have a duty to take action in the country 
of origin to enable return since, by granting asylum, they have assumed the responsibility for the 
protection of their human rights. In my account, states and non-state actors outcome responsible 
for displacement have a duty of justice to fulfil the needs that derive from the harms of 
displacement. Thus, I argue, they retain such a duty in the case of returnees as well. This means 
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ensuring that returnees are adequately supported in the process of recovering control, remaking a 
Home environment, regaining a source of livelihood and a dignified social status and recovering 
psychological wellbeing, so that they can plan and lead a decent, reasonably flourishing life. 
Analogously to return, resettlement and local integration should not be intended only to 
provide the legal permission to settle in the host country (or region). When it comes to remaking 
a Home environment, housing security should be promoted, so that forced migrants can count on 
it and be protected from sudden evictions. This may involve regularising forced migrants’ shelters 
by allowing them to have formal tenancy agreements and pay rent to live in the public or private 
lands or buildings where they are hosted, or to acquire ownership titles.87 Indeed, land or housing, 
or a monetary equivalent, is owed as a compensation for those whose land and housing cannot be 
restored or those who do not wish to return. However, such compensation (both monetary and in 
kind) cannot be merely calculated on the basis of the market value of the land or house and cannot 
leave uncompensated those who did not have any legal title to their housing. Rather, compensation 
should be devised to make sure that the person is able both to count on reliable, decent, and safe 
housing facilities which do not undermine their control over their body, private space, and 
immediate future and to rebuild a comparable Home environment around it (i.e., a web of familiar 
geographical, social, and cultural landmarks on which they can rely to carry out her daily routines 
and make future plans). Collective lands and other commons are often either deemed not worth 
compensation or considered impossible to compensate (see Penz et al., pp. 177–78). However, 
although the exact natural and human geography of the previous Home environment cannot be re-
created elsewhere, this should be taken into account. For instance, displaced indigenous and 
nomadic peoples cannot be considered fairly compensated if they are allocated to flats in a 
 
87 Smit (2012, chapter 4) provides an extensive discussion of housing regularisation in collective centres through 
tenancy and ownership. 
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completely unfamiliar urban environment or given a sum of money to navigate the city housing 
market on their own.88 
 
2.2.Employment, Mental Health, Education: Beyond Humanitarian Aid and Development Aid 
There has been growing interest in the forced-migration literature about development-
oriented approaches, which stress the importance of providing forced migrants with legal access 
to the job market, with training, and with education in order to be economically independent, to 
productively contribute to the economy of the host country, and to acquire (or maintain) skills that 
can be useful in their home country upon return. This, it is argued, is a win-win strategy: besides 
benefitting refugees, it contributes to economic development in host countries, which are mainly 
located in the global South. Furthermore, education, training, and work empower forced migrants, 
who can thus contribute to postconflict reconstruction in their home country. Since the 
overwhelming majority of forced migrants remain in the global South, it is certainly more 
economically efficient to turn them into productive development actors, instead of burdensome 
recipients of humanitarian aid (see Betts and Collier 2017). What is more, this is also a morally 
preferable option, since it empowers forced migrants, while protracted humanitarian assistance is 
humiliating and disempowering (see Brock 2020). 
Critics have objected that the biggest winners, again, seem to be the states in the global 
North which are interested in keeping forced migrants away from their territories 
(Yaghmanian 2017; see also Bertram 2017). Defenders of development-oriented approaches argue 
that keeping forced migrants in the global South simultaneously benefits forced migrants, host 
countries, and sending countries.89 This can provide a new and stronger justification for 
 
88 Van der Ploeg and Vanclay (2017, p. 44) note that the UN criteria related to the right to adequate housing include 
“cultural adequacy.” According to this criterion, “housing is not adequate if it does not respect and take into account 
the expression of cultural identity.” 
89 Draper rightly pointed out that the principle of comparative advantage that is assumed “represents the interests of 
states under conditions of an imbalance of power, not the interests of free states.” Thus, this principle makes states in 
the global South in a relationship of domination, in which less powerful states are induced to “choose options that 
they would otherwise not choose, were the background conditions not ones of inequality” (Draper 2020, pp. 10–11). 
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externalisation and closed-borders policies, compared with approaches that defended humanitarian 
aid, which proved to result in onerous and morally disputed prolonged encampment. Western 
corporate business can also profit from the creation of special economic zones, which according 
to Betts and Collier would facilitate forced migrants’ employment.90 In sum, fulfilling forced 
migrants’ needs for a restored source of livelihood and for receiving training and education when 
needed to adapt to the local labour market seems to be primarily defended as instrumental to 
meeting donors’ goals. Economic self-reliance in a geographically proximate host country is 
expected to discourage onward migration to the global North while also contributing to the 
economic development of host countries and minimising the economic, social, and political cost 
of hosting forced migrants. Moreover, keeping forced migrants well trained and close to their 
region of origin is predicted to make return more likely, assuming that forced migration is triggered 
by temporary mass violence and state fragility. For Betts and Collier, return continues to be the 
best option, from a consequentialist perspective, even when this does not match forced migrants’ 
preference. For instance, they explicitly claim that tertiary education in host countries should only 
“come as a package with the obligation of return”: since graduate elites are needed to rebuild 
institutions and thus to ensure stability in postconflict societies, they should not be given the option 
of integrating locally or moving elsewhere.91 All in all, for both state and non-state donors, 
development aid is a bargain, compared to humanitarian aid: it is a matter of investment, not 
charity.92 
 
90 Special economic zones (SEZs) offer tax breaks and reduced regulation. According to Crawley (2017) and 
Yaghmanian (2017), this would allow companies to impose exploitative labour conditions on forced migrants, as is 
often the case in SEZs. As Brock notes, however, forced migrants are already susceptible to exploitation, since even 
outside camps they often have no other option but to work in the informal market without a legal permit (Brock 2020, 
p. 129). Thus, host states, businesses, and donors could still claim that what is on offer is morally preferable to the 
status quo. 
91 Although they make clear that obligatory return both meets host countries’ interest in denying permanent 
membership and Western countries’ interest in restricting onward migration, the moral legitimacy of their claim is 
defended using a brain-drain argument: skilled forced migrants have a moral duty to return grounded on the special 
responsibility for their less advantaged fellow nationals left behind. See Betts and Collier 2017, p. 195. 
92 Betts and Collier 2017 (see, inter alia, p. 175, discussing the strategic convenience of the Jordan Compact). 
153 
 
While presumably more efficient in ensuring compliance, do development-oriented 
approaches offer a morally preferable alternative to the dual-phase approach envisaging temporary 
humanitarian assistance followed by a durable solution? In contrast to approaches focussed on 
humanitarian assistance, development-oriented approaches are more apt to meet the continuity 
principle. Firstly, such approaches suggest policies which do not reduce the time frame to the 
present, keeping lives “on hold”, but rather take the future into account. Moreover, development-
oriented and empowerment-oriented policies are conceived to be adopted shortly after 
displacement, so that the response to the needs of forced migrants in the initial displacement phase 
is not artificially separated from the durable-solution phase. Nevertheless, development-oriented 
approaches fail to adequately meet the Specificity and Expressivity requirements, because they are 
not sufficiently backwards-looking in identifying needs and in assigning responsibility to fulfil 
them. Since policies providing employment, education, and training are more forward-looking 
than emergency sheltering and feeding, they may have a rehabilitative function for forced 
migrants. However, such policies are not grounded on the recognition of displacement-related past 
harms and their enduring consequences; thus, their rehabilitative function cannot be a proper form 
of redress. 
Indeed, defenders of development approaches do not endorse a theory of reparative 
responsibility for displacement. For instance, Betts and Collier minimise “Western complicity” in 
forced displacement as “occasional”, citing examples of direct military intervention in conflicts, 
such as those in Vietnam, Kosovo, and Iraq (Betts and Collier 2017, p. 99). Furthermore, they 
explicitly reject as a “lingering vestige of colonialism” the view that “in a globalized world, all 
injustice is structurally interconnected” and endorse Gibney’s claim that “some injustices are 
simply local” (Betts and Collier 2017, pp. 99–100). The Syrian war, for example, is depicted as an 
almost completely endogenous civil conflict, in which external states do not bear any reparative 
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responsibility for the mass displacement it involved.93 In their view, external states, business, and 
other non-state potential “donors” are similar to a crowd of bystanders by the pond where forced 
migrants are about to drown: they all individually have a duty to rescue, but they should find a 
criterion (i.e., comparative advantage) to discharge it in a coordinated way, according to their 
capacities. Surely, showing that contributing to development-oriented policies both meets their 
interests and creates economic, political, and social benefits is more strategically effective in 
motivating them to fund employment, training, and education policies than arguments based on a 
disputable duty to repair harms for which they are directly or indirectly outcome responsible. 
However, I argue that part of what justice in forced migration requires is precisely the recognition 
that social services (including employment, training, and education policies) are owed as a form 
of redress, and not as a form of either humanitarian or development aid by generous or self-
interested donors. 
Finally, development-oriented approaches largely focus on forced migrants’ economic 
self-reliance and thus tend to highlight the importance of employment, training, and education, 
while the need for other rehabilitative social services, such as psychological support, does not 
emerge. If mental health were to be taken into account, presumably it would at least be 
instrumentally valued, as a means to ensure that the forced migrant is economically productive 
and thus contributes to the development of their host country or to the reconstruction of their 
country of origin. Indeed, from a consequentialist perspective, the mental health of a person who 
is outside the formal labour market, such as a housewife, also has indirect social and economic 
benefits, since it affects their partner and children. However, according to my harms-based 
approach, it is important to insist that a forced migrant is owed support towards recovering their 
mental health as a form of reparation for having been psychologically harmed when forcibly 
 
93 Betts and Collier 2017, p. 99. According to Bertram (2017), “Betts and Collier present both history and social 
science in highly selective ways. They present the failures that led to mass forced migration as the unpredictable 
results of local ‘fragility’ and downplay the responsibility of Western governments. This is particularly jarring in the 
case of Syria and indeed the whole Arab Spring, where the destabilising effect of the 2003 Iraq War is simply 
forgotten.” Crawley 2017 makes a similar point. I will extensively examine the Syrian case in chapter 7. 
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displaced: this would continue to hold even if improving their mental health did not result in a 
benefit for the host society or the society of origin. 
 
2.3.Social Status as Individuals and Group Members: The Role of Recognition and Truth 
The literature on reparative justice shows that, for social service provision to work as a 
reparation, it should be publicly explained that “the social benefit is given to the victim in 
recognition of the harm suffered” and “as on obligation for the harm caused” (Perez Murcia 2014, 
p. 199). Housing, health, employment, training, and education policies can thus be used as forms 
of redress for the distinct harms of displacement. However, such policies should be tailored to 
meet forced migrants’ specific needs to restore control, remake a Home environment, regain 
livelihoods and social status, and restore mental health. This implies that social policies should 
sometimes engage in positive discrimination to foster forced migrants’ social recognition, as 
individuals and also as members of a group, when this is the case. Layers of recognition are not 
mutually exclusive and may apply simultaneously to the same person. Recognition as members of 
a harmed group may come through positive actions, such as offering credit to start a new farm or 
a small business or through instituting quotas and bursaries to access education and training 
courses.94 This means that a forced migrant is recognised as having been disadvantaged by 
displacement. However, a forced migrant is not only a member of a harmed group; they are a 
person whose individual identity has not only been upset as a result of forced displacement, but 
also overshadowed by their forced-migrant condition. As de Angelis writes about trafficked 
women, their reduction to victims of trafficking “threatens to strip women of a real and enduring 
sense of who they are—before and outside of their trafficking experience” (de Angelis 2016, p. 
 
94 Forced migrants can be considered a harmed group that shares the experience of common harms, without implying 
that they shared any previous cultural or ethnic membership or that they identify themselves as members of a group. 
This is analogous to a non-essentialist conception of women as a harmed group. By contrast, some forced migrants 
also belong to minority groups, such as indigenous minorities, for whom displacement involves social and cultural 
harms as a people. 
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61). Trafficked women do need to be believed and recognised as forced migrants, but they also 
need to be recognised as individuals. De Angelis’s collection of testimonies shows that they not 
only “possess a sense of their trafficked selves” but also “maintain a pre-trafficking persona” (de 
Angelis 2016, pp. 61–63), which they describe when referring to their former job, their former 
roles and responsibilities within the family, and their personal achievements (e.g., in education). 
Recognition of a forced migrant’s individual identity may be expressed through extra support in 
finding a job which is appropriate to their skills and shows respect for their pre-displacement social 
roles. Finally, recognition of the same forced migrants as members of an ethnic or cultural minority 
who have collectively been harmed by displacement may require public acknowledgement and 
support (e.g., concerning the minority language or religion), particularly if such membership has 
contributed to making them vulnerable to displacement. 
To recover social and epistemic status, forced migrants are also owed truth telling about 
why they have been displaced and should be offered the opportunity to contribute as witnesses in 
reconstructing what has happened. This may sometimes require judiciary trials in civil and even 
criminal courts, but it may also involve forms of truth telling, such as truth commissions, which 
are not aimed at imposing penalties on individuals or legal persons. As for reparations more 
broadly, the limited literature on the role of truth telling in redressing the harms of displacement 
focusses on the responsibility of states of origin in reintegrating returnees and is limited to 
postconflict situations (Bradley 2012, pp. 213–14). However, as Bradley noted, truth telling may 
also make it more acceptable for forced migrants themselves to settle elsewhere and consider other 
compensation options instead of restitution in kind and return to their original houses or lands 
(Bradley 2012, p. 215). This may apply to enduring conflict and postconflict situations where 
return is politically unfeasible (e.g., Palestine or Cyprus), but it also applies to other kinds of 
displacement (including development-induced and environmentally induced displacement). 
Whether or not this leads to their return, forced migrants often need truth to be reconstructed and 
publicly recognised to get on with their lives and recover self-esteem and social recognition, 
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overcoming feelings of humiliation, guilt, fear, anger, or suspicion. When displacement-related 
harms are considered together, it becomes clear that tying truth telling to return undermines its 
reparative role. In Bradley’s words, “If the truth-telling process is geared toward promoting a 
particular durable solution such as return, rather than opening up a range of choices to refugees 
and IDPs regarding the resolution of displacement, the process may ultimately be frustrating and 
disempowering, rather than helping to mend relations and restore to the displaced a stronger degree 
of control over their lives” (Bradley 2012, p. 217). 
In the postconflict and transitional-justice literatures, truth telling is mostly exemplified by 
truth commissions. However, along with truth commissions, other forms of truth telling include 
the collection and publication of oral, written, and visual testimonies. As credible and reliable 
witnesses, displaced persons regain social and epistemic status. Moreover, when their story is 
validated by actors who bear a special reparative responsibility for their harmful action and this 
results in public apologies, this further strengthens forced migrants’ status. Truth telling may also 
foster their trust in institutions as well as mutual trust among them and the non-displaced 
population (both hosts and those who remained home, in the case of returnees). 
In the first section of this chapter, I argued that special responsibilities for forced migration 
are more frequent than commonly acknowledged and apply to external states and non-state actors 
along with states of origin. Moreover, even those actors who do not have special reparative 
responsibilities should acknowledge the epistemic value of forced migrants’ testimonies; indeed, 
the recognition of the harms they suffered as displaced people and the recognition of the forcedness 
of their move do not require the interlocutor to assume responsibility for having caused such harm. 
Finally, when state and non-state actors participate in structures and processes that have plausibly 
contributed to forced displacement, those actors should publicly recognise, rather than deny, their 
outcome responsibility and the general reparative responsibilities that this entails. Even if they are 
not individually guilty of wrongdoing, the public recognition of such a collective responsibility 
158 
 
both contributes to meeting forced migrants’ claim to truth telling and preludes commitment to 
reforming structures and processes to reduce future forced migration. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter considered which institutions are responsible for the fulfilment of forced 
migrants’ needs and what kinds of moral obligation state and non-state actors have. I adopted a 
backwards-looking, harms-based approach to the issue of responsibility, and I argued that both 
states (not only the state of origin but also external states) and non-state actors may have reparative 
duties of justice, rather than humanitarian duties, towards forced migrants, when they are outcome 
responsible for their displacement. This is typically the case in the current non-ideal world: such 
institutions may have either special reparative responsibilities if their actions contributed to 
displacement or general reparative responsibilities if they participate in structures and processes 
that contributed to displacement. The second section was devoted to the implications of this harms-
based reparative approach to how forced migrants’ needs should be met. I argued that policies 
should respect three principles. According to the specificity principle, policies should be targeted 
to forced migrants’ distinctive needs qua forced migrants. Secondly, the continuity principle makes 
sure that the recognition of forced migrants’ distinctive condition should begin shortly after 
displacement (as opposed to generic humanitarian assistance) and continue until their distinctive 
needs cease (as opposed to admission-focussed approaches). Thirdly, the expressivity principle 
prescribes that policies addressing forced migrants’ needs must be explicitly carried out as part of 









Introduction to Part II 
 
Forced migration is complex and diversified phenomenon. Part I has identified common 
harms and needs and offered a general normative account of what do forced migrants have a right 
to, what kind of responsibility states and other agents bear towards forced migrants and what 
principles should guide policy responses to forced migration. Part II is meant to apply these general 
harms-based account of forced migrants’ needs and backwards-looking account of responsibility 
to diverse cases of forced migration. While Part is a work of generalisation, part II is a work of 
contextualisation. I will provide three case studies. The aim is to test the theoretical frame in 
different contexts, to assess whether it allows us to better grasp forced migrants’ needs compared 
to other perspectives, to rethink responsibility assessment, and to identify shortcomings in current 
policy responses which may not have identified so far. In three selected case studies, I will examine 
harms, needs, responsibility and remedies. However, the structure of the three chapters will not be 
symmetric. Indeed, although they are not representative of all forms of forced migration, these 
three cases have been chosen because they allow us to draw out different insights from the 
theoretical frame proposed in Part I.  
Chapter 5 will be devoted to forced migration in Colombia. Although increasingly 
discussed in literature on conflict and reparations, displacement in Colombia has not attracted the 
attention of normative theorists working on the ethics of migration. As anticipated in the 
introduction, the overwhelming majority of Colombian forced migrants are internally displaced. 
Moreover, among the minority who crossed international borders, many moved to neighbouring 
Ecuador, whose borders have been largely open to Colombians. Thus, Colombian forced migrants 
do not pose an immigration issue to liberal democracies in the global North. If political theorists 
were to discuss the Colombian case, responsibility to meet their needs would probably be usually 
attributed to the Colombian state for two reasons: the Colombian state has failed to protect them 
from generalised violence or persecution perpetrated by non-state actors, and most forced migrants 
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have remained within the jurisdiction of the Colombian state. By contrast, the backwards-looking 
approach to responsibility outlined in part I allows us to see the special reparative responsibilities 
of external states and companies who contributed to displace Colombian forced migrants. 
Moreover, the harms-based approach to needs shows why remedies pursued by the Colombian 
states, namely humanitarian assistance and land restitution, have been insufficient to properly 
address the needs that Colombian forced migrants have qua displaced people.  
Chapter 6 will examine intra-EU trafficking for labour exploitation. This is an example of 
forced displacement which has not only been neglected in the ethics of migration but also in the 
vast legal and sociological literature on trafficking, which predominantly focuses on trafficking 
for sexual exploitation. Again, this is a case of forced migration where forced migrants do not face 
closed borders but are clearly not in the same condition of voluntary migrants. Rather than being 
considered qua forced migrants, people trafficked for labour exploitation are typically considered 
qua victims of labour exploitation. However, the harms of labour exploitation may well be suffered 
by voluntary migrants or non-migrants as well. Thus, in this case, my first aim is to show that EU 
trafficked people suffer the same kind of harms as other forced migrants. They are not just 
exploited but also coerced or, more frequently, deceived into migrating. Using the taxonomy of 
harms provided in Part I, I show that people trafficked for labour exploitation suffer the loss of 
control, the loss of the Home environment, the loss of social status and the loss of mental 
wellbeing. As a result, they need to recover from these losses, in addition to receiving a shelter 
granting temporary safety from exploiters and the fulfilment of survival needs. Then I consider 
responsibility and reparations. Scholars, policymakers and practitioners converge in considering 
trafficked people to be victims of a crime. Fundamentally, the wrong lies in exploitation and 
responsibility falls on exploiters. Thus, while reparation language is often employed, reparation is 
usually conceived as compensation for the unjustly extracted labour. By contrast, in my account 
forced migrants are owed reparations for the harm of displacement. What is more, my backwards-
162 
 
looking approach encourages to devote more attention to the reparative responsibilities of states 
and companies that contribute to create the conditions for trafficking. 
The final chapter will move to the case of forced migration in Syria. Unlike the previous 
to cases, the Syrian one has gained enormous attention in both public and scholarly literature. 
Several recent works on the ethics of refuge point to examples of Syrian forced migrants. Indeed, 
unlike Colombian IDPs and EU trafficked people, many Syrian forced migrants were confronted 
with closed borders. In this case, I begin by engaging with the dominant understanding of the 
responsibility states have towards Syrian forced migrants. Both policymakers and political 
theorists usually defend or assume a view where external states resemble to innocent bystanders 
who have a humanitarian duty to rescue Syrian forced migrants, by providing admission or aid to 
host states. By contrast, a backwards-looking approach allows us to see that external states are not 
uninvolved in the displacement of Syrian forced migrants. Secondly, I turn to needs and remedies. 
I focus on how Syrian forced migrants’ needs have been dealt with in Germany, which has often 
been praised for its generous admission policies. I show that, even in the German virtuous case, 
Syrian forced migrants have been assumed to need safety, which is to be provided through 
admission and the fulfilment of survival needs. Since the harms of displacement have not been 
properly recognised, the needs to regain control, re-create a Home environment, regain social 
status and restore mental health have not been sufficiently addressed. For the same reason, the 
German state seems prone to encourage return as soon as safety is restored at least in some areas 





Purely Domestic Forced Displacement? The Colombian Case 
 
Colombia has become the second country of asylum in the world, hosting more than 1.7 
million displaced Venezuelans in 2020 (UNHCR 2021, p. 19). However, historically Colombia is 
first and foremost a country that originates forced migrants. Although the latest UNHCR data 
available account for just 104,900 Colombians displaced across borders (UNHCR 2020, p. 20, fig. 
8), the figures dramatically change when IDPs are included in the picture. In 2020, as is the case 
since 2015, Colombia continued to report the highest number of IDPs worldwide, with 8.3 million 
IDPs according to government statistics (UNHCR 2021, p. 24). Besides, both figures are likely to 
underestimate the actual number of Colombian forced migrants, since several more may not have 
registered as refugees or IDPs. 
The Colombian case might seem an easy one to make sense of. Colombia has been torn for 
several decades by a civil conflict involving the state, insurgent groups, and paramilitaries. Thus, 
the situation of Colombian forced migrants might be quickly classified as conflict-induced 
displacement, where people leave as a side effect of generalised violence. Since most forced 
migrants do not cross international borders, their plight appears to be an eminently domestic one 
which remains off the radar of both public and academic debate on migration in the global North. 
Therefore, the Colombian state alone, apparently, bears reparative responsibility for the failure to 
protect its citizens from non-state armed actors (and, in a more refined picture, for its connivance 
with the paramilitary groups actively and deliberately carrying out displacement). 
In reality, the Colombian case is far more complex. As I will show, displacement in 
Colombia is typically not the unintended side effect of a domestic an intestine conflict. 
Displacement is usually actively used as a strategy to separate lands from unwanted settlers, either 
as a means to seize the lands (as in the land-grabbing reading) or as a means of political cleansing 
(i.e., removing politically disloyal residents and replacing them with loyal settlers). Along with 
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the Colombian state, the insurgents and the counterinsurgent paramilitaries, corporations (such as 
banana and palm oil companies), and external states (namely, the United States) play a relevant 
role too, by contributing to and benefitting from forced displacement. In particular, the US wars 
on drugs and terror in Colombia involved funding and training Colombian state forces 
notwithstanding their notoriously ambivalent relationship with the paramilitary squads committing 
massacres and displacing citizens. Furthermore, cases of apparently voluntary economically driven 
subsistence migration turn out to be triggered by environmental degradation connected with the 
chemical aerial fumigation of lands as part of the US war on drugs. Thus, forced displacement is 
not a fully endogenous phenomenon. As a result, both the United States and the corporations which 
can be held outcome responsible bear some special reparative responsibility to redress the harms 
of forced displacement. This holds true even though the overwhelming majority of Colombian 
displaced people remain under the jurisdiction of the Colombian state. 
When it comes to what Colombian forced migrants are owed, I show that what these forced 
migrants need depends on how they have been harmed and thus on the causes of their move and 
on their demographic characteristics. Overall, forced displacement mostly concerns rural areas and 
disproportionally affects people belonging to Afro-descendant and native minorities. Colombian 
forced migrants often move to urban areas which may be dramatically different from their previous 
Home environment. There, they may still face safety threats, coupled with economic insecurity, 
existential uncertainty, social marginalisation, and stigmatisation, even within their own country. 
The few who cross borders to neighbouring countries are not luckier. Ecuador, the main destination 
for Colombian forced migrants, has been pursuing an open-border policy which nonetheless 
proved insufficient to meet Colombian forced migrants’ needs, and did not protect them from 
widespread xenophobia. In sum, although most Colombian forced migrants are not confronted 
with the issue of closed borders, their existential condition remains distinct from that of voluntary 
migrants, as well as from the existential condition of non-displaced Colombians. 
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Despite the negotiation attempts and the official demobilisation of some armed actors, 
peace, security, and rule of law do not seem to have been reached in Colombia yet. It is true that 
reparative-justice projects have been pursued in the meantime. In particular, an ambitious law on 
land restitution has been introduced. However, criticisms have been raised about its 
implementation. Fine-tuned social service provisions have been claimed in lieu of mere restitution, 
monetary compensation, or memorials. Truth telling, rather than a generic apology, emerges as a 
key issue in recognising the harms of forced migration and in restoring the social status of 
Colombian desterrados. Surely, the ongoing armed conflict makes the fulfilment of forced 
migrants’ needs difficult and risky, particularly as reparations would entail a redistribution of land 
titles, a key issue that lies at the origins of the civil conflict. Rather than providing a ready-to-use 
policy toolkit, however, the aim of this section is to reorient the frame within which policies should 
be devised. While forward-looking humanitarian approaches would easily consider the Colombian 
case as a generically conflict-induced migration one needing better-managed humanitarian and 
development aid (as in the UNHCR view), a backwards-looking approach allows us to unpack its 
different roots, triggers, and impacts, to identify special responsibilities, and to ensure that policies 
acknowledge forced migrants qua forced migrants and carry a reparative value for the specific 
harms they endured. 
This chapter proceeds as follows. In section 1 I adopt a backwards-looking approach to 
responsibility for forced migration. I begin by sketching the historical roots of civil conflict in 
Colombia, laying out the uncertainty about land titles coupled with the concentration of power in 
the hands of the two main parties, which resulted in widespread clientelism and did not allow 
citizens to peacefully express dissent. Armed insurgent and counterinsurgent non-state actors were 
formed against this background. The underlying causes behind the political, legal, and economic 
arrangements of Colombia may well be traced back to colonialism. However, even assuming them 
to be domestic factors, we should acknowledge the role that external states, namely, the United 
States, and private companies have played in the last decades in contributing to widespread forced 
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displacement in Colombia. Indeed, the interests of such actors intersected with those of domestic 
actors involved in the civil conflict. I show that displacement in Colombia has been used to both 
remove political opponents and appropriate land (or benefit from cleared land). I also show that 
even cases of environmentally induced forced migration in Colombia have often been causally 
connected to US foreign policy. In section 2 I then adopt a backwards-looking, harms-based 
approach to the needs of Colombian forced migrants. I argue that the harms of forced displacement 
influence the needs of Colombian displaced people and make them distinctively different from 
those of non-displaced Colombians. Thus, I show that humanitarian-assistance policies and even 
restitution policies fall short of fully acknowledging such distinctive harms and thus to adequately 
meet IDPs’ needs. This holds true also for policies adopted by host countries, even “welcoming” 
ones such as Ecuador, that focussed on the admission of displaced Colombians. By contrast, I 
argue that recognition qua forced migrants and truth about causes and responsibilities are key 
components of what Colombian forced migrants need. 
 
1. Roots, Triggers, and Responsibilities regarding Forced Displacement in Colombia 
The Colombian civil conflict dates back, at least, to the 1940s, and land control has always 
played a key role. Since colonial independence at the beginning of the nineteenth century, land 
titles have been concentrated in the hands of wealthy latifundistas, while a large share of the 
Colombian territory has long remained unclaimed and outside the effective control of the state. 
Moreover, Colombian political life was dominated by two parties—the Liberals and the 
Conservatives. Conservatives strongly opposed land redistribution, while Liberals proposed a 
tentative agrarian reform, the 1936 Law of Lands, or Ley 200 (Steele 2017, p. 62). 
The confrontation between Liberals and Conservatives escalated throughout the 1930s 
and 1940s. Following the assassination of the (former Liberal) populist and pro-redistribution 
presidential candidate Jorge Elicér Gaitán in 1948, armed conflict broke out (Tate 2012, p. 397). 
In this period, known as La Violencia, violence spread among civilians in the countryside, where 
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Conservative death squads known as pájaros and Liberal guerrillas targeted political opponents 
and engaged in torture and killings. Violence de-escalated after a military coup in 1953 that led to 
a short-lived dictatorship, followed five years later by the power seizure by the two traditional 
parties united in a National Front, which would rule until 1974. Liberals and Conservatives had 
agreed on alternating power. No third-party participation was allowed, nor any electoral choice 
offered. 
Insurgents, however, did not give in after the end of La Violencia. Abbey Steele considers 
the “widespread civilian displacement during La Violencia as essential for the formation of the 
insurgent groups that became the protagonists of the contemporary war” (Steele 2017, p. 89). 
Some peasant guerrillas, who were fleeing state and paramilitary forces, settled in largely 
uninhabited lands that were in practice outside the control of the Colombian state.95 There, they 
gave rise to “independent republics” (Tate 2012, p. 398). Initially tolerated, guerrilla enclaves 
began to be the target of counterinsurgent operations in the mid-1960s, under the pressure of local 
elites (Steele 2017, p. 75). This inaugurated a new phase of the conflict. Guerrilla groups adopted 
a Marxist platform and in 1966 formed the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), 
the most influential and enduring insurgent group in Colombia. Other guerrilla groups were created 
in the following years, inspired by the Cuban revolution and the decolonisation processes, 
including the National Liberation Army (ELN), the People’s Liberation Army (EPL), and the 
April 19 Movement (M-19).96 To fund their expansion, guerrillas mainly relied on vacuna (i.e., 
extortion) and kidnappings.97 
In the 1960s and 1970s, the Colombian military forces remained small and the military 
budget limited. Thus, the state still generally avoided open confrontation with the guerrillas in 
their enclaves. Nevertheless, civilian self-defence was legally authorised in 1968. Such 
 
95 Tate 2012, p. 398. See also Steele 2017, pp. 69–72. 
96 Tate 2012, pp. 398–99. Note that, during the Cold War, Colombia was in the US sphere of influence and contributed 
a battalion to fight in Korea. 




paramilitary forces, however, only gained strength in the 1980s. At the time, the business of drug 
traffickers, namely the Medellín and Cali cartels, was rapidly growing as cocaine consumption 
spread in the United States. Thus, narcotraffickers began buying extensive parcels of lands to 
launder their money, acquire political influence, and grow coca crops out of sight of state 
authorities. Since ungoverned spaces were often under the control of rural guerrillas like the 
FARC,98 narcotraffickers needed paramilitary protection against guerrilla extortion and 
kidnappings. Together with other landowners, they created, trained, and funded paramilitary self-
defence forces.99 Backed by local military forces sharing their counterinsurgent agendas, 
paramilitaries targeted guerrillas and their alleged supporters, including community leaders and 
politicians promoting agrarian reform (i.e., the redistribution of land estates concentrated in the 
hands of the latifundistas). 
It was only at the end of the 1980s that mass displacement emerged in Colombia.100 It 
dramatically escalated in the 1990s and remained considerably high after reaching the peak 
around 2002 (Steele 2017, pp. 114–15). Far from being a mere side effect of a civil conflict, 
displacement was usually sought for both political and economic reasons: clearing areas from left-
wing guerrillas and their alleged supporters, and appropriating lands for legal or illegal businesses. 
Abbey Steele notes that mass displacement in Colombia cannot be explained as the unintended 
side effect of a conflict or the consequence of individual persecution only. While some forced 
migrants are individually targeted, most are collectively targeted. This, she argues, is part of a 
“political cleansing strategy” that could only be adopted in the late 1980s. A strategic, large-scale 
use of forced displacement had not been possible before, because of epistemic and material limits 
on the part of the state and right-wing paramilitaries. However, since the late ’80s a political reform 
allowed armed actors to infer citizens’ allegiances and thus to use displacement as a political 
 
98 Steele 2017, p. 128, footnote 9. 
99 Steele 2017, p. 128, footnote 8. 
100 Although IDPs began to be registered in 1985 and the state only began to keep official displacement statistics 
in 1997, scholars have noted that until the end of the 1980s displacement was limited. 
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strategy. Based on extensive archival research, Steele found out that large-scale collective 
targeting only began after the creation of the Patriotic Union party (Unión Patriótica, or UP) in the 
context of the (ultimately failed) peace talks between the FARC and the Colombian government. 
Furthermore, collective targeting would not have been possible had local elections not been 
introduced. Indeed, Steele notes, “displacement on a wide scale can be traced to 1988, the year 
elections were extended to the local level”. For the first time it was possible to infer the 
constituency supporting the FARC from their support for the UP. Though UP members and 
supporters were not all necessarily guerrillas, and the party officially broke from the FARC in 
February 1989, its opponents conflated the two entities (Steele 2017, p. 129). After the peace talks 
failed in 1987, in its opponents’ eyes the UP remained the political branch of the insurgents whom 
the state and the paramilitaries were at war with. 
Surely, land could have been cleared by physically eliminating unwanted occupants. 
Paramilitaries did carry out massacres in targeted communities, along with the selective killings 
of UP representatives, but their aim was usually to intimidate rather than to exterminate the 
population: murders effectively communicate what fate awaits survivors unless they leave. Graffiti 
and leaflets have also been frequently used “to announce their arrival and to warn residents that 
they should leave ahead of time” (Steele 2017, p. 31). Political cleansing, indeed, is less costly 
than mass killing. First, Steele argues, “it is more plausible to deny responsibility for political 
cleansing; armed groups can and do claim that civilians are leaving of their own accord rather than 
in response to targeted violence. Second, because displacement is frequently perceived to be a by-
product of violence rather than a strategy, armed groups, especially state armed forces, can deny 
responsibility more easily than when they use widespread lethal violence” (Steele 2017, p. 46). 
Note that, since the 1977 amendments to the Geneva Convention prohibited the resettlement of 
civilians during wars, states and armed groups alike have had incentives to represent displacement 
as out of their control and certainly not directly caused by them (Steele 2017, p. 54). 
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Despite the allegiances-revealing role of local elections, collective targeting would not 
have been possible without a power imbalance between insurgent and counterinsurgent forces: 
how did paramilitary and state security forces come to be in a position to reconquer guerrilla-
controlled territories using forced displacement as a tool? The counterinsurgency front began 
receiving unprecedented funds and training, not only from the newly enriched narcotraffickers, 
but also from corporations and even by the United States, since the interests of those diverse actors 
converged in fighting guerrillas. Therefore, though mostly internal, forced displacement in 
Colombia is not purely endogenous and involves powerful external states and multinational 
businesses. 
Paramilitary groups were formed and hired by wealthy landowners, including 
narcotraffickers, to clear guerrillas and civilian supporters from their lands. Indeed, extorting 
money from coca growers had been rapidly increasing the guerrillas’ budget. As for the Colombian 
state, it oscillated between open legalisation of the paramilitaries and de facto tolerance. Having 
been legal since 1968, paramilitary forces were outlawed in 1989, only to be legalised again 
in 1994, when they also gained a new structure with the creation of the Convivir platform 
supported by the would-be president Uribe, at the time a governor in the Antioquia department. 
From that moment on, paramilitaries proliferated and could openly form ties with business 
organisations, such as AUGURA, the banana producers’ organisation. In 1997, paramilitaries 
formed for the first time a national body, the United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (AUC), 
under the lead of Carlos Castaño, himself a well-known narcotrafficker and landowner. More 
than 240 massacres were attributed to the AUC between 1997 and 2002 (Tate 2012, p. 402). 
Scholars also attribute the overwhelming majority of forced displacements to paramilitary 
forces.101 
 
101 An analysis of 1,500 land-restitution cases resolved by the Land Restitution Tribunals through April 1, 2016, 
identified paramilitary forces as responsible for displacement in 55 percent of cases, whereas guerrilla groups were 




Meanwhile, Colombian security forces had begun expanding, and the process accelerated 
during the Uribe mandates (2002–10). This transformation was strongly supported by the US Plan 
Colombia inaugurated in 2000 by the Clinton administration. Around 80 percent of the aid 
package was devoted to military training and equipment (Buxton 2006, p. 180). Despite the initial 
target being narcotraffickers, the war on drugs progressively turned into a war on terror, and more 
precisely a war against guerrillas (Buxton 2006, p. 136). According to Buxton, the Colombian case 
is just an example of US foreign policy objectives being “traditionally prioritized over and above 
progress in reducing the illicit trade, even in those countries where the US presence was initially 
premised on anti-drug operations” (Buxton 2006, p. 139). The year 2002 was a turning point for 
the goals of Plan Colombia: “The Bush administration and Congress enacted a bill permitting 
Colombia to use all past anti-drug aid for ‘a unified campaign against narcotics trafficking [and] 
against activities by designated terrorist organizations’” (Martinez 2009, p. 209). In 2004, the 
United States also supported the Colombian state as it engaged in a major counterinsurgency 
campaign, the Plan Patriota, directed against guerrilla-controlled territories. 
While the US aid was not directly given to paramilitary forces (some of them were 
officially counted as terrorists), human rights activists were already revealing the connivance 
between the Colombian state (particularly the military) and the paramilitaries.102 For instance, 
Human Rights Watch issued a detailed report as early as 2001 documenting the fact that at least 
the 24th and the 3rd brigades of the Colombian army actively cooperated with paramilitary 
 
law resulting in generalised amnesty and reintegration support), the process turned out to be deeply flawed, involving 
fake fighters instead of actual paramilitaries being handed over to the authorities. Demobilisation has been followed 
by the official transformation of some paramilitary groups into NGOs and the proliferation of neo-paramilitary groups 
(such as the so-called Black Eagles and the Rastrojos), still engaging in intimidation, murders, rapes, forced 
conscription, and forced displacement (Steele 2017, p. 109). Neo-paramilitary expansion in former guerrilla-
controlled territories seems to be even facilitated by the retreat of FARC guerrillas as a result of recent peace talks 
with the Colombian state. 
102 A 1997 constitutional-court ruling prohibited the paramilitary groups from collecting intelligence from security 
forces and from possessing military-issued weapons but maintained that they were legal. Besides, paramilitary forces, 
strongly backed by narcotraffickers, continued to receive support and training from local military forces (Steele 2017, 
p. 88). Indeed, following the Betancur administration’s attempts to negotiate peace with the guerrillas, disgruntled 
military officials more decidedly opted for an alliance with civilian self-defence groups (Steele 2017, p. 92). 
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groups.103 In some cases, the military warned the civilians that paramilitaries would follow them. 
Even when action was not coordinated, collusion could exceed mere tolerance and omission: 
Human Rights Watch described several cases where the security forces, in particular the military, 
did not move against paramilitaries or engaged in actions that produced only delays and allowed 
paramilitaries to continue their activities with impunity (Human Rights Watch 2001, pp. 3–4). The 
US government at that time was already aware of that, since in August 2000, President Bill Clinton 
made sure to sign a waiver that lifted the human rights conditions imposed by the US Congress, 
“in essence allowing security assistance to be provided to the Colombian military even as the State 
Department reported that some of its units continued to be implicated in support for paramilitary 
groups” (Human Rights Watch 2001, p. 4). 
Along with the military support provided to counterinsurgent forces involved in 
displacement for political cleansing, the United States also directly contributed to environmental 
degradation, leading to further forced migration. Plan Colombia involved massive chemical 
fumigation aimed at eradicating the cultivation of coca leaves. Indeed, the whole funding package 
was dependent on Colombian acceptance of an eradication strategy based on aerial fumigation 
(Buxton 2006, p. 180). Martinez decries that “glyphosate is used in aerial fumigations in Colombia 
in a concentration twenty-six times higher than is allowed in US agriculture. According to Nivia 
(2002: 393, 397), each doubling of the glyphosate dose multiplies its biological action by four, 
meaning that exposure to glyphosate as applied through Plan Colombia has a potency 104 times 
higher than the dose recommended for agricultural use in the United States. Making matters worse, 
coca-growing areas in Colombia are often fumigated two to four times”. Furthermore, “glyphosate 
is very soluble in water and can contaminate ground water at various levels”. Therefore, 
 
103 Human Rights Watch 2001, pp. 2–3. Cooperation involved “active coordination during military operations between 
government and paramilitary units; communication via radios, cellular telephones, and beepers; the sharing of 
intelligence, including the names of suspected guerrilla collaborators; the sharing of fighters, including active-duty 
soldiers serving in paramilitary units and paramilitary commanders lodging on military bases; the sharing of vehicles, 
including army trucks used to transport paramilitary fighters; coordination of army roadblocks, which routinely let 
heavily-armed paramilitary fighters pass; and payments made from paramilitaries to military officers for their support” 
(Human Rights Watch 2001, p. 1). 
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fumigation with glyphosate has been linked to “human health problems, especially of the skin, 
vision and digestive system; illnesses and deaths of farm animals; contamination of water sources; 
and the extermination of legal crops, which has created a significant food crisis in the fumigated 
regions”. It has been estimated that “from 1999 through 2002, 35,000 families were forced to flee 
their homes as a direct consequence of fumigations. In 2003 alone a total number of 27,044 people 
fled areas where fumigations were taking place” (Martinez 2009, p. 212). 
According to Buxton, chemical fumigation in the 2000s “increased the rate of population 
displacement while the fumigation campaign itself detracted from the need to address the social 
problems caused by the on-going civil conflict”. Furthermore, she argues, “US sponsorship of 
chemical fumigation was acutely problematic given that the focus of eradication activities was 
those areas controlled by the left-wing insurgent group, the FARC” (Buxton 2006, p. 187). Thus, 
the war on drugs also contributed to the political cleansing of fumigated land. Although the 
guerrillas initially opposed the cultivation of illicit crops, they tolerated it to preserve popular 
support among growers, to whom the earnings from the new illegal crops often appeared as a 
blessing. Moreover, guerrillas had quickly realised that extortion regarding coca-crop cultivation 
and trafficking in their territories would substantially increase their revenues. Thus, they at least 
benefitted from the dramatic increase of illicit crops in Colombia. In the US perspective, 
fumigation “was seen as functional in the anti-terrorist context as it eliminated the financial base 
and consequently the military capacity of the FARC”. In sum, the “link between terrorism and 
drugs was used to detract from the claims of health problems and illness in sprayed areas. It was 
also used to denigrate the campaign against fumigation with critics of the strategy condemned by 
the US and Colombian governments as supporters of terrorism and the drugs trade” (Buxton 2006, 
p. 187). 
Given this background, forced migration in Colombia is clearly far from being the 
unintended product of unfortunate accidental conditions. As Steele puts it, “The common 
impression that violence causes displacement is incomplete. Rather, it is often the case that because 
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displacement is the goal, violence increases” (Steele 2017, p. 142). The Colombian state bears 
strong reparative responsibility for the harms of displacement attributable to its security forces and 
for its complicity with paramilitary groups doing the bulk of the dirty work in cleansing land from 
unwanted occupants, by means of killings and displacement. However, the United States also bears 
reparative responsibility to the extent it provided equipment and intelligence that strongly 
contributed to the dramatic increase in Colombian forced migration. Moreover, although the 
Colombian government agreed to allow chemical fumigation as a condition to receive US funding 
to counter insurgents, the United States continues to hold reparative responsibility for those 
displaced as a result. As Buxton notes, “Given the power and influence that the USA had over the 
Colombian government at this time, it is open to question how far the Colombian president would 
have been able to resist US eradication plans and strategies” (Buxton 2006, p. 186). Legally, 
liability for the act of delivering a poisoning amount of glyphosate on Colombian lands proved 
hard to isolate. According to Buxton, since chemical fumigation was a product of elite, 
intergovernmental negotiations between the Colombian and US administrations, “no mechanisms 
of accountability or ‘ownership’ of aerial fumigation policies existed”. Moreover, “responsibility 
for fumigation had been outsourced by the US State Department to the US firm DynCorp 
Aerospace Technologies” (Buxton 2006, p. 186). Although the firm is causally responsible for 
materially carrying out the spraying, and thus owes reparations to the displaced people, this does 
not mean that the United States does not bear a large share of reparative responsibility, given its 
key role in devising and funding Plan Colombia. 
The picture becomes even more complex, and more actors come into the picture, if we 
consider what happens to the lands that have been cleared from the undesired occupants and 
sometimes actively repopulated with compliant settlers. As we have seen from the political 
explanation of forced displacement provided by Steele, UP supporters were collectively targeted 
and their removal justified by their being equated with insurgent guerrillas. However, Colombia’s 
IDPs are often selectively or collectively targeted and accused of being guerrillas if they are 
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socially active, reclaiming rights qua workers and union members, qua owners of small farms and 
campesino leaders, or as members of native and Afro-Colombian communities that collectively 
own lands.104 This is how private companies, including large corporations based abroad, come into 
the picture. 
In 2007 the multinational corporation Chiquita Brands International Inc. admitted publicly 
that it had made payments to the FARC, which controlled the Urabá region in the 1990s, and then 
to the paramilitaries from 1997 to 2004 (Martin-Hortega 2008, p. 5). The president of Chiquita 
justified the payments to the paramilitaries based on their capacity to intimidate, claiming that 
there were only two options: pay for the protection of the paramilitaries or run the risk of seeing 
employees killed or kidnapped. Demobilised paramilitaries also confirmed their relationship with 
the companies Chiquita, Del Monte, and Dole. According to AUC military leader Salvatore 
Mancuso, however, there was no need to pressure, blackmail, or threaten the banana-producing 
companies into making payments, as they did it voluntarily and willingly (Martin-Hortega 2008, 
p. 6). If true, this would mean that such companies not only paid extortion money to the armed 
actors, but even hired them as private security forces, as other landowners have done for decades, 
to suppress social protest in rural areas by removing dissenters. 
Furthermore, private companies, including banana companies and more recently palm oil 
companies, have been involved in land grabbing, by taking advantage of land abandoned following 
paramilitary violence or by actively hiring paramilitaries to dispossess land occupants.105 It is no 
coincidence that paramilitary violence has been particularly acute in areas that, like most former 
guerrilla strongholds, had been long outside the state jurisdiction. In those lands, land titles were 
often lacking or collectively belonged to marginalised native and Afro-Colombian communities, 
which represent the overwhelming majority of the population on the Pacific coast (Steele 2017, p. 
 
104 Note that, in 2010, more trade union members were killed in Colombia than the rest of the world combined 
(Maher 2015, p. 312). 
105 Frances Thomson proposed the label “land-grab-induced displacement” to describe such cases; see Thomson 2014. 
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60). As Vigil puts it, “When tenure is not formalised, populations can be labelled as illegal settlers 
and evicted without compensation. Moreover, populations with unclear or insecure tenure 
arrangements have scarce negotiation power” (Vigil 2018, p. 375). Afro-Colombian land is 
protected as alienable according to Law 70, article 7 (NRC/IDMC 2007b, p. 10). Nevertheless, 
Law 210, introduced in 2007, allows companies to easily formalise the coercively or deceitfully 
occupied lands, since they are not required to present evidence on how they were acquired 
(NRC/IDMC 2007b, p. 13). 
The NRC/IDMC reports that fifteen to seventeen thousand people were forcibly displaced 
from Urabá as result of Operacion Genesis, jointly carried out in 1996 by the army and the 
paramilitary groups. Palm companies were established in the cleared areas (Jiguamiandó y 
Curvaradó) starting in 2000, and the extension of palm plantations nearly doubled 
between 2005 and 2007. Companies may have merely benefitted ex post, without being causally 
implicated in the displacement, but the NRC/IDMC also reports that IDPs who were trying to 
reclaim their lands were persistently intimidated (NRC/IDMC 2007b, p. 15), thereby suggesting a 
relationship between companies and paramilitaries. Indeed, unidentifiable men imposed 
themselves during the NRC/IDMC researchers’ fieldwork with some IDPs that had returned and 
built up a shantytown “humanitarian zone” on the fringes of the seized lands (NRC/IDMC 2007b, 
p. 15). Humanitarian zones are meant to reject any political involvement by denying access to any 
state and non-state actors, thus protecting residents from being accused of alleged cooperation with 
the guerrillas. Nevertheless, in 2007 the owner of the land hosting the humanitarian zone visited 
by the NRC/IMDC researchers received death threats by the neo-paramilitary group Águilas 
Negras (NRC/IDMC 2007b, p. 17). 
Links between paramilitary violence, mass displacement, and palm-cultivation expansion 
were also assessed in other regions, such as former guerrilla strongholds Meta, Casanare, and 
Nariño (Maher 2015). Some scholars even suggest that it is possible to identify a typical four-
phase pattern: (1) armed incursion by paramilitary groups, enabling (2) the illegal and violent 
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expropriation of land; (3) forced displacement of owners and/or communities which occupy these 
lands; and (4) the planting of African palm on the “conquered land” (Maher 2015, p. 311). Luis 
Angel, an IDP from Chocó interviewed in 2006 by the NRC/IMDC, comments: 
We don’t know why they needed to use force to get us off the land, despite knowing that we own it. It fills 
us with worry, but we do know that it all has to do with the major projects that they plan for our region; for 
example, monocultures of palm for oil . . . , mining in the Careperro hills and the Urra hydroelectric dam. As 
far as palm is concerned, we’ve got Urapalma, Palmadó, Palmas and Palmas de Curvaradó, and there’s La 
Tukeka, another palm oil company. . . . They took their decisions behind our backs and everything they’ve 
done has been done by force, by violence. In the case of palm, the growers never came to the communities 
to consult us about their operations. . . . More recently the growers tried to make approaches to the 
communities, but they’ve already planted their crops and so we just kept saying that we wouldn’t talk to any 
of them. We know that the state is behind it all, so it should be the state that talks to them. Similarly, we were 
never consulted about the mining operations either.106 
This so-called “black legend” of land and resource appropriation being often the purpose of forced 
displacement in Colombia is not based only on anecdotal evidence and testimonies. For instance, 
an econometric study also analysed the soundness of the causal-link hypothesis to correlate the 
expansion of palm cultivation in Madgdalena between 2000 and 2010, the expansion of the 
paramilitaries, and the dramatic growth in forced migration from that region over the same period. 
Results confirm that the development of the palm oil agribusiness seems to have caused a 
significant increase in forced displacement beyond that caused by the ongoing armed conflict. The 
study also found strong evidence that paramilitary violence was a key factor in the expansion of 
palm agribusiness while guerrilla violence did not affect the expansion of this type of cultivation 
(Hurtado et al. 2017, p. 464). 
Not only some palm oil businesses cooperated with the paramilitaries: paramilitaries 
infiltrate some of these companies from within. What is more, they may even receive funding from 
the US. Indeed, while 80 percent of Plan Colombia funds were military aid, a smaller percentage 
 
106 NRC/IMDC 2007a, p. 177. 
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was meant to promote development while also encouraging the cultivation of legal crops as an 
alternative to coca crops. Palm oil was one of the few aid-funded crops whose profits could match 
coca profits (Ballvé 2009): its market was booming, and it could adapt to both domestic and export 
demand in an extremely flexible way (Marin-Burgos and Clancy 2017, p. 17). According to 
a 2009 article in the Nation, since 2003 USAID’s alternative-development contracts had provided 
nearly $20 million to palm oil agribusiness projects across the country. Urapalma was one of the 
first palm companies to send an application, presenting itself as a representative of “Afro-
Colombian associations”, and nearly won the grant, despite having paramilitary-affiliated 
members and despite having been accused of the illegal seizure of more than fourteen thousand 
acres of land in Chocó. In the end, Urapalma was denied the grant, but other paramilitary-led 
companies got grants. Coproagrosur received its $161,000 grant in 2004, while Gradesa obtained 
a $257,000 grant in December 2003. The former was run by a paramilitary commander known as 
Macaco, while the latter had a narco-paramilitary family on its investors’ board (Ballvé 2009). 
External states also benefitted from the expansion of agribusiness in Colombia. When it 
comes to palm oil, exports more than doubled between 2003 and 2008 (Marin-Burgos and 
Clancy 2017, p. 8). From 2004 until 2008, most palm oil exports went to the European Union 
(Marin-Burgos and Clancy 2017, p. 8), particularly to the UK (War on Want 2008, pp. 4–5). Palm 
oil was no longer employed in food and soaps only; it was increasingly requested as a biofuel too. 
As no palm oil is produced in Europe (palm oil being a tropical crop), the entire supply needs to 
be imported. Some scholars have begun pointing to the ironic effects of “green grabbing”, whereby 
historically high-emissions states’ virtuous turn to biofuels comes through extensive land 
dispossession, displacement, and environmental degradation in the global South (Vigil 2018). 
ONG War on Want decried that the British government had already admitted in a 2006 study that 
increased palm production in Colombia is likely to provoke more forced evictions, land grabs, 
pollution of waterways, and destruction of forests (War on Want 2008, p. 12). Although they are 
not directly causally responsible for displacement, it seems at least reasonable to claim that 
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importing states have a moral duty to research on their suppliers and owe reparations to forced 
migrants to the extent that their displacement was a foreseeable consequence (though not intended 
by the importing state) of the activities (either legal or illegal) of supplier companies. 
 
2. The Impact of Specific Harms on the Needs of Colombian Forced Migrants 
The fact that Colombian forced migrants are neither moving voluntarily nor just displaced 
as an unintended side effect of generalised violence matters when it comes to what they need and 
what they claim once displaced. Being either individually or collectively targeted impairs their 
ability to register as displaced (either inside or outside their country) and to get on with their lives. 
As a result, the humanitarian emergency-assistance approach fails to meet their needs and claims, 
and an impressive law on land restitution may prove nonetheless insufficient for reparative justice. 
To show that this is the case, in this section I rely on qualitative and testimonial evidence to 
highlight the connections between displacement triggers and forced migrants’ needs and claims, 
particularly their claims to truth telling and social recognition. 
Steele notes that when civilians are targeted collectively by an armed group, they are likely 
to resettle together with others similarly targeted or to move closer to the rival group to seek 
protection. Indeed, “hiding” among others who are similarly targeted, or seeking the protection of 
an armed group, will help reduce the chances that that household will suffer direct violence. Most 
tend to relocate to cities for safety and for access to resources. Given that cities tend to be 
controlled by the state (instead of the guerrillas) more often than the countryside, this is a 
satisfactory outcome for counterinsurgents. However, since IDPs tend to cluster in cities too, they 
remain vulnerable to further targeting and displacement (Steele 2017, pp. 49–50). 
Law 387 of 1997 mandated that the state register the displaced. Displaced individuals and 
households must approach a government agency and respond to a questionnaire in order to have 
their application assessed. If successful, applicants are included in the Unique Victim Registry 
(Registro Único de Víctimas, or RUV) and become eligible for humanitarian assistance from the 
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government. At the time of Steele’s fieldwork, assistance amounted to three months of rent and 
groceries, but there was generally a long delay between the time of entrance into the RUV and 
receipt of assistance (Steele 2017, p. 181). Furthermore, short-term humanitarian assistance does 
not help forced migrants to regain a source of livelihood, nor to mitigate the disorientation of 
leaving their Home environment to move to an unfamiliar one where they are often not welcome 
(Selfa 2013, p. 26). Ismael, a peasant and IDP leader displaced multiple times, recalls the 
harassment his children faced at school: “I managed to get the kids enrolled. And once I’d enrolled 
them, then every so often, pretty much everyday, they’d complain that the others, the other 
schoolkids, kept saying they were displaced people and because they were black with curly hair, 
they gave them a hard time. . . . So my kids starting fighting with the others, and then the teachers 
said that they were violent because they were displaced . . . and the kids came home crying” 
(NRC/IMDC 2007a, p. 121). 
In cities, social marginalisation and stigmatisation for their alleged allegiance to insurgents, 
and racism in the case of Afro-Colombians, add to economic destitution, the fear of (often newly 
discovered) urban street crime, and often a persisting fear of being identified by the armed actors 
that have displaced them. The latter leads many IDPs to try to maintain anonymity and to conceal 
the reasons for their move. As a result, they might avoid registration and lose access to government 
programmes. Government programmes for IDPs have traditionally been assistance oriented: they 
focus on the short-term future and do not take into consideration the causes of forced displacement 
(Gonzáles Bustelo 2013, p. 233). Thus, they are not meant to provide compensation or any other 
kind of reparation. Nor are they devised to ensure housing security, social inclusion, psychological 
assistance, and integration in the job market. Blanca, interviewed by the NRC/IMDC in 2006 at 
the age of sixty-four, was unsatisfied with the approach of the Colombian authorities: “I believe 
that they haven’t felt our pain or appreciated us as victims: on the contrary. They say that we have 
to forgive, that we have to forget” (NRC/IMDC 2007a, p. 82). 
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In 2011, the Colombian state issued an innovative law (Ley 1448), marking a significant 
shift from a purely forward-looking and assistance-based approach to forced displacement to a 
backwards-looking, reparative-justice one. This so-called Victim’s Law has been hailed as one of 
the most complex and integral reparation programmes worldwide (Weber 2020, p. 5). Indeed, it 
provides for land restitution, together with agricultural, social, and infrastructural projects, to those 
internally displaced after 1991. To those who suffered human rights violations after 1985 the law 
offers compensation accompanied by a dignification letter. Moreover, groups that suffered 
collective damages can receive collective reparations (Weber 2020, p. 7). The law even envisages 
differentiated measures to respond to the “particular situation and degree of vulnerability” of 
certain groups of victims due to their age, gender, sexual orientation, or disability (Weber 2020, p. 
8). However, there are strong limits on its implementation, particularly when it comes to land 
restitution. Firstly, abandoned lands may not have been registered as such: many displaced land 
claimants never registered their parcels with the Central Registry of Abandoned Parcels and 
Territories out of fear, or did so only many years after abandoning the land (Counter 2019, p. 178). 
Secondly, land irregularly acquired could have been regularised in the meantime by current 
occupants under Law 210 (NRC/IDMC 2007b, p. 13). Thirdly, there is a denigratory narrative of 
land restitution as an attempt to re-establish guerrilla territorial control which enjoys substantial 
political capital, especially among landowners defending their property against claims in the Land 
Restitution Tribunal (Counter 2019, p. 182). Fourthly, the Land Restitution Unit cannot control 
the whole process, which also depends on local authorities, and thus its outcome is vulnerable to 
corruption (Weber 2020, p. 13). Finally, land restitution raises the issue of the eviction of second 
occupants (i.e., current owners), who, even when not causally implicated in displacement, may not 
be eligible for compensation if unable to prove that they bought the land in good faith with due 
diligence (i.e., actively investigated the history of the parcel to ensure the land transfer was free of 
any irregularities) (Counter 2019, p. 177). 
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Furthermore, the limits of the restitution-based approach to forced displacement do not 
consist in implementation shortcomings only. Indeed, land restitution per se is insufficient to allow 
for rebuilding life plans upon return and does not automatically entail truth telling about how the 
land had been seized in the first place. Thus, it needs to be complemented by other effective 
rehabilitative measures (e.g., social services) and symbolic reparations. Restitution and return do 
not suffice to put an end to the distinctive displacement condition of Colombian forced migrants, 
who continue to have specific additional needs deriving from the losses they suffered qua forcibly 
displaced people. 
Weber recently conducted ethnographic research on returned IDPs in the municipality of 
Chibolo, in Magdalena Department. They had been displaced in 1997 by the paramilitary Bloque 
Norte, which repopulated the area with sympathisers to keep the land occupied. Among the harms 
they suffered qua forcibly displaced people, participants mentioned burnt-down houses and the 
loss of their farm animals (cattle being a key measure of wealth) but most importantly the “loss of 
a way of life and the rupture of a process that provided economic and social stability”. They also 
alluded to family breakups and mentioned illness deriving from “stress, hypervigilance and 
sadness produced by displacement”. A loss of their “sense of self and identity” was also mentioned 
in relation to the radical change in lifestyle experienced by those who had moved to cities. Weber 
underlines that participants’ most urgent needs upon return were “defined by the different elements 
needed to rebuild their lives and life projects”.107 As a guarantee of non-repetition, land titles were 
deemed crucial. However, the land-restitution process turned out to be much slower and more 
complex than had been communicated to returning IDPs, who were promised restitution sentences 
within a couple of months. Furthermore, participants emphasised that “receiving land titles was 
only one step towards recovering the life project that was hampered by displacement” 
(Weber 2020, p. 11). The land was not suitable for cattle grazing after more than a decade, and 
 
107 Return began in 2012, while Weber’s fieldwork took place between 2015 and 2017. 
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restoring their livelihoods proved difficult, even more because of the effects of several years of 
drought. As Weber sums up, “They found monetary compensation insufficient to transform their 
living conditions. This would require the provision of the crucial elements for a life plan, such as 
education, employment and the provision of basic living conditions. Yet the infrastructural projects 
ordered in the land restitution sentences, including the provision of running water and electricity, 
had not been implemented” (Weber 2020, p. 12). 
Chimbolo returnee communities were also granted a collective-reparation plan that 
included commemorative activities. Interviewed community leaders, however, expressed a strong 
preference for material reparations over symbolic commemorative activities. Weber comments 
that “material reparations can lend credibility to symbolic reparations. . . . In Chibolo, the absence 
of the conditions for a dignified life makes people feel treated as second-class citizens, making the 
symbolic message of recognition of equal citizenship sent through the Colombian state’s 
dignification letter seem empty words” (Weber 2020, p. 16). Symbolic reparations, I add, also 
require truth telling. Truth on what lies behind displacement and its most proximate triggers gives 
value to commemorations and apologies and also has value in itself, not just for returnees but also 
for those forced migrants who cannot or do not wish to return. 
The claim for truth telling is recurring in IDPs’ testimonies, such as Carlos’s. A former 
peasant farmer from the region of Jiguamiandó and Curvaradó, Carlos was a twenty-six-year-old 
father in 2006 when he was interviewed by the NCR/IMDC. Like many other farm owners in that 
region, he had to leave his land after the arrival of the paramilitaries in 1997; he remained in the 
countryside until 2001, then spent three years in Medellín but had to move again “for security 
reasons”. He was too afraid to have his current place of residence mentioned in the testimony: “No 
one is blamed, because if you know that you were displaced by the paramilitaries, or you if you 
denounce having been displaced by the guerrillas, or whoever else, it’s that group that has to take 
responsibility, not the state”. On the contrary, he claims, “I think it’s just a state strategy . . . Why 
didn’t they just buy the lands from us or tell us what lands they wanted! No one talks about that 
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. . . For example, my land is now planted with palm (backed) by international agencies, especially 
the gringos.108 You say: ‘Fine, what happened here?’ The gringos are supposedly the only ones 
assisting the peace process in Colombia! But on the land from where people were displaced, 
instead of helping us to return, they are growing crops for export” (NRC/IMDC 2007a, p. 185). 
Carlos has no doubts about what he thinks he is entitled to qua IDP: “I want my testimony to be 
taken into account, for someone to begin an investigation. What is happening? What happened 
with those lands? . . . I demand, in the first instance, that the truth be known about what happened 
and why we were displaced; about what was really behind all this. Secondly, that both the material 
and intellectual author of this be punished” (NRC/IMDC 2007a, p. 186). 
I have argued so far that mass forced displacement in Colombia is not a mere side effect of 
generalised violence and that, unlike a purely forward-looking humanitarian approach, a 
backwards-looking approach allows us to see how displacement triggers and deeper causes affect 
IDPs’ needs and claims for reparations. The same, I argue, also applies to the minority of 
Colombian displaced people who migrate across borders. Given their geographical location, 
Venezuela and Ecuador have long been among their main destinations. Analogously to Colombian 
IDPs who overwhelmingly flee to cities, Colombian forced migrants who move to neighbouring 
cities in Ecuador try to hide in the urban crowd. They try to avoid not only the attention of 
Colombian armed actors that may still chase them down, but also widespread social discrimination 
by Ecuadorians. Note that admission is not an issue for Colombians moving to Ecuador. Ecuador 
has maintained a consistent policy of open borders. Under Rafael Correa (2007–17) the Ecuadorian 
government promoted “a discourse of universal citizenship, under which migrants are provided a 
basis to claim protection and a say in the decisions that affect them by virtue of their humanity”. 
Furthermore, the 2008 Ecuadorian Constitution prohibited discrimination based on migration 
status and guaranteed refugees many of the same rights as Ecuadorians (Pugh 2018, p. 986). Since 
 
108 The term is often used in spoken language to refer to US citizens, the US government, or US companies. 
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there are no refugee camps, most forced migrants from Colombia settle either in cities in the Andes 
(e.g., Quito, Ibarra, and Tulcan) or in rural provinces near the Colombian border (Pugh 2018, p. 
986). Their freedom of movement is not formally restricted, and they are allowed access to health 
care, education, and employment (Verney 2009, p. 60). Thus, formal obstacles to rebuilding lives 
are no greater for Colombian forced migrants in Ecuador than they are for those who remain in 
Colombia. Nevertheless, they struggle to have both their survival and specific needs met, 
particularly when it comes to recovering social status. Indeed, their legal inclusion comes through 
their social marginalisation: they face an “invisibility bargain”, whereby tolerance on the part of 
the host society depends on their political and social invisibility (Pugh 2018). 
According to Pugh, Colombians in Ecuador are “expected not to make claims or political 
demands on the government, especially using public, collective action to demand rights to which 
they claim to be entitled because of international treaties, domestic law, the constitution, moral 
claims, or other reason” (Pugh 2018, p. 984). Although advocacy by Colombian migrants during 
the constitutional assembly in 2007–8 was important in achieving progressive policy gains and 
protections, Pugh notes that this “did not violate the invisibility bargain because [it] took place 
behind closed doors and relied on host society NGO allies for political cover” (Pugh 2018, p. 990). 
Furthermore, Colombians are expected to minimise or even hide “characteristics and practices that 
are distinct from the norms defined by the host society—including language . . . or even visible 
racial difference” (Pugh 2018, p. 984). Given the higher percentage of Afro-Colombians compared 
to Afro-Ecuadorians (21 percent versus 7 percent), race is a marker of difference which can 
identify Colombians and mark them for exclusion (Pugh 2018, p. 991). Moreover, in Pugh’s 
qualitative study, accent was second only to “being Colombian” as the most often-mentioned 
reason for discrimination, followed by sexualised stereotypes of women and perceptions of 
threatening male criminality (Pugh 2018, p. 994). 
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Consider how these elements are illustrated in Ricardo Sierra’s testimony.109 Ricardo used 
to be a relatively wealthy car painter in Colombia. His family started being targeted after botched 
business dealings between his brother and the paramilitaries. Following the killing of his beloved 
nephew, he fled to Bogotá with his wife and children, where they lived off of Ricardo’s minimum 
wage job (less than one-third of his previous income). After some years of struggling for survival, 
he decided to move back to his hometown with the family. However, repeated threatening phone 
calls and an attack on a sibling compelled them to leave again, this time to Ibarra, an Ecuadorian 
city close to Colombia where they had been once on vacation. Ricardo was reluctant to migrate 
abroad: “We waited a few months before we decided to go, because at that time I still didn’t have 
the strength to go. I knew it was going to be a hard change”. In Ecuador, Ricardo and his family 
faced a dramatic loss in socioeconomic status, humiliation, and discrimination. Ricardo’s family 
were granted a refugee visa after only six months, which gave them all the rights of the 
Ecuadorians, except the right to vote. However, Ricardo remarks that, since voting is mandatory, 
all Ecuadorians have a voting card. According to his experience, a voting card is the first thing 
required when one applies to work in a company, asks for a loan, or simply tries to cash a check. 
“I am no one here”, he sadly remarks. He started to search for a job as a qualified car painter, but 
all car-shop owners kept replying that there were no vacancies. One of them looked him in the 
eyes and said quietly, “No, I don’t give work to Colombians because Colombians hurt me”. 
Finally, he found a job in the most scattered car shop he visited, making meagre earnings. 
Frustrated, he asked his wife Salud to find a job too. Salud was also denied employment by a store 
owner based on her nationality. She eventually found a job as a cleaner in a “love motel” in a 
neighbourhood in which there were four brothels employing Colombian sex workers. As a result, 
people began to harass her and her daughter. “At school, Lina’s classmates ask her what brothel 
her mom works in. One time, when Salud was at the mass, a priest said that prostitutes that worked 
 
109 See Brodzinsky and Schoening 2012, pp. 237–51. 
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in the neighbourhood brothels were the parasites of humanity, and right then everyone in the 
church turned to look at her. She had to leave the church”, recalls Ricardo. He also mentions 
hearing angry remarks while at work about Colombian men being criminals. He recalls that since 
his first days in Ecuador he had been warned to distance himself from Colombians. A friend of 
him told him he had changed his accent on purpose. However, Ricardo claims it is his duty to keep 
his being Colombian visible and to struggle to change the image that people have of Colombians. 
Surely, one might note, discrimination and xenophobia affect Colombians independently 
of their being forced migrants? Actually, the impact of xenophobia is different for those who were 
forced to flee Colombia and cannot come back. This is what emerges from Pugh’s ethnographic 
work: 
In the same focus group, two university-educated Colombian women shared their personal testimonies. One 
was a white researcher who had migrated to Ecuador on an economic visa and later naturalized as a citizen; 
the other was an Afro-Colombian social worker who had fled death threats and was living in Ecuador as a 
refugee. Both women described incidents of discrimination and xenophobic comments triggered by people 
hearing their accents, as well as sexualized comments about prostitution that responded to gendered 
stereotypes of Colombians. The Afro-Colombian woman, however, responded to her compatriot’s story by 
saying that the consequences of their experiences were very different because her precarity as a refugee meant 
that housing or job discrimination could put her life at risk if she had to return to Colombia or was “outed” 
in public to armed actors who might threaten her. . . . Xenophobic comments, then, represented a greater 
threat to her livelihood and survival than to the other woman (and the white participant agreed).110 
To minimise their difference from the host society, Colombian forced migrants typically 
employ two main strategies: reducing the visible/audible markers that distinguish them from 
Ecuadorians and reducing their level of contact and interaction with Ecuadorians altogether. 
However, this makes them more isolated and less resilient against attacks or discriminatory 
behaviour because they lack a support network that stretches into the host society (Pugh 2018, pp. 
 
110 Pugh 2018, pp. 998–99. 
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1002–3). Furthermore, isolation as an invisibility strategy does not reduce xenophobia on the part 
of the host society.111 
The case of Colombian forced migrants highlights the importance of social-recognition 
claims along with truth-telling claims. They need recognition as individuals whose personal 
identity and status in society have been undermined because of their flight from their Home 
sociocultural environment and by their being forced to settle in a different, often-hostile host 
environment. They need recognition qua forced migrants: they need the fact of their being forcibly 
displaced, rather than voluntarily migrating, to be publicly recognised, the non-accidental nature 
of forced displacement to be acknowledged, and their displacee status to be delinked from 
stereotyped association with being a guerrilla or a criminal. Often, they also need recognition as 
members of a collectively harmed social group: for instance, as members of Afro-Colombian or 
native minorities who have been made vulnerable to forced displacement because of their 
marginalised social status and their lack of individual land titles, or as Colombians when abroad, 
given that the membership in this group results in stigmatisation. 
Such recognition requires their formal social and political inclusion not only through legal 
rights, but also through policies guaranteeing the preconditions for such an inclusion, including 
dedicated or appropriately sensitive mainstream social services and positive actions when needed. 
Although not reparative in itself, the delivery of social services such as infrastructures, education, 
and labour integration may have a reparatory potential depending on the symbolic value publicly 
associated with such delivery. To count as reparations, policies of this kind should recognise the 
beneficiaries’ past harms and the causal connection between the harms of displacement and their 
current needs. Furthermore, they should acknowledge the responsibility of involved actors, which 
may differ from the actors delivering social services. For instance, the United States, or the 
 
111 On the contrary, the literature on contact theory shows that contact does reduce anti-immigrant attitudes. When it 
comes to Colombians in Ecuador, in a 2008 survey 59 percent of Ecuadorian respondents who did not know a 
Colombian personally supported a policy of deporting all Colombian migrants to their country of origin, while 




companies having special reparative responsibility for the forced migrants displaced by the 
paramilitaries they colluded with, may acknowledge their responsibility by providing monetary 
compensation, truth, and apologies. Importantly, such reparations are owed to displaced people 
themselves, instead of being owed to the state hosting them (i.e., Colombia, in the case of IDPs; 
Ecuador, Venezuela, and so forth in the case of international forced migrants). There might be 
fairness-based well-founded arguments to compensate states for the cost of hosting forced 




In this chapter, I have illustrated my backwards-looking harms-based approach to what is 
owed to forced migrants in the context of forced displacement in Colombia. For most Colombian 
forced migrants, admission is not an issue; there is no need to single them out from other people 
on the move to determine the priority owed to their admission claim. Among the few who flee 
across borders, most remain in neighbouring countries, such as Ecuador, whose borders have been 
quite open to them. Moreover, the overwhelming majority are displaced within Colombia. 
Nevertheless, the fact that they have been displaced remains normatively salient. Looking at the 
reasons and the way Colombian forced migrants were displaced and how displacement harmed 
them is useful to better assess responsibility, needs and remedies. I have shown that, even when 
Colombian forced migrants remain under the jurisdiction of the Colombian state, their state of 
origin is not the only agent bearing special reparative responsibility for them. Indeed, the United 
States intervened in the Colombian civil conflict, thereby contributing to conflict-induced 
displacement, and directly caused environmentally induced displacement to pursue foreign and 
 
112 In addition to reparative justice arguments for compensating forced migrants rather than hosting states, there might 




domestic policy goals. Furthermore, local and foreign businesses also funded paramilitaries 
carrying out forced displacement, acquired the abandoned land and even actively sought to 
dispossess unwanted land occupants.  
When it comes to the needs of Colombian forced migrants, I have argued that insufficient 
humanitarian aid aimed to tackle survival needs neglects the specific needs that derive from being 
deprived of one’s Home environment and fails to acknowledge displaced people claim that they 
have been wronged, their demands for truth and reparations. Land restitution is crucial to repair 
the harms of forced displacement, but it is not sufficient because it concentrates on the harm of 
material dispossession. Bearing in mind the harms of forced migration allows us to see why 
Colombian forced migrants are also owed specific social services to regain control of their life 
plans and re-create a Home environment around them, even in the case of those who return to the 
place of origin. Furthermore, it allows us to see that, without truth telling, generic public apology 
results void and provides no guarantee of protection against future displacement.  
In sum, the theoretical frame provided in Part I illuminates the fact that Colombian forced 
migrants are not just people in need of humanitarian or development aid, nor even just dispossessed 
people, but people who have been deprived of control over their lives, forced to abandon their 
Home environment and social roles, and psychologically harmed by both such losses and the 
experiences of violence that often triggered their move. Qua displaced people, Colombian forced 
migrants are owed public acknowledgement of specific responsibilities and the fulfilment of those 





Intra–European Union Trafficking: The Case of Trafficking for Labour Exploitation 
 
The previous chapter, devoted to displacement in Colombia, has concentrated on the 
condition of IDPs since the overwhelming majority of Colombian forced migrants are internally 
displaced. The case of internal displacement in Colombia shows that forced migration remains a 
distinctive and normatively relevant phenomenon even when there are no borders that restrict 
mobility and no need to discriminate among migrants to determine priority in admission policies. 
This chapter will illustrate this claim pointing to a case of forced migration that happens in a 
regional free movement area, where international mobility is allowed. This is the case of 
trafficking in human beings across European Union (EU) member states, which I mentioned in 
Chapter 2. EU citizens are allowed to move and settle in other EU member states. Thus, restriction 
in immigration policies is not an issue. If what all migrants, including forced migrants, ultimately 
needed were freedom to move across borders, identifying forced migrants within the EU would be 
redundant and normatively useless. The point of this chapter is to argue that this is not the case. 
Despite borders being open to EU citizens, some of them do not move voluntarily, and, as a result, 
they experience specific harms and have specific needs. Therefore, their condition remains 
distinctive and normatively relevant. EU citizens are not forced to migrate to neighbouring 
countries because of armed conflicts. Nevertheless, an impressive number of EU citizens are still 
being trafficked, both inside EU countries and across EU countries. 
The UN Protocol on trafficking defines trafficking as 
the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of 
force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of 
vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control 
over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. . . . Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of 
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the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar 
to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.113 
Much emphasis in policy and public debate has been placed on transportation, so that the 
concept of trafficking often overlaps with the concept of smuggling and is thought to involve 
illegal border crossing. However, this is not necessarily the case. Campana and Varese clarify that 
what is essential in trafficking is “the unlawful control over a person”, not the illegal crossing of a 
border (Campana and Varese 2016, p. 93). As Anderson echoes, “The transportation element of 
trafficking does not have to occur across national boundaries and neither is entry into a state 
necessarily illegal” (Anderson 2014, p. 358). Indeed, trafficking also occurs within states or across 
the borders of states that are part of a free-movement area, such as EU member states. Furthermore, 
being transported from one’s place of origin to another place does not amount to being trafficked. 
The crucial elements in trafficking are the means and the ends of transportation. Indeed, trafficked 
people are coerced, or deceived, so that their consent to being transported is deemed irrelevant 
(UN 2000, article 3). Furthermore, they are coerced or deceived into migrating for the purpose of 
exploiting their labour or their own body. Thus, trafficking does not necessarily involve illegal 
migration, yet it is an example of forced migration: trafficked people experience harms that they 
would not have experienced had they moved voluntarily, even in the case their move had involved 
recurring to a smuggler.114 
This chapter will focus on internal trafficking inside the EU. Internal trafficking designates 
the trafficking occurring both inside an EU member state and across EU member states, but I will 
predominantly refer to the latter. Internal trafficking in the EU is indeed a serious issue. The actual 
number of EU citizens trafficked inside the EU is extremely difficult to estimate, given that many 
cases remain undetected. However, it is worth noting that, according to a report issued in 2018 by 
the European Commission, among the 20,532 victims of trafficking registered in 2015–16, nearly 
 
113 UN 2000, article 3. 
114 See Campana and Varese 2016 for a comparison between exploitation following smuggling and exploitation as the 
goal of trafficking. 
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a quarter (22 percent) were citizens of the reporting country (i.e., the country that detected the 
situation of trafficking victims), and an equal percentage (22 percent) were citizens of other EU 
member states. Overall, nearly half (44 percent) of registered victims were citizens of the EU 
(European Commission 2018, p. 80). Note that this data assessment is underestimated, as it did 
not include data from Bulgaria. By contrast, a previous Eurostat report which included data from 
Bulgaria concluded that 65 percent of the registered victims of trafficking (in 2010–12) were EU 
citizens (Eurostat 2015, p. 41). Indeed, the top three countries of origin of registered EU trafficking 
victims, both in absolute terms and in relation to the population, were Romania, Bulgaria, and 
Hungary (European Commission 2018, p. 81). In sum, data suggest that a large share of trafficking 
victims inside the EU are EU citizens themselves. Therefore, internal trafficking is an eminent 
example of forced migration occurring inside the global North and inside a free-movement area, 
where citizens of member countries do not need smugglers or fake documents to travel to another 
neighbouring country. Indeed, as Smith notes, the disappearance of border controls within the EU 
made it easier for traffickers to engage in their business, by providing “opportunities for less 
sophisticated, smaller or mid-level crime groups that would otherwise not so easily operate across 
borders” (Smit 2011, p. 192). Furthermore, as Palumbo highlights, “the fact that EU migrants do 
not need a residence permit linked to an employment contract means they are more likely to be 
involved in a context of informality and irregularity” (Palumbo 2016, p. 23), making them an ideal 
target for traffickers. Thus, far from putting an end to internal trafficking, the enlargement of the 
EU allowed for its increase: notwithstanding the possibility of moving freely across the EU, poor, 
marginalised, or otherwise vulnerable citizens became even more susceptible of being deceived 
by luring job offers by individuals involved in the trafficking business. 
Most literature on trafficking, including intra-EU trafficking, revolves around the 
exploitation of sex work (Anderson 2014, p. 360; Ricard-Guay and Hanley 2020, pp. 289–90). 
Since the emphasis in the migration literature and public debates is on border controls, innocent 
women portrayed as unwilling victims of trafficking have been contrasted with smuggled men 
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who are deemed to have actively sought the services of smugglers and are thus guilty of an offence 
against immigration laws. Scholars and activists have often pointed to the blurring between 
trafficking and smuggling when the agency of migrants is considered (see inter alia O’Connell 
Davidson 2013). Indeed, some trafficked people may well have sought the services of their 
traffickers too, looking for travel and employment support, or at least may have had the intention 
of leaving their place of origin. What is more, they may have consented to be transported and 
employed. Thus, they may well express agency. However, the fact of expressing agency does not 
amount to migrating voluntarily. Thus, while the focus on borders and the criminalisation of 
irregular immigration leads to a misleading picture of ideal trafficking victims as completely 
passive and helpless, analogously to ideal refugees, a focus on the harms of forced displacement 
allows us to see that one need not be infantilised and made completely passive to count as a victim 
of trafficking. Indeed, the aim is not to separate the innocent from the guilty, but to tell who has 
suffered specific harms, has specific needs as a result, and is owed specific reparations. This helps 
us to move from the exclusive focus on the stereotypical “Natasha cases” to get a more detailed 
and complete picture of who the European victims of trafficking are. 
First of all, trafficking should not be equated with sexual exploitation. Although over half 
(56 percent) of registered victims of trafficking in the EU28 in 2015–16 had been trafficked for 
sexual exploitation, 26 percent of registered victims had been trafficked for labour exploitation 
and 18 percent for “other” forms of exploitation (European Commission 2018, p. 55). For EU 
citizens, the proportions concern sexual exploitation (57 percent), labour exploitation (31 percent), 
and other (11 percent) (European Commission 2018, p. 87). Note that labour-exploitation figures 
are likely to be highly underestimated, since cases are even more difficult to detect. Secondly, 
trafficked people are not necessarily female: according to the same report, 32 percent of registered 
victims were male (European Commission 2018, p. 56). Again, male figures are likely to be 
strongly underestimated, since there is a correlation between females and sexual exploitation and 
between males and labour exploitation and there is a gender bias in identifying victims of 
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trafficking. Males were over three-quarters (80 percent) of the victims of trafficking for labour 
exploitation in the EU28 in 2015–16. These data also show that women may well be trafficked for 
labour exploitation too (20 percent), though women are more represented in sexual exploitation 
(95 percent). Moreover, there is a minority of nonfemale victims of sexual exploitation (5 percent) 
(European Commission 2018, p. 64). 
In this chapter, I will thus concentrate on the often-neglected intra-EU trafficking for labour 
exploitation. I will illustrate the importance of a backwards-looking, harms-based approach to 
what is owed to EU citizens who have been trafficked for labour exploitation inside the EU. An 
intersectional approach will also be adopted, taking into account gender, on the one hand, and, on 
the other hand, the displacement condition of the trafficked person and the form of labour 
exploitation. Special emphasis will be given to the Romanian case, given that Romania is among 
the top three sending countries when it comes to intra-EU trafficking. Though most literature about 
Romania concentrates on trafficking for sexual exploitation, and particularly on the role of 
Romanian organised crime in cross-border trafficking of Romanian women intended for 
prostitution, a large number of Romanians are also being trafficked for labour exploitation inside 
the EU. 
 
1. The Harms in Intra–European Union Trafficking for Labour Exploitation 
According to a recent report by the EU Group of Experts on Trafficking (GRETA), “Men 
constitute most of the identified victims of labour trafficking, in sectors as diverse as agriculture, 
construction, hospitality and fisheries. Women are also victims of trafficking for labour 
exploitation, often in the more isolated setting of domestic and care work” (GRETA 2019a, p. 6). 
The GRETA report emphasises that, though the majority of identified trafficked victims in the EU 
were trafficked for sexual exploitation, the “identification of victims of trafficking for the purpose 
of labour exploitation is challenging and statistics available on identified victims do not reflect the 
actual scale of the phenomenon” (GRETA 2019a, p. 7). 
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There are several reasons why identifying victims is particularly difficult when it comes to 
trafficking for labour exploitation. One reason has to do with gender. Male trafficked people are 
particularly unlikely to turn to the authorities to decry the fact that they have been trafficked or 
seek assistance. Not only may they fear retaliation, but they may also be particularly reluctant to 
lose their job, given the social expectations still associated with the traditional role of males as 
breadwinners. Most importantly, they may be unable or unwilling to recognise themselves as 
victims of trafficking and labour exploitation. In a study carried out in the Netherlands, some of 
the participants in the study asserted that “the idea that ‘real’ men are not victims of exploitation 
was ubiquitous and that social pressure was often exerted on men to ‘not overreact.’ Consequently, 
men were ashamed of their victimhood and less eager to express it than the female victims did” 
(van Meeteren and Hiah 2020, p. 1612). Males trafficked for labour exploitation thus often refuse 
the label of victim and feel responsible for what happened to them (GRETA 2019a, p. 7), even 
though they were deceived upon departure, threatened, or coerced to keep on working in 
exploitative conditions impeding them from leaving. They may fear the stigma associated with 
being a victim and a man unable to care for himself and his family. Surtees reports two illustrative 
excerpts from interviewed men. One of them notes that “most people do not believe that it was 
really impossible to exit the slavery. . . . They think if such things happened to you, you are stupid. 
And stupid people do not stand high in people’s esteem”. The second echoes his concerns: “I 
suppose that in my village people would blame me saying that ‘after such disgraceful behaviour, 
he doesn’t deserve to be helped’” (Surtees 2008, p. 27). 
A further reason why trafficking for labour exploitation often goes undetected concerns 
insufficient monitoring. Inspections are at best rare, when not lacking altogether, and often poor 
in quality, meaning that labour inspectors fail to recognise signs of trafficking. In addition, 
trafficked people find themselves isolated, unable to prove their exploitation condition and the fact 
that they have been deceived or coerced into consenting to migrate and to live in such a condition. 
Consider first trafficking for labour exploitation in agriculture. Palumbo has extensively 
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researched this phenomenon in the Italian province of Ragusa, an area characterised by small and 
medium-sized businesses that are difficult to monitor. Immigrant workers in that area, she notes, 
used to be mostly Tunisian until the early 2000s. However, since 2007, when Romania joined the 
EU, the number of Romanian workers in agriculture in Ragusa has increased, exceeding that of 
Tunisian migrants, who by that time were increasingly unionised. Once in Ragusa, Romanians, 
who could not yet count on an established diaspora in the area, would more easily accept 
exploitative working conditions. Furthermore, as Palumbo underlines, “the irregular employment 
of EU migrants is less risky for employers as they do not risk being charged with the offences of 
facilitation and exploitation of irregular migration” (Palumbo 2016, p. 19). Given that trafficked 
victims in the area find themselves physically and socially isolated in an unknown rural area, fear 
retaliation, and are afraid to lose their job and sometimes their shelter (when provided by the 
employer), they are unlikely to seek help. Moreover, their exploitation is hard to prove in the 
absence of written or oral evidence. Finally, employers may provide inspectors with falsified forms 
pertaining to their workers, which impedes inspections and the potential identification of 
trafficking victims (US DOS 2020, p. 279). According to Palumbo, in the Ragusa area most of the 
migrant farm workers, in particular Romanian workers, have either no contracts at all or contracts 
in which the number of working hours is lower than effectively performed.  
Isolation and lack of inspections are even more acute in domestic work. Palumbo highlights 
that domestic workers in Italy have fewer rights compared to the rest of the workers, and the fact 
that their work is performed in the employer’s household makes them more vulnerable to 
exploitation, given that the private sphere escapes labour inspection. Indeed, domestic work is 
hardly considered “real work” both in politics and in public debate, particularly in Italy, where the 
welfare system is still based on a “familialist model” relegating care to the private sphere 
(Palumbo 2016, p. 25). Moreover, domestic workers, especially those who cohabit with the elderly 




For these reasons, trafficking for labour exploitation has been long neglected in the 
academic debate too, which mainly revolves around trafficking for sex exploitation and opposes 
abolitionists, who conceive of all cases of prostitution as forced and exploitative, to sex-worker 
advocates claiming legalisation and labour rights are means to combat trafficking and exploitation. 
It is true that there has been increasing attention to the largely submerged phenomenon of 
trafficking for labour exploitation. There is still a paucity of quantitative data, but at least 
qualitative research has been growing since the late 2000s (although most interviewed people are 
only those who have received some forms of assistance) (Andrees 2008, p. 5). Nevertheless, the 
existing literature tends to focus on either the criminalisation of migrants’ transportation or the 
criminalisation of labour exploitation. When a victim-centred approach is adopted, the person is 
considered qua victim of exploitation. Very little attention is given to the trafficked people’s 
experiences qua forced migrants. Indeed, some might raise doubts about grouping them with 
displaced people. While displaced people usually have not been seeking to emigrate, trafficked 
people may be caught up in trafficking precisely because they have been actively searching for a 
way to emigrate. However, recall that antitrafficking laws consider trafficked people’s consent 
irrelevant. The point of this section is precisely to argue that, analogously to other forced migrants, 
people trafficked for labour exploitation suffer distinctive harms they would not have suffered had 
they migrated without being trafficked. This applies even to those who actively sought the services 
of those agents who led them into trafficking and to those who consented to be transported to and 
employed in a foreign country. Building on the phenomenology of the harms of forced migration 
proposed in chapter 2, I will argue that people trafficked for labour exploitation experience loss of 
control, loss of their Home environment, loss of social status, and loss of mental well-being caused 
by the traumatic experience of being trafficked. 
Analogously to other forced migrants, victims of trafficking lose control over their lives. 
Firstly, trafficked people suffer a loss of control over their life plan when they agree to migrate, 
since their recruitment involves either coercion or deceit. While people who are not deceived at 
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the emigration stage may well face exploitation in destination and transit countries (particularly if 
they lack or lose a visa or residence permit), trafficked people lose control at the emigration stage 
too, and this specific harm leads to further loss of control over their body, bodily movement, work, 
and personal space at the exploitation stage.115 Ottonelli and Torresi strongly made this theoretical 
point. As they put it, an approach to trafficking based on human rights violations only “fails to 
capture a fundamental interest of migrants when their free consent is thwarted” (Ottonelli and 
Torresi, p. 132). By contrast, looking at persons as “bearers of a life plan having an interest in 
leading their life as they see fit” allows us to make sense of “the existential condition of those 
migrants who have lost control over their lives . . . and, therefore, to a specific and very serious 
wrong that is suffered by trafficked . . . people in addition to violence, exploitation and the 
infringement of their basic human rights” (Ottonelli and Torresi, p. 133). 
Lacking economic and social resources, trafficked people usually rely on the help of 
intermediaries to arrange the transportation, employment, and housing. Sometimes utterly illegal, 
intermediaries are more often disguised as legitimate businesses having close ties to the formal 
and informal economies in destination countries. Note that countries, such as Romania, which had 
only recently become market economies before joining the EU, lack adequate regulations and 
capacity to monitor the activities of these private recruiters. According to Andrees, research 
indicates that “intermediaries are able to exploit migrants that can theoretically move freely 
between two particular countries and seek employment legally (e.g., within the EU). Lack of 
awareness and flexible employment regulations play into the hands of these intermediaries” 
(Andrees 2008, p. 21). Indeed, key factors in creating vulnerability to trafficking are 
socioeconomic exclusion and discrimination affecting particularly women and ethnic minorities, 
 
115 In an empirical study, Andrees (2008) identified three cases migrants can fall into: (1) ‘successful migrants’ i.e. 
migrants who were free to leave their employment at any given point in time without the loss of rights or privileges; 
(2) migrants who were not deceived by their recruiter (or who did not need a recruiter) and yet experienced coercion 
at the workplace that could be characterized as forced labour and (3) migrants were deceived/coerced from the 
beginning of their migration project and invariably experienced labour exploitation in the destination country. The 
latter group is made of forced migrants, whose condition is thus distinct from those voluntary migrants whose labour 
exploitation is not a consequence of having been trafficked. 
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such as Roma. Recruiters, she argues, “often approach potential migrants in their village or home 
town and make unrealistic promises. . . . Contracts are often not signed or only upon arrival in the 
destination country where the promises do not materialize. Other abuses include illegal wage 
deduction by charging migrants exorbitant fees for transportation means, housing and sometimes 
even working tools” (Andrees 2008, p. 20). Furthermore, a high degree of control over the person 
is often maintained once they are placed in the job through the agent who acts as a subcontractor 
for the main employer. When this is the case, deception is followed by coercion. 
A recent report reconstructs the typical behaviour of Romanian labour-exploitation 
organised crime as follows: either in person or via the internet, they “promise attractive salaries 
($1,500 monthly, for instance), good working conditions, free accommodation and transport. Once 
in location, identity documents are seized under the excuse of drafting labour contracts. After they 
start working the victims are not paid, entering into a debt trap. . . . Thus, the victims’ first salaries 
are not paid in order to cover the trafficker initial expenses that are in fact overrated. The workers 
are left without money and the trafficker continue to cover their accommodation, transport and 
food, putting new overrated debts on their shoulders” (Nicolae 2019, p. 348). Palumbo offers a 
sketch of exploitation from the perspective of a destination country, namely Italy. According to 
her study, “Most of the migrant farm workers, in particular Romanian workers, have either no 
contracts at all, or contracts in which the number of working hours is lower than effectively 
performed. They work excessive hours. . . . Moreover, most of them do not use a mask or gloves, 
even though they inhale and are in continuous contact with toxic pesticides” (Palumbo 2016, p. 
20). 
In sum, the loss of control experienced by people trafficked for labour exploitation begins 
with the deception, which renders their consent to migration irrelevant when it comes to assessing 
the forced nature of their move. Following this initial harm, they continue to be deprived of control 
over their work and bodily movement, as they are obliged to work in exploitative conditions and 
are either guarded, physically isolated, or left in complete ignorance of their geographical location, 
201 
 
so that they are unable to leave. Once accommodated in shantytowns in the countryside, or 
confined in their workplace, as is often the case for domestic workers, they lack control over their 
private space, much like other displaced people.116  
Furthermore, even those who did not experience violence at the recruitment stage often 
experience psychological and physical violence (including sexual violence) once in the destination 
country, thus losing control over their body. Note that, while women trafficked for sexual 
exploitation are expected to have suffered sexual violence, women trafficked for labour 
exploitation are not only forgotten (even more than trafficked men) but also not expected to have 
suffered this kind of harm. When women do emerge as victims of labour exploitation, the harm of 
exploitation tends to overshadow both the harms suffered qua forced migrants and the harms 
suffered qua women. 
Along with physical and sexual violence, both male and female victims of trafficking for 
labour exploitation face psychological violence, including threats of violence against them or 
against others (particularly family members). As Andrees notes, threats “can also be effective by 
using a person’s sense of shame”, for instance when a man is “humiliated in front of others” 
(Andrees 2008, p. 23). Indeed, losing control over one’s body in front of others, as in physical and 
sexual violence, is humiliating, and the mere threat of this harm is a harm in itself, which also 
contributes to the loss of social status experienced by trafficked people, as they are displaced, 
exploited, and socially isolated, and to the loss of mental well-being. As for other displaced people, 
therefore, the loss of control is strictly intertwined with the loss of a Home environment on which 
they can rely, the loss of status linked to their being forced into dependence on traffickers and into 
degrading work and life conditions, and the loss of mental well-being caused by traumatic 
experiences, constant fear, and misrecognition, often leading to post-traumatic stress disorder 
 
116 In Palumbo’s study, domestic workers often are provided inadequate accommodation (such as sleeping on the 
floor or in the same room with the person to be assisted) (see Palumbo 2016, p. 11). 
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(PTSD), anxiety disorders, and depression (which in turn may sometimes lead to alcoholism and 
further social marginalisation). 
Let us consider the loss of a Home environment. Qualitative literature insists on the 
extreme isolation that trafficked people undergo. As mentioned above, victims of trafficking for 
labour exploitation usually end up trafficked because they were made vulnerable to fraudulent 
recruiting, given that they were already marginalised in their place of origin, did not have 
acceptable alternatives in that place, and could not count on sufficient social and cultural capital 
to allow them to migrate autonomously. Once they are trapped in exploitative work and life 
conditions, they have no exit options, so their stay in the destination country is as forced as their 
initial move. They find themselves in an extremely unbalanced power relation with traffickers, 
employers, and intermediaries. Indeed, there is a dramatic information asymmetry between 
trafficked people and their exploiters: they are deceived about the actual labour and housing 
conditions they are heading into, unable to prove their exploitation and deception because of the 
lack of oral or written evidence, and most importantly unable to orient themselves in the place they 
have moved to. Some of them may even be unaware of their exact location, as illustrated in the 
testimony of a Bulgarian woman trafficked in Greece. She recalls that “upon arrival, one Greek 
person was waiting for us; we all boarded a minivan and were taken to a farm. I had no idea where 
we were. Elena [the recruiter] said something to the Greek and left” (Petrunov 2014, p. 173). 
Others may be physically segregated or trafficked to work in remote rural areas unserved by public 
transport, as with the above-mentioned Romanians exploited in the Ragusa province in Italy. 
Others, like many domestic workers, may live in urban areas but nonetheless be extremely isolated 
as they spend all their days at the workplace and, even when outside it, may not know the local 
language, the local laws, and the institutions they might turn to for help. On top of it, victims of 
trafficking for labour exploitation are extremely deprived of financial capital. They are frequently 
cheated by traffickers who charge them exorbitant transportation and housing expenses as an 
excuse to keep them indebted, pay risible salaries, and thus create dependence or debt bondage. 
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Clearly, people trafficked for labour exploitation are deprived of social, cultural, and economic 
capital and are therefore unable either to rebuild a Home environment in the place of destination 
or to leave and return to their previous Home environment. 
As a result of the loss of control, exploitative work, degrading living conditions, economic 
deprivation, and loss of Home environment, trafficked people also lose social status. Of course, 
they may well have been socially marginalised and economically destitute in their place of origin 
too. However, their social status is further undermined as a direct and specific consequence of 
trafficking. Because of deception and coercion at both the recruitment and exploitation stages, they 
have lost control over their life plan, their bodily movement, their own body, and their private 
space. In the destination state, they find themselves marginalised, economically deprived, and 
disoriented precisely because they have been trafficked. Indeed, disorientation and diminished 
social status are essential components of the trafficking condition which are purposefully obtained 
by traffickers. Before being trafficked, would-be victims of trafficking could at least have relied 
on their usual social connections and sociocultural knowledge, however limited. They could tell 
where they were and whom they could trust, they could communicate, and they knew a few things 
about how to behave in that environment, despite often being socially marginalised, 
disadvantaged, insufficiently educated, and unsure about laws and their rights in that society. They 
could predict what would happen next in their usual routine, possibly wish to emigrate, and even 
actively seek a way to realise that plan. By contrast, once they have been trafficked their life plan 
is no longer in their hands: they have intentionally been made dependent on their exploiters. Thus, 
even their previous social roles, however unpleasant, are left behind and substituted with an 
extremely disrespectful social status. As trafficked people, cheated and coerced, they are deprived 
of their status as autonomous agents. When forced to live in barracks or to sleep on the floor in 
their employers’ home, they are dehumanised and reduced to bare living bodies. When they are 
victims of physical and sexual violence, they suffer what Honneth considers the worst form of 
misrecognition, which deprives them of the basic self-esteem connected to the ability to control 
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their own body. Finally, as victims of work exploitation and marginalisation, they are deprived of 
social esteem both in the destination society and in the society of origin, if they were to return and 
their humiliating-failure story become known. This latter aspect, as already argued, is particularly 
painful for men, who constitute the overwhelming majority of people trafficked for labour 
exploitation within the EU. 
As a result of all these harms, people trafficked for labour exploitation also have their 
mental health seriously undermined. There is a lack of disaggregated data on the mental health of 
EU nationals trafficked for labour exploitation within the EU’s borders. However, a few studies 
have researched the mental health of labour-trafficking victims. Some of them have been carried 
out in destination countries, particularly in the UK, where a large share of labour-trafficked victims 
were identified. For instance, Turner-Moss et al. interviewed a sample of people trafficked for 
labour exploitation in the UK who were receiving support from a non-governmental service 
between June 2009 and July 2010. Over three-quarters of the sample was male (77  percent) and 
nearly one-third was UK or EU nationals who could live and work legally in the UK (Turner-Moss 
et al. 2014, p. 475). Forty percent reported experiencing physical violence while they were 
trafficked (Turner-Moss et al. 2014, p. 473); 57 percent reported one or more PTSD symptoms 
(Turner-Moss et al. 2014, p. 477); 81 percent reported one or more symptoms of poor physical 
health which, according to the researchers, may “represent somatic manifestations of 
psychological distress or may relate to physical health problems arising from violence, prolonged 
exposure to poor living and working conditions, and inadequate nutrition and medical care” 
(Turner-Moss et al. 2014, p. 476–77). High levels of depressive and anxiety symptoms since 
leaving a situation of exploitation were also reported (Turner-Moss et al. 2014, p. 476). Indeed, 
after trafficked people leave exploitation, they may feel constant fear of retaliation against them 
and their family by their exploiters. Furthermore, they find themselves in an extremely precarious 




A broader, more recent study is provided by Oram et al., who interviewed 150 people in 
England who were in contact with post-trafficking support services between June 2013 and 
December 2014. A third of the sample had been trafficked for labour exploitation, while domestic 
servitude and labour exploitation accounted for 29.3 percent and 40.4 percent respectively (Oram 
et al. 2016, p. 1073). Disaggregated data on EU nationals trafficked for labour exploitation within 
the EU’s borders are again not available. Moreover, the authors warn that their finding may well 
underestimate the incidence and the seriousness of mental health distress among trafficking 
victims, since their study excluded those who remained in the exploitative setting, were too unwell 
or distressed to participate, or were unable to provide informed consent (Oram et al. 2016, pp. 
1073–74). Nevertheless, they found that 78 percent of women and 40 percent of men in the sample 
reported high levels of depression, anxiety, or PTSD symptoms (Oram et al. 2016, p. 1073). 
Moreover, 71 percent of the participants reported that they remained afraid of the traffickers even 
after they were out of the trafficking situation (Oram et al. 2016, p. 1075). 
In sum, available data suggest that people trafficked for labour exploitation suffer mental 
health distress as a result of both the traumatic experiences they had while trafficked and the 
enduring risks threatening their safety. Thus, trafficked people need specific support to recover 
sufficient mental health to rebuild their lives. The next section will discuss the needs that derive 
from the harms of trafficking for labour exploitation and assess whether current attempts at 
meeting them respect the principles of specificity, continuity, and expressivity outlined in 
chapter 3. 
 
2. The Needs of European Union Citizens Trafficked for Labour Exploitation 
In practice, the specific needs of EU labour-trafficking victims qua forcibly displaced 
people are far from being adequately met. The 2019 GRETA report on assistance for victims of 
trafficking found that “anti-trafficking policy and practice has focussed on women and girls. Most 
assistance services, including shelters, are designed and tailored to the needs of female victims, in 
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particular those subjected to sexual exploitation. However, not enough resources are available to 
assist female victims of other forms of exploitation” (GRETA 2019b, p. 6). Furthermore, despite 
a recent raising of awareness about the phenomenon of trafficking for labour exploitation “there 
is still a marked shortage of assistance projects for male victims of trafficking” (GRETA 2019b, 
p. 6). Funding is disproportionately allocated to assisting female victims of sexual trafficking, who 
are also often portrayed as “archetypical victims”: destitute, helpless, third-country nationals in 
need of charitable help from the global North (Ricard-Guay and Hanley 2020, pp. 289–90). Thus, 
assistance for EU nationals may be limited too. In Spain, for instance, GRETA found that “EU 
citizens may not benefit from resources provided for third-country victims by the General 
Secretary for Immigration and Emigration, and there was a lack of resources to assist victims of 
trafficking for purposes of exploitation other than sexual” (GRETA 2019b, p. 11). Finally, the 
GRETA report remarks on a “lack of long-term options for survivors who continue to need 
assistance” (GRETA 2019b, p. 6). 
Indeed, trafficking has to date been perceived by policy makers as a criminal offence to be 
prosecuted. Trafficked people have to be assisted qua victims of such criminal offenders, and thus 
should receive emergency assistance and be allowed to stay in the country as long as they 
cooperate in prosecuting their offenders. They are precious informants who need to be protected 
and “encouraged to remain in the country of destination for long enough to serve as witnesses in 
trials against traffickers” (GRETA 2019b, p. 5). Though the EU convention against trafficking 
prescribes that the provision of assistance to a trafficked person should not be made conditional 
on their willingness to act as a witness or otherwise cooperate with competent authorities in the 
investigations and criminal proceedings, GRETA found evidence that “the provision of assistance 
to victims of trafficking hinges on their co-operation with law enforcement authorities, even 
though the link does not exist formally” (GRETA 2019b, p. 13). Therefore, assistance policies do 
not approach trafficked people qua forcibly displaced people and do not have the primary aim of 
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rebuilding control, re-creating a Home environment, restoring their social standing, and providing 
long-term mental health support. 
When it comes to housing, for instance, trafficked people, much like other displaced 
people, are entitled to emergency accommodation, but housing provision is neither sufficiently 
specific nor continuous. Trafficked people may be hosted in facilities for asylum seekers, where 
social workers may not be aware of their personal history and whose addresses may be public and 
accessible to former exploiters, thus failing to secure protection from retaliation.117 Female 
trafficked victims are also often housed with victims of gender violence, who are not in a 
displacement condition. Furthermore, during visits to certain shelters, GRETA observed that 
trafficked people’s freedom of movement, personal liberties, and privacy were excessively 
restricted (GRETA 2019b, p. 17), thus perpetuating their lack of control over their bodily 
movement, private space, and life plan, rather than restoring such control. Furthermore, housing 
and other basic necessities are only provided in the short term. In the Netherlands, for instance, 
there are no clear arrangements for support and accommodation beyond the three-month “recovery 
and reflection period”, and ad hoc solutions have to be found by the municipalities 
(GRETA 2019b, p. 37). Analogously, in the UK, the government-funded support to victims of 
human trafficking lasts only during the recovery-and-reflection period of forty-five days and all 
service providers interviewed by GRETA researchers confirmed that trafficked people face 
considerable difficulties in accessing housing, health care, employment, or training afterwards, 
finding themselves at risk of being re-trafficked (GRETA 2019b, p. 36). 
However, policy advisers, like GRETA, and trafficking researchers often invoke a “victim-
centred” or “person-centred” approach, aimed at securing alternative sources of livelihood and 
support in socioeconomic integration. A person-centred model of care, according to Timoshkina, 
“ensures the provision of individualized, trauma-informed, culturally competent services” 
 
117 See for instance the case of Ireland in GRETA 2019b, p. 19. 
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(Timoshkina 2020, p. 679). This means valuing [trafficked people’s] experiences, respecting their 
right to self-determination, and helping them to make informed choices and to take back control 
of their lives” (Timoshkina 2020, p. 679). Moreover, Timoshkina makes clear that “conceptually, 
the chain of support starts with the responders’ first contact with the presumed trafficked person 
and ends when the survivor achieved self-sufficiency” (Timoshkina 2020, p. 684). While the first 
week of assistance should be devoted to meeting immediate needs, the next three to four months 
should be “about contemplation and stabilization”, meaning developing “individualized safety and 
care plans” (Timoshkina 2020, pp. 685–86). This should be followed by a long-term response, 
providing “stable and affordable housing, ongoing physical and mental health care, access to 
education and vocational training, life skills and financial literacy training, economic 
empowerment, assistance with finding employment, family reunification, and community 
(re)integration”, since trafficked people at this stage often “struggle with the issues of identity and 
finding their place in society” (Timoshkina 2020, p. 687). Trafficking scholars also acknowledge 
that, although “persons who have been victims of trafficking will have similar needs in terms of 
protection, (e.g., immediate and longer-term shelter, regularization of their migration status, legal 
assistance, alternate economic opportunities), different types of trafficking will raise different 
issues” (Ricard-Guay and Hanley 2020, pp. 299–300). 
In sum, despite the gaps between policy prescription, policy, and policy implementation, 
academics and practitioners demonstrate some implicit awareness of the importance of specificity 
and continuity in tackling the needs of trafficked people. However, recall that, to have reparative 
value, social service provision should also respect the expressivity principle: social services should 
be provided to respond to the specific needs arising from the harms of displacement and show 
acknowledgement of outcome responsibility. This latter aspect does not emerge in policy practice 
and remains underdeveloped in policy prescriptions and academic research too. The next section 
will examine why a satisfactory reparative framework on the harms of trafficking for labour 




3. Reparations for European Union Citizens Trafficked for Labour Exploitation 
The language of reparations is not completely absent in the academic debate and in 
activists’ works on labour exploitation. However, I argue, in addition to implementation 
challenges, the dominant approach has important limits, since it reduces reparations to monetary 
compensation. What is more, compensation is pursued as a component of a criminal or civil case 
against specific individual traffickers. Thus, destination states continue to be usually depicted as 
innocent bystanders, unimplicated in trafficking. In addition to special responsibilities, structural 
processes which made trafficking advantageous for both companies and states remain in the 
shadows. In sum, reparative justice only emerges in the context of individual traffickers’ 
prosecution. Much like paramilitaries and dictators in the case of war displacees, individual 
traffickers are identified as criminals, morally and legally liable for the harms suffered by 
trafficked people, thereby absolving states and businesses from moral responsibilities and 
downplaying their relations of causal contribution and benefit. 
Let us begin by considering how compensation is pursued. Compensation is understood to 
have restorative, preventive, and punitive functions (La Strada International 2019). The emphasis 
is thus on punishing traffickers, while, at the same time, having them repair the wrongs they 
committed against trafficking victims. A recent report by La Strada International recalls that “the 
right of victims of trafficking to seek and obtain compensation is established in the most important 
international and European anti-trafficking instruments, including the UN Trafficking Protocol, 
the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, the EU 
Directive on Trafficking in Human Beings, the EU Victims’ Rights Directive, and more recently 
the Protocol to the ILO Forced Labour Convention” (La Strada International 2019). Nevertheless, 
very few trafficked people can rely on sufficient information and means to seek compensation. 
Indeed, they would need specialist legal aid to access criminal, civil, and administrative 
proceedings, which is not always provided by the state they have been trafficked to. Moreover, 
210 
 
among those who succeed in submitting their claims, only a minority actually receive a 
compensation payment (La Strada International 2019). For example, Milan, a Czech man, was 
denied compensation in the criminal case, even though he had been trafficked to the UK under 
false job promises, his identity documents had been confiscated by the employer upon arrival, he 
had been assaulted and forced to work twelve to sixteen hours per day as a cleaner, and he had 
been made dependent on the employer for food and accommodation.118 
La Strada International coordinated the Justice at Last consortium, which 
studied sixty cases concerning victims of trafficking or other related crimes in 2018. They found 
out that “only two out of three of the victims that claimed compensation, were awarded with 
compensation”, and “only a quarter of them actually received the awarded compensation amount” 
(La Strada International 2019). Unsurprisingly, 60 percent of the compensation claims were 
addressed in criminal proceedings, civil cases being residual (La Strada International 2019). 
However, criminal cases may increase the risk of retaliation against victims, which makes 
enforcement difficult and risky. Consider the story of Mihai, thirty-four years old. According to 
the Justice at Last consortium, Mihai 
was recruited by one of his employers in Romania to work as a car wash operator in Ireland. He had been 
promised €300 per month salary in addition to free board and lodging. Once in Ireland he was made to work 
over 80 hours per week without a contract, no proper breaks and insufficient rest periods. He was paid 
irregularly and significantly under the national minimum wage. He was forced to sleep in a shed behind the 
employers’ house. There was no bed, only a mattress on the ground. There was also no heating and no toilet 
or washing facilities. After a year of living and working in such conditions, the man was assaulted by one of 
the employers. He ran away from his place of work and, with the help of a local shopkeeper, the police were 
informed. The man was subsequently referred to the National Referral Mechanism. He was also referred to 
an NGO for assistance with submitting a claim to the employment redress mechanism. He was reluctant to 
do so, and very afraid of the employers’ possible retaliation against his family, both in Romania and in Ireland 





lodge a complaint but the entire process was extremely stressful and traumatic. The employers did not appear 
at the hearing and an award was subsequently made in his favour. However, the current whereabouts of the 
employers is unknown and, even if known, it is unlikely that the victim would pursue them for enforcement 
of the award due to his concerns for his safety and that of his family. Criminal proceedings for trafficking for 
labour exploitation were discontinued.119 
As shown above, restitution in labour trafficking is usually conceived of as part of the 
prosecution of traffickers, who should compensate victims by returning money unjustly extracted 
from their labour. In the United States, the Californian legislature “specifically chose the term 
‘reparations’ to describe the victim’s injuries—a word that includes not only monetary loss but the 
conduct and nature of the wrongdoing”. This means that a court “should appreciate that a trafficked 
victim’s injury is not limited to the loss of labor wages but should also credit how the labor was 
extracted” (Greer 2020, p. 1628). Even in that case, however, the focus of reparations remains on 
the harms of exploitation, failing to appreciate the specific additional harms involved in 
trafficking. Moreover, the currency of reparations remains exclusively monetary. 
By contrast, I argue, a reparative, harms-based approach to the needs of people trafficked 
for labour exploitation should also include material reparations, in the form of specifically targeted 
social services, and non-material reparations, including social rehabilitation, truth telling, and 
apologies. Non-material reparations thus require a more comprehensive reconstruction of outcome 
responsibilities for trafficking for labour exploitation, overcoming the exclusive attribution of 
moral and legal responsibility to organised crime groups or specific individuals. The latter do 
indeed owe compensation to trafficked people, but they are not the only actors who contributed to 
and benefitted from trafficking. Businesses and states may have both special reparative 
responsibilities for specific actions and general reparative responsibilities as they participate in the 






According to Ricard-Guay and Hanley, “Early anti-trafficking understandings strongly 
associated trafficking with organized crime and hence maintained the idea that [it] occurs outside 
of the mainstream economy, social values, norms, as well as policies. In other words, trafficking 
was confined to the underground, the criminal, and the ‘extraordinary,’ and not easily related to 
labor market structures and labor migration laws” (Ricard-Guay and Hanley 2020, p. 290). 
Relatedly, “there has been a growing shift toward the use of the term ‘slavery,’ to the extent that 
slavery, trafficking, and forced labor are sometimes used interchangeably” (Ricard-Guay and 
Hanley 2020, p. 290). The discourse on trafficking conceived of as a new form of slavery, some 
have argued, diverts attention from the “structural causes” and “depoliticizes the wider debate on 
migration and labor” (Ricard-Guay and Hanley 2020, p. 290). 
In the UN Trafficking Protocol, Schumann notes, “regular business corporations typically 
were neither perceived as potential perpetrators committing the offence of trafficking in human 
beings, nor were they explicitly targeted as beneficiaries of cases of human trafficking” 
(Schumann 2020, p. 1659). To the limited extent businesses’ responsibility has to date come to be 
considered, such a responsibility is usually conceived of as criminal liability for extraordinary 
unlawful acts, rather than as outcome responsibility for not-necessarily-criminal acts and 
participation in structures.120 What is criminalised is the “intentional use of services of a victim of 
trafficking in human beings” and the related acts of “recruitment, transportation, transfer, 
harboring, or receipt of the person” (Schumann 2020, p. 1657). In addition, trafficked people’s 
employers “might be held liable for inciting, aiding, or abetting the trafficking offender” 
(Schumann 2020, p. 1658). 
Many trafficking practices across the world occur within the context of legitimate 
businesses. Indeed, trafficked persons can be employed in legitimate industries such as agriculture, 
 
120 Depending on the particular domestic legal order, the concept of corporate criminal liability might or might not 
include potential liability for forced labour and human trafficking. In the EU, the emerging model on corporate 




construction, hospitality, and transportation (De Vries et al. 2020, p. 751). Yet, scholars and 
practitioners have only recently begun to “recognize how human trafficking occurs in legitimate 
businesses and otherwise intersects with the private sector through supply chains, logistics, or 
finance” (De Vries et al. 2020, p. 747). According to Palumbo, “There is a lot of attention on the 
‘effect’ of an abusive system, i.e., about tent cities, low wages etc., there are millions of photo 
exhibitions about the shantytowns (‘baraccopoli’) but we do not focus on the responsibilities of 
companies and all the other actors involved in the supply chains” (Palumbo 2016, p. 28). Focussing 
on agriculture, she notes that producers, in particular small producers, are often in a weak position 
to negotiate in the supply chains. Given the increasing pressure traders and large retailers put on 
the prices of agricultural products, some producers claim that they are not able to pay workers the 
salary stipulated by national and provincial contracts (Palumbo 2016, p. 26). 
As we have seen, responsibility attribution and reparations in trafficking for labour 
exploitation are usually framed in a criminal justice perspective. This is a relevant limit when it 
comes to including legitimate business into the picture. As Vries et al. highlight, “A criminal 
justice system approach has proven to be especially limiting in addressing corporate offending in 
the context of human trafficking. . . . even if corporate criminal liability is legally an option, its 
actual use may be limited due to concerns about the potential adverse impacts of corporate criminal 
liability on businesses and trade relations” (De Vries et al. 2020, pp. 755–56). A backwards-
looking, reparative approach to trafficking for labour exploitation should thus go beyond criminal 
liability to consider the outcome responsibility that businesses (including traders and retailers) 
have for contributing to the structures that trigger the demand for trafficked labourers and to 
consider how they benefit. 
States’ responsibilities in contributing to and benefitting from trafficking for labour 
exploitation should also be considered, in addition to the responsibilities that states of origin have 
for the failure to protect their nationals from being recruited and in addition to those that states of 
destination have for the failure to protect trafficked people from exploitation taking place under 
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their jurisdiction. Indeed, countries of destination also contribute by their actions and omissions to 
creating demand for trafficked labourers and to maintaining impunity for exploiters, and they 
benefit from trafficking. Along with trafficking for exploitation in agriculture, construction, and 
other sectors that cannot be relocated to the global South to lower production costs, recall the case 
of domestic work. As Palumbo illustrates, Italy benefits from trafficking for labour exploitation in 
domestic work, which allows the informal provision of cheap, quasi-free labour to continue in the 
private sphere. Indeed, the state saves the resources that would otherwise be needed to fund social 
services such as elderly care, nursery school, or home care for chronic illnesses.121 In sum, 
receiving EU states occupy a powerful structural position in shaping the economic arrangements, 
political choices, and legal norms that make trafficking for labour exploitation a frequent outcome, 
even within the EU. Therefore, receiving states owe trafficked people social service provision as 




This chapter has focused on another case of forced migration that would be overlooked if 
we keep the focus on borders and admission policies. This is the case of intra-EU trafficking for 
labour exploitation. Admission is not an issue for EU citizens, who are allowed to move and settle 
in other EU member states. EU trafficked people thus do not need to be smuggled through illegal 
routes or to use fake documents. Yet, their existential condition is deeply different from that of 
other EU voluntary migrants. They have been coerced or deceived into moving to exploit their 
labour and purposefully prevented from regaining control over their lives. In this case, the 
theoretical frame provided in Part I allows us to see that, in addition to the harms of exploitation, 
 
121 Surely, one might argue, the familialist model of care does not necessarily require trafficking to be sustained. In 
other words, trafficking is not a direct and necessary consequence of a familialist model. The point is rather that the 
receiving state benefits from trafficking when the labour of trafficked domestic workers contributes to sustaining that 
model despite the decrease in female family members’ labour. 
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EU trafficked people also suffer the typical harms of forced displacement. They do not only need 
to exit the exploitative employment and find protection against retaliation. They also need to regain 
control over their lives, to re-create a Home environment where they can orient themselves, resume 
planning their lives, acquire meaningful social roles, and receive specific psychological assistance. 
Reparation, thus, should not consist just in the prosecution of exploiters and in the compensation 
for unfairly extracted labour. Qua forced migrants, EU victims of trafficking for labour 
exploitation are owed targeted services to overcome the harms of displacement. The responsibility 
to provide such services does not only rest on the state where the trafficked person has been 
brought to in virtue of its territorial jurisdiction: special reparative responsibility rests on receiving 
states, states of origin and legitimate business to the extent that they created the background 






Forced Migration across Borders: The Syrian Case 
 
The Syrian conflict has been enduring for ten years. Since 2014, Syria has been the main 
country of origin of people forced to move across borders. According to the UNHCR, at the end 
of 2020 there were nearly 6.7 million Syrians displaced outside their country (UNHCR 2021, p. 
7). The previous UNHCR Global Trends report accounts for 6.6 million, 3.6 million of whom 
living in Turkey, nearly a million in Lebanon, over 600,000 in Jordan, and more than half a million 
in Germany (UNHCR 2020, p. 20). In addition, over 6 million people were estimated to be 
displaced within Syria itself, making the country rank second in the world ranking of IDPs’ 
countries of origin, behind Colombia (UNHCR 2020, p. 30). While Colombians have been largely 
displaced inside their country and have attracted limited academic and public attention in the 
global North, Syrian forced migrants who left Syria outnumbered Syrian IDPs. What is more, 
European countries were forced to face the predicament of Syrian forced migrants when thousands 
of them began to seek asylum in Europe, particularly through the hazardous Balkan route, from 
Turkey across the Aegean to Greece and then heading North. This has been remembered as the 
“refugee crisis” or “Mediterranean crisis”, given the alarming numbers of casualties at sea. 
Not only politicians, but also academics, including political theorists, have been compelled 
by the “refugee crisis” to assess how European states should deal with an unprecedented flow of 
forced migrants, many of them fleeing war-torn Syria. The dominant approach to the issue is a 
humanitarian one, and the most pressing issue concerns admission policies. In other words, what 
Syrians are thought to be due is admission to a country where their survival and basic human rights 
are not at immediate risk. The basic assumption seems to be that the Syrian regime is the main 
entity responsible for both violence and subsequent displacement. External countries could be 
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conceived of as innocent bystanders by Singer’s famous pond.122 They all have a Samaritan duty 
to help displaced Syrians, provided that they are able do it at a reasonable cost. The point, then, is 
to fairly share the burden.  
If the burden consists in physically hosting forced migrants, then such a burden appears 
unbalanced, given that most Syrian displaced people moved to neighbouring countries. It has been 
noted that these countries are forced to shoulder most of the burden merely because of their 
geographical proximity, even though wealthier countries have a greater capacity to help. Germany 
seems to have done more than its fair share, given that it was the only country in the global North 
to admit more than half a million Syrians.123 Indeed, for a few months in 2015 German chancellor 
Merkel suspended the Dublin regulation obliging forced migrants to ask for asylum in the first EU 
country where they arrive, thereby allowing them to reach Germany. This helped to relieve the 
burden on both EU border countries (namely, Greece) and Levant countries. Nevertheless, some 
scholars have criticised Merkel’s gesture as unwise. According to Betts and Collier, Merkel’s 
behaviour was excessively impulsive and emotional, and it led to a rise in forced migrants risking 
their lives in the attempt to reach Germany (Betts and Collier 2017, pp. 84–85). Merkel’s 
irrationality, they claim, worsened the “refugee crisis”.124 Besides, it also resulted in a right-wing 
backlash that soon prompted Merkel to abruptly reverse her policy, by supporting an EU deal with 
Turkey to stop the departure of Syrians from its territory. Although the deal included resettlement 
quotas along with financial help to Turkey, EU states showed little compliance with the 
resettlement part of the deal, basically outsourcing the hosting of Syrians to Turkey. According to 
 
122 This is made explicit in Betts and Collier 2017, p. 99. 
123 In absolute terms, Germany was the fifth country in terms of the number of displaced people living on its territory 
in 2019 and the first among global-North states (UNHCR 2020, p. 22, fig. 9). In terms of the overall number of 
refugees as a proportion of the total population, in the period 2010–19 Malta (2.7 percent) and Sweden (2.5 percent) 
surpassed Germany (third among global-North countries with 1.5 percent of refugees). See 
https://www.nrc.no/perspectives/2020/the-10-countries-that-receive-the-most-refugees/. 
124 In their view, not only those displaced could have been incentivised to take the Balkan route, but more people 
could have been displaced given Germany’s welcoming attitude: “The offer of a new life in Germany made it 
considerably more likely that military action against rebel civilians would induce them to leave Syria. Inadvertently, 
this may have encouraged the Assad regime to intensify the violence” (Betts and Collier 2017, pp. 85–86). 
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Betts and Collier, a more efficient and fair way to share the burden of helping forced migrants 
would have consisted in a coordinated effort by the global North to fund development plans in the 
Levant countries, to promote forced migrants’ economic self-sufficiency and thus effectively 
relieve the burden that they pose to hosting countries. In any case, Betts and Collier’s development-
oriented approach explicitly builds on an underlying humanitarian ethics of rescue, where external 
states have a shared moral duty to save forced migrants from death, coupled with a marked 
consequentialist emphasis on efficiency and rationality in distributing the resulting burden. 
The aim of this chapter is to assess the implications of my harms-based, backwards-looking 
approach to the Syrian case, discussing how it would change the way Syrians’ plight is approached. 
Firstly, shifting the approach affects responsibility allocation by tracing external states’ special 
and general reparative responsibilities for contributing to Syrians’ forced displacement. Although 
this would not set each state’s fair share, it would modify the frame of the debate. Secondly, a 
harms-based approach to forced migrants’ needs illuminates what is due to Syrians besides 
admission to a safe country. To illustrate this point I will focus on the case of those Syrians who 
have been admitted to Germany, to consider to what extent German policies meet Syrian forced 
migrants’ rights qua displaced people and whether they can count as reparations for the harms of 
forced displacement. 
 
1. A Backwards-Looking Approach to Responsibility for Displacement in Syria 
Forward-looking humanitarian approaches focus on how the responsibility to assist forced 
migrants should be distributed independently of why they have been displaced. What counts is the 
urgency of the need, rather than its source. Indeed, the rationale is a beneficiary principle, which 
does not require assessing whether assisting states have causally contributed to forced 
displacement. By contrast, a backwards-looking, harms-based approach to responsibility for 
forced migration entails the assessment of the reasons why forced migrants have been displaced. 
The guiding idea is that if “assisting” states have contributed to forcibly displacing people, they 
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bear a reparative responsibility to repair the harms of forced displacement and to fulfil the needs 
that forced migrants have as a result. This responsibility is more stringent than the generic 
humanitarian duty to help all strangers in distress provided that this is possible at a reasonable cost. 
Why have more than twelve million people been displaced in Syria? A short answer would 
be: because of the violent repression of an uprising, which triggered a harsh civil conflict involving 
human rights violations and humanitarian-law violations. However, the dynamics of the Syrian 
conflict and its roots are more complex and not purely endogenous. Of course, the regime’s 
policies played a crucial role both in making Syrians take to the streets and in turning the uprising 
into an armed rebellion. However, the regime and the rebels did not act in a vacuum, without any 
external influence. Indeed, without external influences the uprising might not have happened, and 
surely it would neither have rapidly escalated into a proxy war nor have resulted in a protracted 
stalemate. Thus, it is worth summarising the complex picture and balancing internalist and 
externalist approaches to the causes of the massive displacement in Syria. 
A disputed externalist explanation of the uprising’s root causes has attributed it to climate 
change leading to drought and then to a struggle for water. Though the causal connection between 
climate change and the Syrian war appears tenuous, the debate illuminates the interplay of 
domestic and external factors behind the uprising. Syrians began to pacifically take to the streets 
in 2011. Among the proximate triggers of the protests, we should recall the solidarity with the 
Arab Spring protests that had started spreading in the Middle East and North Africa. The time 
seemed favourable to the removal of another dictator, given the wide praise of the international 
community for the Arab Spring and the direct involvement of global-North states in Libya. In 
addition, living conditions were rapidly deteriorating in Syria, due to environmental stressors and 
sudden changes in economic policy. Syria was experiencing a serious drought. Though cyclic 
droughts were common in the area, the impact of the drought was exceptionally destructive, 
particularly in the rural Northern and Northeastern regions, because of a shortage of groundwater 
reserves, which had been overused (Daoudy 2020). Behind this groundwater depletion, there was 
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a miscalculated regime plan to excessively extend the cultivated areas, coupled with corruption in 
well concessions (Daoudy 2020; De Châtel 2014). Moreover, the use of inefficient irrigation 
systems was making precious water evaporate while also causing the salination of lands 
(Daoudy 2020). However, groundwater depletion has also been linked to the Turkish policy of 
unilaterally diverting Euphrates water and to the pollution of downstream water coming from 
Turkey, which also contributed to salinisation (Karnieli et al. 2019). 
The drought was thus putting farmers’ livelihoods under strain. What is more, it occurred 
while the regime was embarking on a precipitous economic liberalisation. The abrupt cut in state 
subsidies strongly affected the rural population. For instance, Marwa Daoudy observes that when 
the fuel subsidies were removed in 2008, just before the harvest, “diesel fuel prices rose 
approximately 350 percent. . . . This price spike coincided with farmers’ increased need to pump 
water because of declining soil moisture and precipitation from drought, and farmers needed the 
diesel to run their pumps” (Daoudy 2020, p. 158). Subsidies for chemical fertiliser were also cut 
in 2008, resulting in price increases of 200–450 percent. Several farmers could not sustain their 
livelihoods and left. It has been estimated that around 60–70 percent of villages in Hassake and 
Deir ez-Zor provinces were abandoned, as well as 160–220 villages in the Jazira province 
(Daoudy 2020, p. 160). The cumulative effects of drought and economic liberalisation led to an 
unprecedented rise in internal displacement: while seasonal internal migration had long been 
common, entire families were now forced to move in search of an alternative livelihood (De 
Châtel 2014, pp. 526–27). 
The Syrian state chose to implement reckless economic policies. However, economic 
liberalisation was strongly encouraged by Western states. It has been noted that the EU had an 
“unshakable belief that free trade and market-oriented reforms would be the panacea for the 
political, economic and social problems of the Arab partners” (Cavatorta 2020, p. 266). Issues of 
democratisation and human rights had moved to the background, and the Syrian state was being 
pushed on “economic integration through market reforms and free trade, in the hope that a better 
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performing economy would have a democratizing effect on the political system while delivering 
significant economic benefits to the EU” (Cavatorta 2020, p. 264). Macroeconomic indicators 
were taken as evidence of successful economic development, with analysts failing to recognise 
that the impact of such reforms impoverished the great majority of citizens (Cavatorta 2020, p. 
266). 
By 2011, inequality and unemployment had been rising. In addition, endemic corruption 
made bribery a survival-dictated choice for a growing number of Syrians, and pervasive state 
surveillance made it impossible to democratically contest the regime’s policies and its structures. 
Thus, there were strong reasons for Syrians to call for demonstrations. The spark that lit the flame 
was the arrest of a group of schoolchildren in Daraa, accused of having written some graffiti 
against the regime. Demonstrations and sit-ins multiplied in the following days, while the regime 
began to open fire on protesters. As more and more killings, tortures, and arrests were reported, 
the uprising grew. Neither economic nor environment-related claims ranked high in the protesters’ 
demands,125 which concentrated on freedom, dignity, and an end to corruption (De Châtel 2014, 
p. 221). Yet, we should remember that the global North had been proactive in promoting 
inequality-triggering neoliberal policies in Syria while tolerating the regime’s undemocratic and 
repressive strands. Furthermore, I will argue, the global North’s actions contributed to making the 
Syrian uprising an ideal opportunity for regional powers to compete for their geopolitical ends. 
International-relations scholar Christopher Phillips argues that “Syria’s conflict is not a 
domestic civil war that has become a proxy war, but rather had an international dimension from 
its very beginning. This is not to deny agency to either Asad [sic] or his opponents, nor to indulge 
in conspiracy theories that either acted as an agent of a foreign power. The Syrian conflict is 
complex and multiple factors have driven and shaped it. But external factors have played a vital 
role in framing, enabling and facilitating the war from the very start, not just getting sucked in 
 
125 Note, however, that Dara’a province, where the uprising began, had been considerably hit by the drought and there 
were protests revolving specifically around well licensing and groundwater use (De Châtel 2014, p. 225). 
222 
 
later on” (Phillips 2020, p. 38). The United States’ 2003 invasion of Iraq and its failure to create a 
stable post-Saddam democracy had a huge impact by upsetting the fragile regional balance of 
power. The major beneficiary was Iran, which bolstered its relations with Iraq’s Shi’a majority—
who used to be marginalised under Saddam Hussein’s regime—as well as with the Syrian Alawite, 
heterodox-Shi’a regime. This frightened (Sunni) Saudi Arabia, whose arms imports from the 
United States dramatically increased between 2004 and 2011 (Phillips 2020, p. 39). Betts and 
Collier concede that “occasionally, refugee movements do involve direct Western complicity—
Vietnam, Kosovo, and Iraq, for example”, but they claim that this is not the case with Syria (Betts 
and Collier 2017, pp. 99–100). On the contrary, Phillips notes that “even the expectation of 
external support from domestic actors can lead them to favour violence over compromise. This 
clearly happened in Syria”. He deems the US position contradictory: despite wanting to step back 
from the region, in 2011 US president Obama “repeatedly used the language of the dominant 
power towards Asad. Similarly, a year later, in August 2012 he famously threatened Asad not to 
cross a ‘red line’ on chemical weapons use” (Phillips 2020, p. 42). The expectation of a 
forthcoming US military intervention prompted Iran to send military support to the Assad regime. 
The same happened with Russia, which also feared that a pro-US Syria would deprive Russia of 
its geopolitical influence and of its naval base on the Mediterranean. On the anti-Assad front, Saudi 
Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey began training and arming the insurgents, expecting the United States 
to intervene against Assad as it had just done in Libya (Phillips 2020, p. 42). Hinnebusch agrees 
that “seeming to promise intervention and then failing to do so in the Syrian case created the worse 
of all scenarios” (Hinnebusch 2020, p. 9). 
Meanwhile, EU states were divided on whether weapons should be sent to the insurgents 
and agreed on pursuing the economic-sanctions route to express condemnation of the regime’s 
repression, initially advocating reforms and later demanding that Assad resign. Economic 
sanctions were also meant to financially weaken the regime. However, they clearly missed this 
target: Iranian and Russian resources allowed the regime to resist and fight, while economic 
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sanctions—particularly those affecting oil revenues—turned out to be key in the debilitation of the 
state and of its capacity to provide basic services to the population (Hinnebusch 2020, p. 9), thus 
contributing to forced displacement in Syria. 
When a US-led coalition did overtly intervene in Syria, its goal was no longer deposing 
Assad, but rather destroying the self-proclaimed Islamic State (IS) in the rebel-controlled area. 
Indeed, the Syrian insurgency was highly fragmented into several rival secular and Islamist Sunni 
groups, the latter backed by Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey.126 Among them, there were two 
main jihadi groups derived from the Iraqi branch of Al Qaida: Jabhat al-Nusra and the IS group 
(Phillips 2020, p. 44). As the IS began seizing more and more territory in Syria and announced the 
proclamation of a caliphate in 2014, fighting the jihadists became the priority for the United States 
and Europe. Thus, a US-led coalition was formed against the IS. Looking for non-Islamist local 
proxies, the coalition allied with Kurdish rebels (the Syrian Democratic Forces) (Phillips 2020, p. 
44). This further complicated international relations in the anti-Assad front, given that Turkey 
strongly opposed the creation of an independent Kurdistan neighbouring the Turkish border; thus, 
for Turkey, preventing the creation of a Kurdish state took priority over deposing Assad. The 
active military involvement of Russia on the regime’s side, with the use of air bombardment on a 
massive scale, further shifted the power balance in favour of the Assad regime (Hinnebusch 2020, 
p. 11). The Syrian and Russian forces have since then repeatedly and deliberately targeted civilian 
objects (e.g., hospitals) and even employed banned weapons (Human Rights Watch 2021, p. 638). 
Besieged rebel-controlled territories have gradually capitulated, and the regime has now 
reconquered around two-thirds of its territory, yet the conflict has not come to an end. Arguably, 
Assad’s resignation will no longer be an option in future peace talks. 
Some scholars blamed the United States and the EU for failing to intervene against the 
Assad regime, particularly since the regime crossed what Obama had called the “red line” in 
 
126 Phillips reports that “there is evidence that both Qatar and Turkey offered support to Islamist fighters opposed to 
the Free Syria Army, at the same time as they claimed to be backing it” (Phillips 2020, p. 43). 
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employing chemical weapons (Gani 2020, p. 217; Phillips 2020, p. 42). This, they argue, is a 
failure to live up to the responsibility-to-protect doctrine (R2P), which had been used to justify the 
military intervention in Libya shortly before. Thus, we might conclude, the United States and the 
EU have a reparative responsibility towards the victims and the forcibly displaced for their failure 
to militarily intervene against the regime to protect them. However, it should be noted that UN 
Security Council resolutions against Assad were invariably vetoed by Russia and China, which 
suspected R2P could be used as an official cover to mask military intervention driven by strategic 
interests (El-Kebbi 2020, pp. 304, 309, 313). In addition, the military intervention in Libya was 
not succeeding in securing peace or security, let alone democracy. In sum, the consequences of a 
counterfactual military intervention against the Assad regime are difficult to imagine, 
independently of whether it would have been morally justified, and it is not clear whether military 
intervention would be the wiser way to deploy the R2P. 
However, as I have argued in chapter 4, reparative responsibility for forced migration does 
not require moral culpability. Even if not necessarily morally guilty for military inaction, global-
North states, as well as the other external states and local actors, have a reparative responsibility 
for the outcomes they contributed to. This also applies to the US-led coalition’s intervention 
against the IS. Legally, it has been primarily justified as a defence against a non-state actor that 
had been claiming terrorist attacks in the global North (Cohen 2020, p. 17). Morally, it might also 
be justified by referring to the R2P, given the atrocities committed by the IS group, including the 
genocide of the Yazidi minority. Nevertheless, the US-led coalition engaged in air bombardments 
and indisputably directly displaced and killed civilians in Syria,127 though harming civilians might 
not have been done on purpose. In addition, we should recall that thousands of EU citizens joined 
the IS as foreign fighters128 and that the US intervention in Iraq greatly contributed to the 






and the EU cannot claim complete extraneity in the Syrian conflict nor in the plight of the forcibly 
displaced. 
To sum up, I have tried to sketch a picture of the complex interplay of causes of the Syrian 
uprising and the even more complex dynamics of the conflict that followed. My aim has been to 
evaluate the plausibility of externalist and internalist accounts of what lies behind the massive 
forced displacement in Syria and to assess whether host states actually resemble bystanders by the 
pond where Syrians are drowning. I have conceded that externalist accounts attributing the Syrian 
uprising to climate change and the subsequent struggle for water do not seem to effectively make 
sense of the Syrian case and that they excessively downplay the role of the Syrian state in setting 
the preconditions for the Syrian war. Thus, contribution to climate change seems to provide poor 
ground for a general reparative responsibility towards Syrian forced migrants. However, I showed 
that EU diplomatic pressure on the Assad regime to economically liberalise while leaving 
democratisation issues aside did contribute to dissatisfaction among the Syrian population. 
Although surely not an intended outcome, this was still a foreseeable outcome. Moreover, external 
states have played a crucial role since the beginning of the Syrian conflict. Turkey, which hosts 
half of the displaced Syrians, was actively engaged on the rebels’ side; it even allowed foreign 
fighters into IS and financially supported the IS by buying its oil (Hinnebusch 2020, p. 10). Thus, 
it seems puzzling to consider Turkey as an innocent bystander merely owing admission to Syrian 
forced migrants on humanitarian grounds. When it comes to the global North, the US ambivalence 
in the first months of the uprising fuelled the expectation of a forthcoming intervention, 
contributing to a rapid escalation of the civil conflict into a regional one. EU sanctions also 
communicated a willingness to escalate and contributed to the deterioration of the basic services 
in Syria while failing to weaken the ruling elite. Finally, the United States and some EU states also 
engaged militarily in Syria to fight the IS, thus directly provoking victims, destroying buildings, 
and displacing residents. Surely, this time the United States and the EU allies did not initiate the 
war, unlike in Afghanistan and Iraq. They could not be charged for most killings and forced 
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displacement, nor for the forced disappearances, tortures, and illegal weapons deployment 
ascribable to the regime and other states or local actors. However, they do not appear completely 
uninvolved in the conflict either. Notwithstanding the attribution of blame, even in this case the 
United States and the EU states share some collective reparative responsibility for indirectly 
contributing to setting the background conditions and nourishing a conflict that displaced millions 
of people and also bear special reparative responsibility towards those that they directly 
contributed to displacing. 
 
2. A Harms-Based Approach to What Is Owed to Displaced Syrians: A Focus on 
Germany 
The previous section adopted a backwards-looking approach to the issue of responsibility 
for displacement in Syria. The intricate picture I have attempted to sketch supports the claim that 
those states that found themselves confronted with the “refugee crisis” are not completely 
unrelated to the plight of the displaced Syrians. Thus, such states do not merely have a 
humanitarian duty to relieve human sufferings according to their capacity; at least, they bear some 
collective, general reparative responsibility to mitigate the harms of forced displacement given 
their contribution to underlying causes or to the management of the conflict. In addition, some of 
them bear special responsibility towards subsets of forced migrants coming from the areas affected 
by the military operations they have been involved in. The reparative responsibility of these states 
thus varies: Turkey, for instance, seems to have far greater reparative responsibilities than, say, 
Jordan, given its strong involvement in the conflict. Global-North states also have differentiated 
reparative responsibilities, and this may matter in determining their fair share of costs. Assuming 
for a moment admission is a simplified currency for the costs of discharging reparative 
responsibility, Germany, for instance, seems to have taken up the slack by admitting over seven 
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hundred thousand asylum seekers since the beginning of the war,129 while the United States has 
resettled far fewer.130 A fair and exhaustive attribution of costs to each state exceeds the aims of 
this discussion of the Syrian case. Other criteria, along with outcome responsibility, may be worth 
factoring in. However, the point is that a backwards-looking assessment of outcome 
responsibilities matters in determining what kind of moral obligations states have towards Syrian 
forced migrants, which is prior to the determination of their individual shares. 
In what follows, my aim is to consider how a backwards-looking, harms-based approach 
matters to what these forced migrants are owed. My claim is that the distinctive harms involved in 
forced migration should be taken into account to understand what forced migrants need and to 
determine how such needs should be met. A harms-based approach highlights that forced migrants 
do not merely need rescue (i.e., admission to a safe haven and survival). Thus, even those states 
that admitted a large share of Syrian forced migrants did not necessarily meet the needs that those 
forced migrants have as a result of their forced displacement. Moreover, the reasons why states 
address such needs and the way they do so are also crucial in determining whether forced migrants 
are given what they are owed, which is the recognition of and reparation for the harms they 
suffered qua forced migrants. Thus, my harms-based approach helps us to illuminate shortcomings 
even in the most successful cases, where forced migrants’ survival needs are sufficiently 
addressed. To illustrate my argument, I will focus on the case of Syrian forced migrants who have 
been admitted to Germany. As I have already noted, Germany admission policies have been 
particularly inclusive towards Syrian forced migrants, at least at the beginning of the “refugee 
crisis”. Moreover, Germany seems particularly successful in providing assistance to those forced 
migrants who have been admitted. Among the states that host the bulk of the Syrians displaced 
outside their country, Germany has been able to better provide for the needs of Syrian forced 
 
129 By December 2018, 770,000 Syrians had requested asylum in Germany since the beginning of the war 
(Meininghaus and Mielkem 2019, p. 17). 




migrants it admitted, compared to Turkey or Lebanon.131 Germany clearly has greater financial 
and infrastructural capacities than the Levant countries. However, I will show, even prosperous 
Germany did not properly recognise and meet the needs that Syrian forced migrants have qua 
displaced people. A harms-based approach helps to illuminate these needs and to identify where a 
change in policy is needed. 
A harms-based approach highlights that forced migrants do not only need to be saved from 
death. Rather, they have distinctive needs to regain control over their lives, to remake a Home 
environment where their life is predictable and has some meaning, to restore social status, and to 
recover mental health. Those who reached Germany did not travel a long distance in order to 
merely survive, but rather to be able to plan a life again, to find a source of livelihood and decent 
housing with sufficient privacy, and to receive an education or secure an education for their 
children. For Nur and her family, for instance, life in Lebanon was so bad that after two years they 
attempted to return to Aleppo, where unfortunately “things were worse” than when they left. At 
that point, they decided to cross the Aegean and try the Balkan route to Germany. Nur recalls, 
“Once while I was waiting for an appointment in one of the state agencies here I met a journalist. 
She told me, ‘The most important thing is that now you’re safe.’ I told her, ‘But we haven’t come 
looking for safety. We’re not afraid of death.’ And it’s true. We don’t have a problem with death. 
Our problem is life without dignity” (Pearlman 2017). This might seem puzzling if we assume that 
Syrians reached Germany exclusively to flee life threats, such as indiscriminate bombings, or 
persecution. By contrast, as we have seen, forced migrants have specific needs as a result of the 
harms of forced displacement, and they seek the fulfilment of such needs, besides physical 
security. Let us thus turn to the harms-based theory of the specific harms of forced displacement 
and consider whether such needs have been recognised and addressed in the case of Syrian forced 
migrants in Germany. 
 
131 For a comparison with Turkey on labour integration, see, for instance, Okyay 2017. On issues and coping strategies 
in Turkey, see Arenliu et al. 2020. 
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In chapter 2, I have argued that forced migration involves a loss of control over one’s body 
and bodily movement, one’s private space, and one’s future life plan. As a result, forced migrants 
have a specific need to regain control over these fundamental aspects of human existence. As I 
have argued in chapter 3, policies focussed on admission and on the fulfilment of mere survival 
needs do not adequately acknowledge such needs and thus fail to adequately meet them. Indeed, 
they may even further deepen forced migrants’ loss of control. Consider how Germany’s policy 
choices, although generous in providing admission, fell short of adequately meeting Syrian forced 
migrants’ need to regain control. 
During the “refugee crisis”, German policy makers, like many other policy makers, 
academics, and the public, seem to have been moved by a humanitarian ethics of rescue. It was 
imperative to maximise admissions, even though this required emergency temporary shelter. 
Moreover, if what forced migrants needed was merely a safe haven, it did not really matter where 
they were placed. Thus, it appeared rational to adopt a quota system, allocating a share of forced 
migrants to each Land (i.e., federal state) according to the Land’s number of inhabitants and tax 
revenue (Adam et al. 2019, p. 4). In the German system, as a first step, forced migrants are assigned 
to emergency reception facilities in the designated Land for up to six months. Subsequently, again 
based on quotas, the Land’s authorities allocate refugees to the municipalities, where they can 
again be temporarily sheltered in emergency shelters such as sports halls, and then moved to 
collective accommodations such as hotels or prefabricated buildings.132 Only once they receive 
refugee status are they allowed to move to a private dwelling and entitled to social housing (Adam 
et al. 2019, p. 5). To ensure that the distribution among Länder would be respected, it seemed 
rational to impose a residence obligation on forced migrants requiring them to remain in the Land 
(or even the town) they were assigned to. According to the German Residency Act §12a/1, all 
asylum seekers who were accepted as refugees after 1 January 2016 are required to stay in the 
 
132 See Adam et al. 2019, pp. 8–9 on the case of Cologne. 
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Land to which they have been assigned for a period of three years (Damir-Geilsdorf and 
Sabra 2018, p. 17). By June 2018, seven states out of sixteen had implemented additional 
restrictions;133 for instance, the Land of North Rhine–Westphalia (NRW) also required that those 
who are granted refugee status reside in the municipality they were allocated to for three years 
(Adam et al. 2019, p. 5). This was a way to fairly share the burden of hospitality among Länder, 
while also granting forced migrants what they were owed: a safe place where their life was not at 
risk. However, Syrian forced migrants were not just people whose life and human rights were 
threatened in the place of origin. They were first and foremost displaced people, who had been 
deprived of control over their lives and that were struggling to replan their lives anew. Thus, being 
assigned to a Land and obliged to live there for years did not help them to regain control over their 
lives. 
Secondly, the uncertainty, dependency, and lack of information in the asylum process 
perpetuated the loss of control over their near future. A UN report describes the system as “neither 
transparent nor efficient, involving many different bodies that do not communicate with each other 
so that procedures are extremely slow”. This, the report observes, “creates an atmosphere of 
uncertainty and insecurity, of powerlessness and disappointment” (Damir-Geilsdorf and 
Sabra 2018, p. 20). Insufficient information undermines the (limited) sense of control an asylum 
seeker strives to develop about what is expected to happen next. Furthermore, impersonal 
communication can increase a sense of unpredictability and arbitrariness about the whole process. 
An asylum seeker recalls that in the reception centre where he was hosted, the source of 
information was a board: every day, they had to check if their name was on the board to find out 
if they were on the list for a transfer or for any other thing that might be important for them, such 





arguing or posing questions to a board. They used to feel totally helpless and passive in the process 
(See Gürer 2019, p. 63). 
Thirdly, the emergency shelter they received was far from helpful for regaining control 
over their private space. Syrian forced migrants in Germany often found themselves assigned to 
camp beds in a sports hall for many months. Surely, this was originally meant as an emergency, 
short-term-assistance provision. Besides, privacy seems a luxury, compared to physical security. 
However, it is a fundamental need for a person who has been suddenly deprived of it and might 
have already endured its lack for years as an IDP or a forced migrant in a country near Syria. To 
some, it may also be a necessary condition for feeling secure. According to the above-mentioned 
UN report, since “the majority of persons accommodated in sport halls are male, men dominate 
the space while women usually do not have any specific spaces for retreat, and although showers 
are gender segregated, they often cannot be locked” (Damir-Geilsdorf and Sabra 2018, p. 20). The 
lack of privacy obliges women with headscarves to wear them there all the time (Damir-Geilsdorf 
and Sabra 2018, p. 20), as if they were constantly in a public space, rather than their only surrogate 
home. Far from whimsical, a sphere of privacy is a basic human need and its protracted lack is 
extremely stressful for anyone. For a forced migrant who has lost control over their home and 
cannot come back, this is even more harmful and shows a misrecognition of their specific 
condition. What is more, the lack of privacy exposes women to sexual and gender-based violence. 
Indeed, sexual harassment has unfortunately been reported in German reception centres too 
(Damir-Geilsdorf and Sabra 2018, p. 20) and not only in camps in the global South. 
Along with the need to regain control, Syrian forced migrants struggle to re-create a Home 
environment. As I argued in chapter 2, a Home environment does not only require a home, 
understood as a relatively stable physical space allowing sufficient personal privacy. A Home 
environment is also made of a web of reliable social connections, spatial landmarks allowing one 
to orient themselves in space, and intelligible and predictable social norms and routines. A Home 
environment is a place that provides a sufficient sense of stability, where planning for the future is 
232 
 
possible, even though the plan may involve moving elsewhere or eventually returning to the place 
of origin.  
It should be noted that Germany has been offering language courses and cultural-
integration courses to many Syrian forced migrants. However, these courses are not offered as a 
way to meet the need to re-create a Home environment for those who have lost it. Rather, the 
reason to provide such courses is to promote employment and the cultural assimilation of those 
who are likely to become permanent—or at least long-term—members of German society. Indeed, 
language and cultural-integration courses are provided not to all forced migrants, but only to those 
who have already been granted refugee status, or at most to those who have a high chance of 
receiving it (Okyay 2017, p. 6). Even more neglected is the need to orient themselves in space, 
given that forced migrants are allocated to municipalities they often did not know and can be 
moved repeatedly from one reception facility to another.  
Again, it seems that as long as physical security is provided, forced migrants are given 
what they are owed, qua forced migrants. Only if they eventually settled in Germany, qua society 
members, would they be entitled to language and cultural-integration support, in order to 
assimilate in and benefit society instead of burdening it. Thus, during the exhausting wait for a 
decision on their status,134 forced migrants are not thought to be owed support to orient themselves 
in Germany when adjusting to unfamiliar places and habits and mitigating the disorientation that 
comes from being forced to flee their previous Home environment for an indefinite time, perhaps 
forever.  
While voluntary migrants would also benefit from language courses and integration 
support, they have not lost their Home environment: they deliberately left it behind and could in 
principle go back to it if they decided to. Syrian forced migrants, instead, usually had no intention 
 
134 In 2016, the average length of an asylum application was seven months from lodging an application to receiving a 
decision. When the waiting time between arrival and getting an appointment with the Federal Office for Migration 




to leave Syria before they were forced to. Iman, a female engineer from Harasta, sadly remarks, 
“We had just gotten married and lived only two months in our new home before we had to abandon 
it. I’d chosen everything in the house with such care: the furniture, the curtains, the colors of the 
walls” (Pearlman 2017). To her, forced displacement clearly came as a sudden disruption of her 
life plan, and adjusting to a new Home environment is a painful necessity, rather than a challenge 
worth undertaking to pursue a migration plan. In sum, an enforced protracted wait for a residence 
permit with little support for re-creating a Home environment in the meantime evinces a 
misrecognition of the distinctive condition forced migrants found themselves in as a result of 
displacement. 
To re-create a Home environment, human relations are at least as important as orientation, 
discernability, and predictability of the outside world. Along with developing positive contacts 
with members of the new society, forced migrants’ effort to re-create a Home environment usually 
involves reunification with family members and friends from their previous Home environment. 
Indeed, family life is conceived of by most migration theorists and policy makers as a central 
aspect of human life, and family reunification is understood to be a right in the EU,135 albeit a 
qualified one. However, German policy choices in dealing with Syrian forced migrants 
significantly hindered family reunification, not only with family members remaining in Syria or 
in neighbouring countries, but even with those who made it to Germany but had been assigned to 
a different Land. 
The right to family reunification, in Germany, only applies to spouses and minor children 
and is restricted to those who are granted asylum (according to article 16a of the German Basic 
Law) or refugee status (according to the Geneva Convention). However, since 2016 the percentage 
of Syrians granted refugee status has dropped vertiginously. While in 2015 nearly 95 percent of 
Syrian applicants received asylum, in 2016 the winds had already changed and just around 56 
 




percent did, while 40 percent received subsidiary protection and could not apply for family 
reunification.136 Many of them “had already spent a year or more waiting for receiving the refugee 
status that would allow them to apply for family reunification and were shocked to discover they 
were not allowed to” (Damir-Geilsdorf and Sabra 2018). Indeed, given the risks of irregular 
migration and the price of passage, often men had travelled alone with the idea of bringing in 
safely the rest of the family once in Germany. For those who received the refugee status and could 
apply for family reunification, bureaucratic obstacles had still to be overcome. 
The procedure would look reasonable if refugees’ family members were leading a peaceful 
life in a well-functioning state, but they turn out to be rather sadistic if we consider the actual life 
conditions of Syrians. The person who has been granted refugee status in Germany can file an 
application for family reunification with the Foreign Office via a special online system within 
three months of notification of their protection status. In addition, however, family members 
abroad have to apply online for an appointment to submit their own written applications and have 
a personal interview at a German embassy. This is particularly complicated and risky for those 
who have remained in Syria, including IDPs: given the closure of the German embassy in 
Damascus, they have to reach the embassy in a neighbouring country, such as Turkey, Jordan, or 
Lebanon. This not only requires the visa to be obtained in time, but it also involves multiple 
checkpoint crossings in a country at war. Moreover, it may take several months before the 
appointment is made. After the interview, family members have to go back to Syria or to their 
current places of residence and wait again, since the processing of the submitted files may require 
several more months. 
For the whole duration of the process, they need a valid telephone number and an e-mail 
address to be able to communicate with the embassy, as if they were waiting tranquilly in their 
 
136 See Damir-Geilsdorf and Sabra 2018. In Germany, family reunification for people with subsidiary protection has 
been alternatingly allowed and denied. Since 2018, it has been allowed, up to a limit of a thousand people per month 
(see Brücker et al. 2019, p. 25). 
235 
 
living room in Berlin, instead of being crammed with other IDPs in dilapidated houses, sleeping 
in a tent in a camp, or living in a precarious urban shelter in a Levant country. What is more, 
collecting the required documents can entail life risks or be totally impossible. According to a UN 
report, “There are documented cases of women with children who had to leave relatively secure 
shelters in Turkey and travel back to Syria to renew their passports” (Damir-Geilsdorf and 
Sabra 2018). Personal-status documents such as marriage or birth certificates, the report continues, 
“are not only required to be translated into English or German but also need a pre-certification 
stamp from the Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs that has to be issued no later than 2012” (Damir-
Geilsdorf and Sabra 2018). This is quite ironic, given that applicants may live in rebel-controlled 
areas or be targeted as opponents by the regime. In addition, those documents may simply not 
exist. “I got married in 2013 when I was in a rebel-held area. How am I supposed to get a marriage 
certificate?”, wonders Zein (Damir-Geilsdorf and Sabra 2018). Stateless displaced people from 
Syria (including members of “maktum” Kurdish minorities), who are faced with similar problems, 
need to take a DNA test at the embassy.137 
It might be argued that granting the right to family reunification to all Syrian forced 
migrants would create significant additional economic and social costs for Germany, given that it 
would entail admitting a large number of additional forced migrants. However, the sudden drop in 
the percentage of refugee-status recognitions seems to suggest a morally problematic exploitation 
of the arbitrariness of the process to both reduce the likelihood of permanent settlement among 
admitted forced migrants and curtail the number of newly admitted ones by impeding family 
reunification. Furthermore, German policies have hindered family reunification even among those 
family members who were already on German territory. Indeed, family members who had arrived 
separately could be allocated to different Länder. That was, for instance, the case of Siwar, who 
 
137 See McGee 2019. Note that “Syria has long been reported as hosting one of the largest stateless populations in the 
world. According to figures from the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR), prior to the 2011 conflict, Syria had 
a population of approximately 300,000 stateless individuals, mostly Kurds from the north-eastern Governorate of 
Hassaka. . . . In addition to those included in UNHCR statistics, more than half a million stateless Palestinian refugees 
had been habitually resident in Syria prior to the outbreak of the conflict” (McGee 2019, p. 8). 
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arrived in Germany a year and a half after her husband and was sent to a shelter about 100 km 
away from him (Damir-Geilsdorf and Sabra 2018, p. 16). In addition, given the narrow 
understanding of the family-member definition, children above eighteen, aunts, uncles, and 
grandparents do not count as family members. Taking into account more extended family relations 
and the presence of family members who had already arrived in Germany while distributing Syrian 
forced migrants among Länder would have allowed forced migrants to re-create a web of 
significative social relations in the new environment without admitting additional forced migrants 
or entailing significant extra costs for Germany. 
Consider now the need to recover mental well-being. Such need derives from the loss of 
mental well-being which, as we have seen in chapter 2, is the psychological consequence of the of 
the specific harms of forced displacement coupled with the violence that often triggers, 
accompanies, and follows forced displacement. Obstacles to regaining control over one’s life and 
to rebuilding a Home environment, including being unable to reunite with family members, further 
undermine mental health in forced migrants, who have already experienced traumatic events 
connected with forced displacement and often with perilous journeys. Psychological research 
indicates that “besides the traumatic experiences at home or whilst fleeing their country, 
resettlement in a new country may also put refugees under great strain and have a powerful impact 
on mental health” (Borho et al. 2020). Indeed, “post-migration experiences often tend to be more 
detrimental to refugees’ mental health than pre-migration traumatic events and . . . the post-
migration environment plays a key role in either fostering or impeding recovery from trauma” 
(Borho et al. 2020). 
Syrian forced migrants, in line with other forced migrants, show a higher prevalence of 
depression, anxiety, and PTSD than the host populations. Furthermore, the first follow-up study 
on Syrian forced migrants carried out in Germany found that the mental health of respondents had 
not improved after a year and a half. In that sample, “26.9% fulfilled the criteria for a clinically 
relevant depression diagnosis, 16.7% for a generalised anxiety disorder and 13.9% for PTSD at 
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T1. Approximately 1.5 years later (at T2), these prevalence rates hardly changed and were 30.6% 
for depression, 15.7% for generalized anxiety and 13.0% for PTSD” (Borho et al. 2020). 
Unexpectedly, at T2, “a significant increase of having experienced and/or witnessed traumatic 
events as well as in the number of traumatic events mentioned was found” (Borho et al. 2020). 
Memories of traumatic experiences thus seemed to become more pervasive instead of fading away 
with a longer duration of stay in Germany. This could be linked with the insufficient mental health 
support that Syrian forced migrants receive, even in Germany. Among the respondents to the 
above-mentioned study, only 6.5 percent at T1 and 7.4 percent at T2 reported having already 
received psychological help (Borho et al. 2020). Lack of information, language barriers, and 
stigmatisation of psychological distress seem to be the most cited obstacles to receiving mental 
health support (Borho et al. 2020; El Khoury 2019; Hassan et al. 2016). El Khoury claims that 
since “seeking counselling is foreign to the Syrian culture”, it is “important to spread awareness 
about the normality of seeking counselling and to tone down the thoughts that stigmatise those 
who seek psychological help.” Secondly, “more Arabic speaking counsellors are needed” to allow 
forced migrants to “express themselves and receive counselling in their own mother tongues” (El 
Khoury 2019 p. 77). 
Poor mental health, particularly depression, has also been linked to the loss of social status, 
which, as we have seen in chapter 2, is one of the distinctive harms involved in forced migration. 
Indeed, researchers in psychology acknowledge that the fact of “realising that they ‘have lost 
everything’ including their social standing and control over several aspects of their lives” has a 
severe detrimental impact on the mental health of forced migrants. A study investigated downward 
mobility in subjective social status among a sample of male Syrian forced migrants in Germany. 
Among respondents perceived social status in Germany was considerably lower compared to 
social status in Syria, indicating overall subjective downward social mobility. Moreover, the study 
revealed that those “who experienced stronger subjective downward social mobility exhibit more 
severe depressive symptoms and were more likely to fulfill [sic] provisional DSM-IV criteria for 
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a diagnosis of Major Depression” (Euteneuer and Schäfer 2018). This highlights that forced 
migrants, including Syrians in Germany, have a distinctive and strong need to regain social status. 
Having an employment which secures a source of livelihood is a key component in the 
process of regaining social status. Germany has designed programmes to train Syrian forced 
migrants so that they can enter the highly specialised German labour market. Vocational training, 
along with language, is a prerequisite to become a specialised worker and apply for a job in 
Germany. However, the length of the process of language acquisition and training can be highly 
frustrating for adult forced migrants who lost their previous jobs and have been forced to start a 
career anew. Some opt out of the training and start looking for an unqualified job, even in the 
informal labour market, to rapidly achieve economic self-sufficiency.138  
It would be important to check the provenance of Syrian forced migrants (their urban or 
rural place of origin), the sociocultural milieu, and their previous job both in allocating them to 
German municipalities inside Länder and in orienting them in the job market. A facilitated, faster 
entry into the job market and a more careful, fine-grained match between forced migrants’ 
individual background and job opportunities might help to reduce dropout from training. 
Moreover, it would also reduce potential marginalisation and deviance among those who 
abandoned the path they were set on, which would otherwise result in considerable costs for the 
receiving society. Furthermore, it would both express the recognition of the harm of losing one’s 
place in the society of origin and support them to regain social status and to reduce mental health 
conditions such as depression. By contrast, if employment policies remain overwhelmingly 
oriented towards using forced-migrant labourers to fill the gaps in the labour market according to 
the host-country needs only, they fail to recognise the specificity of forced migrants. Indeed, Syrian 






deprived of their jobs, as well as of the socially recognised roles they used to have in their Home 
environment. 
In addition to the recognition of their individual skills and social identities, as we have 
seen, forced migrants need recognition of their forced-displacement condition, of the harms 
involved in displacement, and, as is usually the case, of the injustices behind displacement. In the 
case of Germany, accommodation based on the quota system reveals an insufficient 
acknowledgement of the reasons why Syrians were displaced and why many of them began to 
demonstrate in the first place. As a Syrian refugee in Germany remarked, “Many people see 
refugees as people who popped up in the Mediterranean. For many people, the story begins only 
in the Mediterranean in boats” (Ragab and Antara 2018, p. 19). The lack of a backwards-looking 
approach leads to neglect of crucial political and cultural differences among Syrian forced 
migrants. Many of them supported the revolution, others supported the regime, and others wished 
to not take sides but were caught up in the fight and forced to move. Insurgency supporters are 
also highly diversified and include Arabs as well as Kurds, supporters of a secular state as well as 
Islamists whose claims for justice involve the appeal for giving to the Islamic law a stronger public 
role. Given that Syrian forced migrants are far from a uniform group and given that political and 
cultural differences have been made salient during the conflict, enforced cohabitation may be tense 
if not conflictual. Consider Zein’s testimony: 
Zein and her husband first stayed for six months in shared accommodation with wooden walls between 
families’ beds and were then transferred to a small three-room flat in a little village [in Germany] at the Belgium 
border that they have to share with two other couples. Zein describes not only the previous distressing lack of privacy: 
“Since one year my husband and I have never been alone in a house and I find it hard that I never can be alone in a 
room,” but also the equally distressing social control in the new accommodation by their fellow residents. One of the 
two couples is very religious and criticizes her for neither praying nor wearing a veil, while the other couple are 
enthusiastic supporters of the Assad regime: “They represent exactly what made me flee and now I have to live with 
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Thus, when treated as an undifferentiated mass of needy people in search of food and shelter, 
forced migrants are not recognised in their nuanced pre-displacement social identities that may 
well have been salient to the causes of displacement itself. 
A further crucial component of the process of regaining social status is the recognition of 
Syrian forced migrants’ testimonial and agential capacities, particularly in helping to construct a 
narrative of how they came to be displaced, what the uprising was aiming at, and how the conflict 
was felt on the ground, as well as to determine what peace would require and under what conditions 
return would be feasible and morally acceptable. As for peace and dignified return, Syrian forced 
migrants have so far been largely excluded from official peace talks or negotiations. Concerning 
narratives, given that global-North states have directed their military efforts against the IS, the 
media have contributed to backing the Syrian regime’s narrative, which depicts the conflict as a 
confrontation between the Syrian state and terrorists. This negates the complexity of Syrian 
insurgency groups and obscures the legitimate claims raised during the uprising. Nevertheless, it 
is worth noting that German civil society has supported the creation of civil society organisations 
among Syrian forced migrants, aimed at spreading testimonies of Syrian forced migrants 
themselves or advocating enhancing human rights and democratisation and justice more broadly 
in postwar Syria (see Meininghaus and Mielkem 2019).  
Displaced Syrian activists seem to be particularly interested in truth and justice, understood 
primarily as retributive justice. Indeed, they have continued spreading images and videos by 
citizen journalists who remained in Syria and have protested against widespread immunity 
regarding the human rights violations and crimes against humanity perpetrated by the regime’s 
army and by other militias. German courts have started cooperating in identifying and prosecuting 
 
139 Damir-Geilsdorf and Sabra 2018, pp. 20–21. 
241 
 
individual criminals, appealing to the principle of universal jurisdiction (Kaleck and Kroker 2018). 
A few trials have been initiated, and one has recently come to an end in the conviction of a low-
ranking officer in the Syrian intelligence service to four and a half years of detention.140 Along 
with contributing to accountability for individual criminal responsibility, however, global-North 
states should also investigate the responsibilities of those corporations based in the global North 
that contributed to or profited from the protracted conflict (Kaleck and Kroker 2018, p. 167). 
Furthermore, global-North states should acknowledge their own outcome responsibilities for 
contributing to killing and displacing Syrian civilians and for destroying properties. This would 
not mean taking on the bulk of moral responsibility for the civil conflict or denying individual 
responsibilities for identifiable crimes. Yet, it would contribute to the overall effort of 
reconstructing truth, and it would allow states to provide reparations to the affected Syrian 
civilians. Instead, the US-led coalition has so far been downplaying its outcome responsibilities, 
minimising casualties and harms deriving from the air strikes, thus providing very limited 
reparations conceived of exclusively as material compensation.141 
I have argued so far that a backwards-looking, harms-based approach allows us to better 
identify what is owed to forced migrants in receiving countries and to evaluate the extent to which 
a state that has admitted many forced migrants has also been able to recognise and fulfil the specific 
needs deriving from the harms of forced displacement. Finally, such an approach has important 
implications concerning justice in return as well. As I have already argued in chapter 4, return 
itself is not a solution to forced displacement; forced migrants still need to regain control over their 
lives, to re-create a Home environment, to secure a source of livelihood and a role in society, and 
to overcome the mental health issues deriving from forced displacement and migration abroad. 







a return, but another migration to a new Home environment which might be completely unknown 
to the returnee. Besides, after a ten-year conflict Syrian towns are in ruins, and the same goes for 
the economy, education, and health services. Thus, returning to Syria may mean moving to an 
unknown place offering hardly any opportunity to rebuild lives once again. Even coming back to 
the exact place of origin does not actually mean “returning”. Obviously, pre-displacement house, 
job and social status are usually unattainable. Moreover, the pre-displacement Home environment 
may no longer exist. Indeed, the social fabric may have dramatically changed, given the high 
number of people who have died, have emigrated, or have settled there in the meantime. Turkey 
is believed to have encouraged or even forced thousands of Syrians to return to Syria and to settle 
in the provinces bordering Turkey and taken from the control of the Kurdish rebels (Yüksel and 
van Veen 2019, p. 9). This is part of a process of ethnic substitution in a formerly Kurdish-majority 
area of Syria, aimed to prevent the creation of an autonomous Kurdish state which could strengthen 
the autonomy claims of Kurds in Turkey (Yüksel and van Veen 2019). For these returnees, moving 
to Syria does not mean coming back to a familiar environment, nor would it mean it for previous 
residents after the massive arrival of these newcomers.  
Germany has not promoted return as a means of ethnic substitution. However, Germany 
should take into account the changes undergone in Syria in the last decade and should not expect 
that a decrease in open hostility would make return feasible and morally acceptable. Thus, it should 
not only refrain from forcibly deporting Syrian forced migrants whose temporary protection is due 
to expire. It should not incentivise voluntary return either if the material and social conditions in 
the place of origin would likely compel the forced migrant to leave again and end up internally 
displaced. Instead, as part of the US-led coalition, Germany should contribute a share of 
reconstruction aid to airstrike-affected communities and, as leading member of the EU, to Syrian 
communities more broadly. This would eventually help to create the conditions for forced 
migrants’ needs to be increasingly addressable in the place of origin and could gradually make 





The previous two chapters have contextualised the theoretical frame provided in Part I 
pointing to cases of forced migration that have been largely overlooked in normative political 
theory. Indeed, such cases do not raise pressing issues for the ethics of immigration policies in 
Western counties. By contrast, this final chapter has aimed to illustrate how a backwards-looking 
harms-based approach to what is owed to forced migrants also allows us to reframe a widely 
discussed case of forced migration, namely the Syrian one. Over six million Syrian are currently 
displaced outside Syria. Over the last decade, hundreds of thousands pursued onward migration 
towards Europe and sought admission to EU states, facing immigration restrictions. Thus, the 
Syrian case raised ethical debates and stimulated reflection among political theorists.  
In this case, a backwards-looking harms-based approach can play two important functions. 
Firstly, it allows us to rethink the kind of responsibility that states bear towards forced migrants. 
Secondly, it highlights what Syrian forced migrants need besides or after admission to a safe state. 
I have argued that external states, including the US and EU states are not completely innocent 
bystanders bearing a humanitarian duty of rescue, because they directly or indirectly contributed 
to conflict and forced displacement in Syria, even though the bulk of responsibility rests on the 
country of origin. Furthermore, I have shown that Syrian forced migrants, qua forced migrants, do 
not merely need a safe haven and the fulfilment of basic survival needs. Focussing on Germany, 
which admitted the largest number of Syrian forced migrants among EU states, I have illustrated 
the importance of acknowledging the harms of displacement to assess what forced migrants need. 
Indeed, even wealthy Germany has not yet properly recognised and addressed the needs of forced 
migrants, since its policy has been based on a humanitarian picture of Syrian forced migrants as 





The ethics of migration is a growing field of enquiry for political theorists. This thesis has 
argued that forced migrants have distinctive moral claims compared to other people on the move. 
Furthermore, such claims are shared by both international and internal forced migrants (i.e., IDPs). 
Thus, IDPs should not be conflated with non-migrant people in need, such as the global poor. 
Forced migrants, I have contended, are neither just migrants, nor just needy, destitute people. They 
are people who have suffered distinctive harms and have developed distinctive needs, compared 
to both populations. The harms of displacement undermine in a specific way the fundamental 
interests that all human beings share in having place and purpose, which provide the conditions 
for a dignified, minimally flourishing life. Thus, forced migrants have distinctive claim rights, 
analogous to human rights, to the fulfilment of the needs that derive from the harms of 
displacement. What is more, I have argued, the harms of displacement are usually attributable to 
human actions, man-made structures and processes. While displacement is not necessarily the 
product of injustice, it usually is in our non-ideal world. Thus, agents whose actions caused 
displacement or contributed to processes and structures causing displacement bear reparative 
responsibility towards those who have been harmed by displacement. Therefore, meeting the needs 
of forced migrants is not just a matter of humanitarian obligations, or obligations of charity, but 
rather an issue of justice. 
This work offers both methodological and substantive contributions to the ethics of forced 
migration, with the aim of fostering the recognition of forced migrants qua forced migrants. On 
the side of methodology, this thesis has attempted to reframe forced migration by addressing it 
from a different angle. Normative theorists usually approach forced migration from within the 
debate on admission policies, having already assumed or argued for an ethics of admission policies 
for voluntary migrants. The normative question of who should be admitted precedes and guides 
conceptualisation, shaping both the existence and the extension of categories of non-voluntary 
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migrants and what such migrants owed.  As a result, normative attention focuses on forced 
migrants as admission claimants. By contrast, I have attempted to rethink what is peculiar about 
being a forced migrant independently of whether forced migrants face closed borders and to 
deepen our understanding of what is owed to forced migrants besides admission. Thus, I have not 
assumed any ethics of admission policies and I have avoided identifying forced migrants with the 
neediest admission claimants. Although border policies and practices can make a crucial difference 
in migrants’ lives, the plight of forced migrants begins before they reach a border and may continue 
even when border crossing is allowed. My main research question has been: “Is there anything 
common to the experiences of those who have clearly been forced to migrate, anything which 
grounds the normative salience of the forced migration concept?”. I have adopted a 
phenomenological approach, conceived as an approach that starts from the lived experience of 
forced migrants to identify what makes it distinctively harmful. While some harms may well 
depend on borders being closed, I have purposefully tried to elucidate harms that do not derive 
closed borders and externalised borders. This led me to devote more attention to those forced 
migrants for whom admission is not an issue, because they are internally displaced within their 
country or are legally permitted to move across borders. Therefore, the methodological approach 
I adopted prompted me to enlarge the scope of the ethics of forced migration, bringing light to less 
explored categories of forced migrants such as IDPs. 
Given the methodological choice of beginning the enquiry from an exploration of the 
distinctive harms of forced migration, this thesis has also proposed novel substantive contributions 
to the normative debates on what is owed to forced migrants, what kind of obligations states have 
towards forced migrants and whether other agents besides states have any obligations. Concerning 
what is owed to forced migrants, I have offered a harms-based theory of forced migrants’ needs 
and rights. I have argued that forced migrant are not just owed safety and eventually political 
membership in a state which protects human rights. Indeed, forced migrants are not just people 
whose basic human rights are unprotected because they lack an effective citizenship. Non-
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displaced people may lack effective citizenship and human rights protection as well. By contrast, 
forced migrants have additional specific rights because they have suffered specific additional 
harms that result in specific needs. Forced migrants’ needs, I have argued, are as fundamental as 
those protected by human rights, because the harms of forced displacement undermine the 
fundamental conditions for a dignified life. However, what is at stake are needs which only arise 
when someone is displaced and thus are not captured by general human rights. This has potential 
normative, legal, and policy implications for the responses to forced migrants’ needs in their 
country of origin and in global South host countries, which are typically meant to fulfil basic 
human rights through humanitarian assistance or development aid. Moreover, it has implications 
for the responses to forced migrants’ needs after admission after admission to countries of the 
global North. 
In line with the harms-based account of forced migrants needs, I have proposed a 
backwards-looking, harms-based approach to responsibility for forced migration. While 
humanitarian responsibility to help does not depend on how the need for help came about, I have 
argued that looking at the hams generating forced migrants’ needs allow us to see whether such 
harms are attributable to agents and thus whether there are reparative responsibilities. I have argued 
that, along with states of origin, external states and non-state actors bear special reparative 
responsibility when directly forcing people to migrate. In addition, states collectively bear a 
general reparative responsibility when they contributed to structures or processes, such as climate 
change, which force people to migrate. This has implications concerning the ground of obligations 
agents have towards forced migrants and their strength, given that duties of justice to remedy harm 
are stronger than humanitarian duties of beneficence and are not equally affected by the nearer or 
farer physical location of the forced migrant. 
Based on the harms-based account of needs and on the backwards-looking account of 
responsibility I have offered, I have proposed three normative principles for an ethics of policy 
responses to forced migration. Firstly, policies should be specific: namely, they should recognise 
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forced migrants’ distinctive condition. Just policies should target the specific needs that depend 
on the harms of displacement. Thus, such policies should be either formulated ad-hoc or be 
sufficiently sensitive to forced migrants’ needs. Secondly, justice in forced migration requires 
continuity: the specificity of forced migrants’ condition should be taken into account since the 
beginning of displacement until its end. Temporary assistance policies, thus, should not be limited 
to basic survival needs without taking into account the specific needs that derive from the harms 
of displacement. When these harms are not acknowledged, temporary assistance may even 
perpetuate and worsen such harms. Moreover, the specific needs of forced migrants should not be 
assumed to cease when a durable solution is reached: even when forced migrants are allowed to 
remain in a host country, to resettle elsewhere or to return, they do not find themselves in the same 
condition of non-displaced fellow residents or other newcomers. Thus, they should still be entitled 
to receive targeted support until the harms of displacement cease to impact on their needs. Finally, 
justice in forced migration requires that the harms of displacement be explicitly recognised. Not 
only social services should express this recognition by targeting provisions. Non-material policies 
should be adopted to express this recognition, fostering the reconstruction of truth on the causes 
of displacement and helping forced migrants to obtain the epistemic resources to make sense of 
their experience.  
This project leaves open several paths for possible future research. Since my aim has been 
to focus on what justice in forced migration requires besides admission, my backwards-looking 
account of responsibility does not deal with obligations to admit or resettle. While the lack of 
engagement with the admission debate might strike as an obvious limit of the thesis, it is also one 
of its strengths. Methodologically, the thesis is aimed to avoid being burdened and oriented by the 
principles of an ethics of migration that deals with the admission of voluntary migrants. As a result, 
its normative conclusions are in principle acceptable by both closed-borders defenders and open-
borders advocates. However, a theorist defending or realistically assuming states’ right to exclude 
might derive implications for admission and resettlement policies as well. Indeed, states having 
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individual, special reparative responsibilities to repair the harms of forced migrants may well be 
argued to have special obligations to admit or resettle those forced migrants that arrive at their 
borders or apply for resettlement. Furthermore, one might also assign to states having collective, 
general responsibilities differentiated shares of obligations to admit or resettle taking into account 
their relative power or relative contribution to the process or structure that caused forced 
displacement. 
A second important issue this thesis does not engage with is non-compliance. The thesis 
has adopted a realistic approach to the forced migration phenomenon, trying to convey a realistic 
picture of the harms and needs experienced by forced migrants. Yet, it is a work in ideal theory 
since it is interested in what justice requires in principle, i.e., in what forced migrants are owed, in 
who owes forced migrants what they are owed and in what principles should guide just policies. 
Assuming this ideal framework, one might turn to the issue of non-compliance and thus move to 
non-ideal theory. Indeed, one might argue, there are feasibility issues in ensuring that states assume 
their special reparative responsibility for their individual contributions to forced displacement and 
in determining fair shares in the case of collective, general reparative responsibility. The question 
of whether non-responsible or less responsible states should take up the slack would thus remain. 
Furthermore, my account stresses the fact that reparative responsibility extends to IDPs and forced 
migrants hosted in other countries. This could raise implementation issues, given that these forced 
migrants are under the jurisdiction of another state who might choose not to cooperate in 
dispensing targeted and continuous services to forced migrants even when the responsible external 
state complied in funding such services and in providing non-material reparations. Additional 
issues of non-compliance would arise if one extended the backwards-looking account of 
responsibility to admission and resettlement policies.  
A third issue I have not dealt with is historical responsibility for forced migration. My 
backwards-looking account of responsibility, indeed, has taken recent past into account since it is 
interested in how and why forced migrants have been harmed. It has considered proximate sources 
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of coercion and deceit and has attempted to inscribe them in the context of larger political, social 
and economic relations. However, it has not looked back to historical injustice proper. For 
instance, it has not taken into account colonial legacies and the responsibilities that former 
colonisers may have in setting the conditions for current displacement triggers. Extending 
backwards-looking responsibility to historical injustice would be consistent with my approach and 
it is an interesting direction that future research could take. Moreover, on might note, throughout 
the thesis I have focussed on forced migrants who have themselves been displaced, rather than on 
the descendants of forced migrants. Of course, displaced persons’ children or even grandchildren 
may endure harms that depend on their parents or grandparents’ displacement. This is evident in 
cases of people who have been born in refugee camps and have been spending their whole life 
there. However, I maintain that the harms and needs experienced by those who are forced to 
migrate differ from the harms and needs experienced by descendants. While such harms and needs 
and subsequent reparative responsibilities might be worth philosophical consideration, I leave 
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